In order to clarify the different theoretical conceptualisations that were reviewed in chapters one and two, and how these relate to the social media, an overall summary will now be set out in this section. During the discussions of the first chapter, it was shown that some authors see social media as a public sphere due to a variety of reasons. For instance, Dahlgren (2005) draws attention to social media as a forum for public discussion, debate and interaction, which are all elements typical of a public sphere. On the other hand, Papacharissi (2009) proposes that social media offers a forum where online activism can foster offline activism. Shirky (2011) also regards social media as a public sphere that can generate offline activism, allowing (Arab) people to discuss ‘forbidden’ social and political issues (Shirky, 2011). With direct reference to the Habermas (1984) concept of the public sphere, Shirky (2011) argues that the discussions on social media will have a persuading influence on people, causing them to ‘develop’ their opinions and attitudes, and thereby encourage them to join the street protests. This implies that social media has the potential to create and develop an entire social movement.
In addition, Shirky (2011) also emphasizes the role of social media in helping activists to raise awareness of their calls of freedom and democracy, by spreading their message to the masses of the general population. Similarly, Benkler (2006) and Petersen (2011) say social media has produced a global public sphere by linking individuals and communities together, even those who are separated by large geographical distances. Authors such as Ghannam (2011) further claim these social media networks increase transparency, and seek to hold governments accountable. Social media has even been said to generate the most dramatic increases in freedom
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of expression in recent Arab history (Ghannam, 2011). Also Root (2012) argues that Facebook represents a public sphere because of the detailed arguments that take place there, whilst Salanova (2012), Singh and Thakur (2013) and DeLong-Bas (2016) explain how this allowed marginalised groups (including the Tunisian and Egyptian activists) to communicate their ideas, challenge the regime and seek to generate social/political change.
In contrast to these authors who regard social media as a public sphere, chapter one also reviewed the literature of sceptics who are critical of social media’s role as a public sphere. For example, Roberts and Crossley (2004) state that Habermas’s (1984; 1991) reference to public sphere participants as coming from the bourgeoisie is inappropriate as it does not account for the diverse range of social media users who are currently active. The Habemasian public sphere (where bourgeois participants are claimed to have free and equal access) also does not address issues of digital divide in access, motivation, digital skills and different usage (Van Dijk 2012).
Noam (2005) argues that increased political discussions on social media do not necessarily improve its effectiveness as a public sphere, nor raise the quality of communication or increase government accountability. Rather, Morozov (2011) and Fuchs (2014) claim that authoritarian regimes can prevent social media from functioning as an open public sphere through policies that include censoring, monitoring and the arrest/detention of individual users. Therefore Gladwell (2010) describes the relationships between social media users as weak where distant friends or acquaintances are unlikely to persuade each other to take risky action, such as joining the street demonstrations. Dajani (2011) also says social media is not effective in changing peoples’ attitudes or opinions, and Dajani (2011) supports Juris
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(2011) in claiming that the spoken word in face-to-face communication is far more influential.
With regard to other authors who are neither outright supporters nor opponents of social media as a public sphere, Gerbaudo (2012) suggests our understanding of social media’s role during the uprisings should be based on a middle way between social media optimism and scepticism. Gerbaudo (2012) also agrees that face-to-face communication plays a vital role in mobilising masses of protesters onto the streets. On the other hand, Dellicastelli (2011) draws attention to the importance of various other factors (including poverty, widespread corruption, high prices, and high levels of unemployment) as contributory causes of the uprisings.
In this chapter, different positions were also addressed concerning technological determinism (Smith and Marx, 1994). This included a review of authors who may be described as hard view technological determinists, including McLuhan (1967) and Castells (2012), those who may be described as soft view technological determinists, including Shirky (2011), and those who may be described as opponents of technological determinism, including Chandler (1995). Since technological determinism refers to the potential for new media technology to generate social and political change, this theory will be applied to investigate the use of social media as a tool for communicating, organising and planning collective action.
Castells (2012) claimed that Facebook and Twitter were the essential catalysts of the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, as well as being the generators of social and political change. Castells (2012) and Shirky (2011) discussed how social media enables activists to communicate, plan and organise their activities. Lynch (2015) also highlights the positive role that Facebook and Twitter played in the Tunisian and
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Egyptian uprisings, both as organisational tools for activism and as tools for spreading information on the uprisings. He also draws attention to the importance of citizen journalism, as well as to the interconnections between the different forms of media. Similarly, Salanova (2012) and Singh and Thakur (2013) point out that social media greatly assisted activists by providing them with a two-way communication tool that was cheap and rapid. Therefore the April 6 Movement, which relied heavily on social media, was described as probably the best organized and most influential of all the opposition groups that took to the streets in the earliest days of the uprising, utilizing social media as an essential means of planning, organizing, informing, persuading, and communicating (Khamis et al, 2012). Barassi and Trere (2012) even suggest that activists prefer to use social media as an organisational tool, rather than as a public sphere, for the exchange of political information.
By contrast, Gladwell (2010) claims that social media activists are poorly organised because they lack clearly structured hierarchies and strong leadership. Hence, he claims that they are unlikely to succeed. On the other hand, Hassan (2011) believes social media activism will fail because rapid communication will lead to a political vacuum of chaos and confusion. Hassan (2011) argues that the speed of social media destabilizes the normal rhythms and processes that a changing society should go through.
This chapter also discussed issues surrounding the possible manipulation of social media, focusing primarily on applying McPhail’ (2008) notion of electronic colonialism to social media. This is the possibility that media messages from dominant Western countries are impacting on the minds of dependent countries’ citizens, thereby having a Westernising or Americanising effect on countries such as
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Tunisia and Egypt. Such arguments also appear to have indirect support from other authors including Ramadhan (2012).
Finally, this chapter reviewed the more recent contributions to literature. Here there was a discussion of the views of authors Aboubaka (2013) and Alahmed (2014), who believe that social media both caused and sustained the uprisings. Likewise, Lim (2013) is of the view that social media helped to increase the scale of the uprisings by transforming online activism into offline activism. In addition, Bruns et al (2013) drew attention to the overlaps between Arabic and English users (thereby highlighting the global dimension of social media usage) whilst Brym et al (2014) identified a positive correlation between being a social media user and being a demonstrator during the uprisings. However, Brym et al (2014) also recognised the importance of other factors (such as poverty, authoritarianism and corruption) in encouraging individuals to change from being sympathisers to becoming offline demonstrators in the street.
In contrast, Wolfsfeld et al (2013) claim that significant levels of social media usage are more likely to happen after protest activities rather than prior to it, whereas Srinivasana (2014) believes that the links with and support from traditional media (such as Al Jazeera TV) were more influential than social media during the uprisings. In addition, although it can be said that social media assisted the Tunisian and Egyptian people in ousting their authoritarian leaders, this does not necessarily mean that the final outcome will be one of positive social and political change (Cook, 2013; Karatzogianni, 2013).
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