Espectrofotómetros con barrido de longitudes de ondas

Previously, I discussed participants’ accounts from three countries that form the Old Commonwealth and Hong Kong. The participants from Japan, Taiwan and Korea53_{, were}

seen to lack ‘historically laden imaginaries’ (Salazar, 2011: 576) of colonial-historic travel to Britain. However, as mentioned earlier, participants’ mobility imaginings were moored to national identities. Japan’s place is unique in this categorisation since the UK

53 _{Based on data from World Economic Outlook database (October 2016), International Monetary}

Fund, these three countries rank high in GDP (per capita) when adjusted for Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) Source: https://www.gfmag.com/global-data/economic-data/richest-countries-in-the- world?page=12 [Accessed 4 September, 2017]

and Japan had a bilateral youth exchange scheme since 2001. Japan also stands out among the other East Asian countries because of its inclusion in the first list of countries54

of YMS in 2008 and is also the only East Asian country whose nationals are exempted from producing ‘certificate of sponsorship’ letters along with their YMS application. Arguably, fifteen years of bilateral youth mobility arrangements could constitute ‘historically laden imaginaries’ (Salazar, 2011: 576) for Japanese participants. However, I could not gauge this from their accounts, which were like those from Taiwan and Korea. Taiwanese and Korean participants attributed their imaginings to globalisation and bilateral agreements initiated at the behest of their governments – demonstrating their countries’ global standing in the world, and trustworthiness that they enjoy with the West (particularly, the UK).

Participants from Taiwan, Korea, and Japan had internalised a notion of mobility based on the existence of global opportunities. Globalised opportunities of mobility in their accounts, however, do not transcend participants’ belonging to nation states. In this section, I understand ‘globalised imaginings’ as collective imaginings enabled by ‘state- driven globalisation’ (Kang, 2000, cited in Yoon, 2015: 76), in which nation states take an active role in moulding ‘a global generation’ (Yoon, 2015: 76). In this section, I argue that such discourses of globalisation must be understood in the context of bilateral youth mobility arrangements (like YMS). To elaborate on this, I will first examine the account of Harry, a Taiwanese man from a middle-class background.

I don’t think I have heard [about] this scheme in school either in Taiwan or in Britain and…because it was the, it is ...it has just been the second year of the scheme. Not so many people know about it (…) yes it’s kind of … it’s kind of like, once the government promised the young people for when [to enable] to go somewhere, if they couldn’t afford to study there…At the moment there is Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United States, Japan and Singapore…and Britain, Ireland, erm..Austria…Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary and Germany. (Harry, 25, Male, Taiwan)

For Harry, the construction of YMS links to the ‘promise’ made by the Government of Taiwan to ‘young people’– producing imaginings drawn from state’s role in the

provision of global opportunities. Harry acknowledges the nascence of the scheme and a subsequent absence of social imaginary associated with it; he is part of the second cohort of Taiwanese participants to the UK. He could, however, recollect similar arrangements to several countries, pointing to a rising number of bilateral working holidays between Europe, USA, and East Asian powerhouses (example: Singapore, Taiwan).

Similarly, Dai, a Taiwanese man of middle-class background, linked the increasing global opportunities for Taiwanese young travellers to a discourse of trust which he associated with Taiwan, contrasting it with China.

They [Foreign governments] trust these travellers from these countries… they are [at] present better than other countries they reject… like Chinese… I heard about Chinese…they are very poor… because some of my friends from university who are Chinese... and… they got interviewed before they come here right? And… and the people ask them questions… and they must answer ‘I will leave as soon as possible after I graduate’, because if they have some… few say, probably I want to [start] working here, and the visa will be rejected. Because they will think, the government will think if you want to stay here, and never go back... Yeah, its’ true. So, I think, probably the government trust me a lot, trust our country a lot. So, they apply [allow] for the visa for us.

(Dai, 26, Male, Taiwan)

Two important themes emerge from Dai’s account – trust and perception of governments, and his understanding of who may overstay. Interestingly, his account aligns with the British Home Office’s idea of risk, and associated assumptions of managing migration (explored in the previous chapter). The accounts of Harry and Dai are indicative of young people’s awareness of opportunities for youth travel/mobility becoming available for them, and Dai at least is also acutely aware of processes that make them ‘eligible’ as opposed to others who do not qualify. In doing so, their mobility imaginings are also laced with ideas of ‘deserved eligibility’ as they see it. Ironically, these accounts also give critique to the discourse of globalisation and a borderless world,

since negotiation of borders is clearly based on perceptions of trust and arbitrary risk values55_.

Another participant – Ji Hu, a Korean woman, of middle-class background, was very proud of the South Korea-UK relationship and believed that the youth mobility visa was a testament to this.

It proves that we’re really in a good relationship between two countries. I feel like this, other countries, like those like China, or… Some countries doesn’t have this kind of opportunity.

(Ji-Hu, 25, female, Korea)

Ji-Hu was acutely aware of the increasing opportunities for youth mobility for young Koreans, unlike those from China. As for Dai, this national pride in his country’s good relationship with the UK contrasts with China’s lack of youth mobility agreements. It is interesting to note that China was regarded as a competitor by Ji-Hu, a young Korean, as it was less obvious when compared to Taiwan’s competition with China. In doing so, Ji- Hu reiterated the notion of ‘deserved eligibility’ that manifested in Dai’s account (discussed earlier).

I will now examine the accounts of Japanese participants for final discussions in this section. I treat their globalised imaginings separately because as discussed earlier, Japan and UK have had a working holiday arrangement56 since 2001. Japan and UK have also had a mobility arrangement for British graduates to teach in Japanese schools, under the aegis of Japan Exchange and Teaching (JET), operational since 1987. Mee-Ling Lai argues that despite the emphasis on English language and teaching, the JET programme was always connected to Japan’s ‘cultural and political targets that are more important to the country’ (Lai, 1999: 218). In this way, Japan and UK have a longer history of bilateral temporary mobility arrangements, calling for a different approach to understanding globalised imaginings arising out of the latter.

55 _{As I argued in the case of YMS risk formula in chapter 4.}

56 _{Japan operated "Working Holiday Scheme" for the British, and the UK operated the "Japan: Youth}

Exchange Scheme" for the Japanese. See http://www.uk.emb-japan.go.jp/itpr_en/index_000072.html [Accessed on 1 September, 2017]

Suoko, a Japanese man of middle-class background, recounts the popularity of the YMS programme to the UK and offers a glimpse of the ‘competition’ that such youth mobility arrangements entail.

[YMS] is very very popular. About… It is often said… 10000 people is [are] applying for that visa… But… only, you know 1000 people can get that… Yeah, so it is very very difficult to get the visa. (…) Youth Mobility scheme is not only for the Japanese people but also the British people as well. So, I think government wants to save [keep] the opportunity to go to Japan (…) you know, for European people to work in Japan is very very difficult to get the visa, and of course, language is very very difficult.

(Suoko, 29, Male, Japan)

Suoko emphasises the intense ‘competition’ for YMS visa, pointing to the limits of choice and agency among participants. Interested candidates apply to the concerned authority in Japan, which then uses a lottery system to choose the 1000 participants in each year. His account also serves as a reminder of Japan’s closed approach to foreigners and reflects what Lai (1999) identifies as Japanese policy in maintaining a homogenous nation-state in which ‘inhabitants of non-Japanese origin exceeded 1% for the first time only in 1993’ (1999: 216).

From the accounts discussed so far, YMS is aimed at promoting international relations and bilateral co-operation, much like the aims of the JET scheme. Yulia, a Japanese woman of middle-class background, recount similar difficulties in getting a YMS visa.

It’s popular in Japan. YMS is… Japan has many countries [with] YMS connection, I think almost [all] young guys knows [know about] this scheme. But everyone choose London, Australia or Canada, New Zealand too… Yes... And always more… is too difficult to get visa [to the UK], because [of] London. (Yulia, 31, Female, Japan)

Yulia believes young people mostly end up going to London, Australia, Canada, or New Zealand because these are the most popular destinations. Consequently, I argue that Yulia’s account reflects Japanese government’s internationalisation efforts that parallel the JET scheme (Lai, 1999), criticised for its Western orientation and exclusion of less developed countries (Lincicome, 1993 cited in Lai, 1999: 220). Her account is replete

with mention of competition for visas for some countries above others and problematizes the notion of choice and freedom or the ‘taken-for-granted’ mobility imaginings which draw from historically rooted imaginaries, discussed in 5.3.1. In the above accounts, the participants from Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan do not talk a language of entitlement and normality of travelling to the UK. Instead, they speak about competition57_{, to get on}

these government-initiated opportunities. However, some of them talk the language of ‘deserved eligibility’ which may eventually solidify into notions of entitlement.

Restricted mobility through a lottery system and basing one’s overseas travel on luck is far from the sense of entitlement expressed by participants from Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and Hong Kong58_{. The globalised imaginings discussed in this section contrast}

historically rooted imaginaries, by not being linked to colonial histories of the Empire. They also challenge notions of entitlement and privileged mobility to Britain. Consequently, their mobility imaginings draw from discourses of state-led globalisation, trust, and perception of their own countries in global geo-politics. In the next section (5.4), I will shift to participants’ motivations, which are both personal and strategic, and patterned on privilege – drawing from nationality and gender.