On 14 February, Gwilliam was forced to split up No. 3 ACC, in order to render assistance to the various fighting patrols of the 1st SA Bde. Pienaar’s main effort was directed at capturing Gobwen; however, he ordered Gwilliam’s No. 2 Platoon to take up a position astride the Gobwen-Chisimaio road to prevent the Gobwen garrison from escaping.367 An armoured car section, under command of Lt L.S. Steyn, assisted the Carbineers in preventing a number of Italian troops from retreating north, and subsequently capturing a number of them.368 The armoured cars of No. 2 Platoon had meanwhile encountered an Italian minefield on the Gobwen-Chisimaio road which, after being reported to brigade headquarters, was destroyed by the engineers. By the afternoon, Gwilliam’s No. 1 Platoon led the advance of the 22nd EA Bde into Chisimaio without encountering any Italian
365
DOD Archives, WD, Box 300, File –12 AFR DIV Extracts from War Diaries. Extract from Appendices to 12 (A) Div War Diary for February 1941- Notes on Conference prior to launch of Juba Ops – Jan 1941.
366
Orpen, East Africa and Abyssinian Campaigns, p. 202.
367
DOD Archives, WD, Box 300, File –12 AFR DIV Extracts from War Diaries. 12th African Division Report on the Operations in Italian Somaliland Feb – Mar 1941.
368
DOD Archives, WD, Box 220, File – A1-5 1RNC. War Diary 1st Royal Natal Carbineers February 1941.
opposition.369 Pienaar realised that something was awry, when hardly any determined Italian resistance was encountered along the Chisimaio sector of operations. The South African attack on Gobwen was a disjointed affair. The South Africans spent most of the night marching across difficult terrain and relied exclusively on the tanks of No. 1 LTC to secure their route of advance through the thick thorn bush which was ever present. The tanks acted as bulldozers during the night’s advance on Gobwen, with scenes reminiscent of the attack on El Wak only two months before. On the morning of 14 February, the South Africans occupied Gobwen without a shot fired.370
The Italian garrison of Kismayu, with the troops until recently in occupation of Gobwen, retreated successfully across the Juba River during the night of 13/14 February. The South African troops, upon occupying Gobwen, came under sustained Italian artillery and machinegun fire. The retreating Italian forces had set the pontoon bridge at Gobwen across the Juba River on fire, and when the South African troops attempted to reach it they came under such a sustained artillery bombardment, that it was estimated that over 3 000 rounds had been fired at the South African troops.371 The tanks of No. 1 LTC extricated the stricken South African infantry, and successfully helped with the evacuation of the wounded. The troops were ordered to find cover amongst the sand dunes and buildings surrounding Gobwen.372
During the afternoon of 14 February, Godwin-Austen visited the forward areas to review the situation in person. Pienaar, in the meantime, carried out his own reconnaissance of the forward areas to ascertain his force’s position in and around Gobwen. En route to Gobwen, Gwilliam’s armoured car, which transported Pienaar, struck a landmine, causing no damage to the car or its occupants. The situation around Gobwen, however, remained rather dire. The initial plan, as laid out by Cunningham, had come apart owing to the fact that the South Africans were unable to immediately cross the Juba River and occupy Giumbo. It became evident to both Godwin-Austen and Pienaar that any attempt to cross the Juba River at Gobwen would be suicidal. The essence of surprise was all but lost, and Pienaar was ordered to reconnoitre a possible crossing to the north of Gobwen after the Italians
369
DOD Archives, WD, Box 300, File –12 AFR DIV Extracts from War Diaries. Extract from Appendices to 12 (A) Div War Diary for February 1941- Intelligence Summary No. 20 – 19 February 1941.
370
Klein, Springboks in Armour, pp. 81-82 and DOD Archives, WD, Box 215, File B1-8 3 ACC. War Diary No. 3 Armoured Car Company February 1941 and DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 122, File – NarepEA4. 1st Sa Inf Bde Narrative of the Jubaland and Giuba River Operations 1- 28 Feb 41.
371
DOD Archives, WD, Box 300, File –12 AFR DIV Extracts from War Diaries. Extract from Appendices to 12 (A) Div War Diary for February 1941- Note on Gobwen and Giumbo 14 February 1941 and DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 122, File – NarepEA4. 1st Sa Inf Bde Narrative of the Jubaland and Giuba River Operations 1-28 Feb 41.
372
completely destroyed the remainder of the pontoon bridge during the night of 14/15 February.373
Despite the halt in the offensive by the 1st SA Bde, Cunningham’s East African Force made immense progress. A mere three days after launching their attack, Cunningham’s force captured a string of objectives. These objectives had seemed almost unattainable during the previous December. The rapid advance, coupled with the fact that the Italians soldiers made no viable defensive stand, ensured that Afmadu, Gobwen and Kismayu were captured by mid-February. As limited as these victories were, they did help boost morale.374 The Juba line seemed almost impregnable to the South Africans at first sight. Prior to the attack, the river flowed extremely strongly and was consistently 178 metres wide. Destroying the bridges, the Italians ensured that the Juba River would effectively halt any advance. All viable crossings were registered as Italian artillery targets. The Duke of Aosta, believing that his forces could stem Cunningham’s advance at the Juba line, amassed the majority of his forces in Italian Somaliland for its defence. Both Cunningham and Aosta realised that once the Juba line was breached, the road into the southern Abyssinian highlands and the vast expanses of Italian Somaliland would be open. The forcing of the Juba line thus remained crucial to the success of Cunningham’s advance.375
Pienaar decided that the 1st SA Bde, with No. 3 ACC in support, would attempt to force a crossing of the Juba River at Ionte, 22 kilometres upstream from Gobwen. The 24th GC Bde, with No. 1 LTC providing armoured support, would attempt a crossing further upstream at Mbungo, 48 kilometres to the north of Gelib.376 On the morning of 16 February, Pienaar and Gwilliam conducted an aerial reconnaissance of the Juba River up to Ionte, in order to ascertain a suitable crossing. Pienaar identified Ionte as such, and immediately received permission from Godwin-Austen to conduct a reconnaissance in the direction of the proposed crossing point. Two sections of armoured cars from No. 2 Platoon, subsequently reinforced by a company of Carbineers, were ordered on a reconnaissance patrol towards Ionte via Andaraf. Pienaar personally accompanied a fighting column to follow in the wake of
373
DOD Archives, WD, Box 215, File B1-8 3 ACC. War Diary No. 3 Armoured Car Company February 1941 and Klein, Springboks in Armour, pp. 81-84 and DOD Archives, WD, Box 300, File –12 AFR DIV Extracts from War Diaries. Extract from Appendices to 12 (A) Div War Diary for February 1941- Note on Gobwen and Giumbo 14 February 1941.
374
Klein, Springboks in Armour, pp. 81-83 and DOD Archives, UWH Civil, Box 122, File – NarepEA4. 1st Sa Inf Bde Narrative of the Jubaland and Giuba River Operations 1-28 Feb 41.
375
Klein, Springboks in Armour, p. 84 and DOD Archives, WD, Box 300, File –12 AFR DIV Extracts from War Diaries. 12th African Division Report on the Operations in Italian Somaliland Feb – Mar 1941.
376
DOD Archives, WD, Box 216, File C1-12 1 SA LT Tank Coy. War Diary of No. 1 Light Tank Company December 1940 and DOD Archives, WD, Box 300, File –12 AFR DIV Extracts from War Diaries. Extract from Appendices to 12 (A) Div War Diary for February 1941- Intelligence Summary No. 20 – 19 February 1941.
the reconnaissance patrol. Pienaar was advised by the 12th Division’s staff not to attempt a crossing of the Juba River, until such permission had been given by Godwin-Austen himself.377