ESPECÍFICOS

Interpretivism is open to various disciplines, theories and methodologies; it can be a very open-ended framework. This dissertation refines the interpretivist approach further so that it is more relevant to the research. Thus, a hybrid theoretical framework – informed by three theories (or models) from within the political science and migration literature – is proposed. Each of the three is directly relevant to studies of policy, and more specifically, policy change. Though these three middle- to micro-range theories approach the subject from different perspectives, it is not inconceivable that they could work together coherently, and provide prompts or reference points during the research process. Two are situated within the political science wing (Gamble; Harmel and Janda) and one is from the migration studies field (Hollifield); it is expected that each of the three will provide a useful theoretical lens.In partnership with, and beyond, these theories, this thesis takes care to place politics ‘in time’ and to pay attention to the plurality of social processes, and the extent to which they show linkages across time, rather than disembodied ‘moments’ in history.12

The ‘politics of power’ versus the ‘politics of support’

Gamble’s theory, broadly speaking, states that a political party must gather popular support – ‘the politics of support’ – in order to govern – ‘the politics of power’. 13 _{A party in}

opposition is subject to different forces from when it is in government; it is these influences which construct distinct dynamics. Blake argues that for the party in office ‘[p]roblems come up one after another and are solved – or not solved – by empirical criteria’.14 The party in opposition, however, must ‘steer a tricky line between policy statements so clear that they give hostages to fortune or so vague that they offer no alternative at all’.15 There is a difficult balance of forces at work: parties that regard themselves as vote-catching operations prepared to promise anything will, once they are in office and limited by the constraints of the existing state, sorely disappoint the electorate, at the very least.

In the context of this study, Gamble’s theory suggests that policy should be examined in segmented periods – when the Conservatives are in opposition and when the Conservatives are in government. With regard specifically to immigration policy, the theory would imply that the Party leadership in opposition makes policy according to what it perceives necessary to mobilise both grassroots and broader electoral support. However, by responding to the concerns of activists and voters (two distinct and at times – opposing – groups), policy may be hard-line, difficult to implement and inconsistent with the rest of the Party’s programme. Once in government, the Party’s immigration policy is more moderate because the Party reacts to interventions from the civil service, the judiciary and lobby groups by toning down the rhetoric and modifying policy. If Gamble’s theory does apply to this case study, this generates more questions. Do the Conservatives know at the time policy is being developed that they cannot deliver on their promises? If so, does the Party anticipate issues in the course of policy implementation and does it plan for compromise? If this is not the case, why do the Conservatives not realise that they cannot deliver?

The drivers of (policy) change in political parties

In their work on political parties, Harmel and Janda also observe that the government/ opposition dimension can be a driver of party change, but they propose other factors too. Their work on change within political parties can (and has) been used to look more specifically at policy change within parties.16 Given the widespread agreement that change must be driven by something, it makes sense to focus on the impetus. The most commonly cited independent variables or ‘drivers’ of change, largely derived from the framework elaborated by Harmel and Janda and their co-authors, are first, external shock (essentially, electoral defeat or loss of office); second, a change of leader; and, third, a change in the dominant faction (or coalition) that, to a greater or lesser extent, runs the party in question.17 The perception of electoral defeat (and hence, the impetus for policy change) may be much greater – or more heavily felt – in a party which has narrowly lost an election than in a party which has suffered a severe defeat. Indeed, recent work has found that, for the Conservatives a severe defeat (in terms of vote share and seats lost) may not necessarily result in more significant immigration policy change than a minor defeat.18 _{Investigating the impact of these}

drivers of change (in whatever combination) on Conservative Party migration policy allows for examination of the theoretical synthesis, at least as it touches on policy, and – if necessary – discussing drivers that it may have previously underplayed or missed completely. This thesis will build upon Harmel and Janda’s framework in order to focus specifically on how political leaders perceive these factors, rather than provide a simple explanation based on these factors.

The ‘gap hypothesis’ in policy preferences

First observed by Hollifield, the ‘gap hypothesis’ refers to the supposed gap between the objectives and the outcomes of immigration policy.19 This can partly be explained by the tension between elites’ rhetorical commitment to immigration control and the reality of continued immigration. In short, while elites push for and put in place immigration policies which are liberal and expansionist, the general public prefer policies which are more restrictive. While preferences are not the same as policy, it is the case that preferences can, and are, developed into policy proposals. Critics might well argue that the ‘gap hypothesis’ is no longer relevant. Certainly, in the 30 years since Hollifield published his text, the Conservative Party’s immigration policy could not be described as liberal or expansionist. It could also be said that there has been some degree of convergence in the immigration policy preferences of those governing and those who are governed. However, a general move in favour of more restrictionist policies does not mean that there is not a tension, between the elites and the electorate.

During the 70 year period in question, the Conservative Party’s leaders had different views about whether the Party needed to be in accord with the electorate on immigration. However, political parties which try to follow public opinion in order to produce policies that win votes at the ballot box should be cautious. The ‘production’ of public opinion is revealed in studies which show survey answers to be dependent on how questions are phrased. Research by the IPPR on public opinion towards asylum seekers has found that answers were heavily dependent on how the issues were framed.20 Some researchers find that there is not much of a difference between elites and ordinary people in terms of opinions on immigration.21 While it is difficult to deny the existence of some differences, divergence may be down to how such attitudes are portrayed.