EQUIPO / HERRAMIENTAS / MATERIALES av.

The 1953 update to the Yugoslav Constitution “so radically changed the law that it is almost considered to be a new Constitution entirely” (Mertus, 1999:289). Specifically, revisions were initiated to promote increased self-governance at the Republic level, which had successive though unintended, adverse outcomes for the Kosovo Albanians. First, the new Constitution redefined the functions of Federal and Communist Party; and secondly, in conjunction with the first, it further delegated its governing authority to the Republics and Municipalities

(Curtis,1992).

The first revision was to separate the functions of the Republic and Municipality. The primary strategy was to diffuse the authority of the Republic through the establishment of small, self- governing communities, known as communes47 _{(Benson, 2001; Curtis, 1992; Trifunovska, 1994;} Vratusa, 1961). The commune was much smaller than the municipality, and each Republic contained several hundred of them48 _{(Benson, 2001; Curtis, 1992). They held “every political} authority not specifically delegated to government at the federal or Republic level” (Curtis, 1992). Each commune contained a source of employment,49 _{cultural, education and health} services, as well as control of the local utilities and local planning (Vratusa, 1961). Law enforcement and elections were maintained at the larger municipal level, while defense remained at the national level.

47_{Communes were self-governing local communities; most would merge into the larger municipalities. The} Commune initially contained its own politial chamber, elected by popular vote, and the Chamber of Producers, formed of representatives of the Workers Councils.

48_{Benson cites over 400 communes in some Republics; Curtis states over 500 communes by 1988.} 49_{Employment was typically a local factory or cooperative.}

90

The Commune system unintentionally marginalized Kosovo Albanians. In Kosovo, Serbs still “held over 50 percent of the party positions, and 68 percent of the administrative and leading [government] positions, … and were 50 percent of the factory workers” (Malcolm, 1998:323), despite comprising a population of just 27 percent of the Province. Thus, the Commune with its smaller population and economic capacity, had the effect of fragmenting and reducing both overall political representation and economic opportunity for the Kosovo Albanians, while strengthing the Kosovo Serb political and economic advantage.

A significant new responsibility for the Commune was to identify suitable representitives and provide a consolidated list of candidates for higher government offices, as well as the Commune itself, which would be subsequently vetted by the local communist party. Hence, the commune did not have real administrative authority over its hires, resulting in government organizations filled by politically appropriate candidates, the majority of them ethnically Serb. While this process was not limited to Kosovo, or even to local government, the comparatively small number of Kosovo Albanian candidates acceptable to the commmuist party, in addition to separation by language, ensured their near-absence in influential government offices (Malcolm, 1998).

At the same time, the responsibility of Peoples Committee’s increased to include ensuring unconditional loyalty to the communist Party, and “ … a growing obsession with hunting for [irredentism and] weapons among Kosovo Albanians” (Malcolm, 1998:321). Through UBDA, Kosovo Albanian men were increasingly detained, interrogated, and beaten; or jailed on ficticious charges (ibid.). The escalating security directives were fostered by Aleksandar

Ranković, a hardline Serb nationalist, and Tito’s second in command. Ranković was the director of the Yugoslav Ministry of the Interior until 196650 _{when he was dismissed for ‘discriminitory}

50_{Ranković was relieved of his position and authority for abuse of power when it was discovered members of Tito’s} senior staff and officers were wire tapped without Tito’s knowledge.

91

and illegal practices” (Mertus, 1998:290). However, it was only the official discrimination against Kosovo Albanians that ended when he was removed from office.

4.5.1 Relative Autonomy in Kosovo

Kosovo Albanians gained a series of new civil freedoms and authorities during the 1960’s. First among them was its designation as a “social-political community”,51 _{with significant autonomy} of governance down to the local level. This granted Kosovo virtually all of the rights of a Republic (Benson, 2001). In 1967 Tito personally directed that Kosovo Albanians be allowed increased admission to the Serb-controlled Kosovo government, including hiring for civil and industry positions (Malcolm, 1998:324); they may be permitted to establish local laws and judiciary,52_{and to receive Albanian language education to the university level}53_{. Kosovo} Albanians soon began to join the communist party and eventually gained nearly two-thirds of local administrative positions in Kosovo (Malcolm, 1998:326). In addition, the tactic of holding simultaneous office in the People’s Party and position in government office was banned to “reduce the abuse of power through bureaucratic networks” (Benson, 2001:111; Curtis, 1992:175). This allowed Kosovo Albanians to hold high party positions that had been formerly out of reach. While new laws did not change the underlying antagonistic attitudes of Serbia or of Kosovo Serbs, the laws did reduce the overtly discriminatory practices. Kosovo Albanians quickly made significant civil, cultural, economic and social progress between 1966-1974. Moreover, despite the overall widening economic gap54 _{between the Yugoslav Republics and} Kosovo (Bennett, 1995:61; Malcolm, 1998:237; Woodward, 1995), Kosovo itself had improved significantly. Nevertheless as Malcolm reminds, this suite of gains and improvements was a

51 _{‘Social-political communities’ is the same verbiage used to legally define the Republics.}

52_{Kosovo’s internal laws could not conflict with Federal law, or legislative direction of the Republic of Serbia, but} were otherwise permissible.

53_{Use of the Albanian language, especially in education, became a linguistic ceiling as Albanian is not widely spoken} outside of Kosovo and Albania.

54_{Among the greatest criticisms of the economic gap was the rise in the Kosovo Albanian population, though more} typical of the high rural birthrates that are shared throughout the Balkans, than a concerted political strategy to push out Serbs (Malcolm,1998:331; Pavlovic, 2013:52).

92

response to feared outcomes of the continued uneven political and economic conditions in Yugoslavia, rather than a national will to elevate the social and civil rights of Kosovo Albanians (Curtis, 1992; Malcolm, 1998:325) .