ADMINISTRACIÓN DE EMPRESAS
CIENCIAS ECONÓMICAS Y ADMINISTRATIVAS: SUSTENTO EPISTEMOLÓGICO PARA UNA ALTERNATIVA PEDAGÓGICA.
3.3.3. Estilos de aprendizaje en la educación superior.
At the end of 2001, the federal air marshal program had 33 armed officers, and a budget of about $4 million. A year later, the number of employees had swelled into the thousands—U.S. officials are reticent, for security rea- sons, to indicate the number of air marshals that have been deployed—with a budget of more than $1 billion. The rapid pace of growth was symptomatic of a larger change in the face of air travel after the September 11th attacks. In the aftermath, the federal government placed security screeners under government employment, and planned to put in place a new computerized passenger- profiling system. These were visible signs that the ordi- nary traveler could hardly fail to notice. Most of all, travel- ers were confronted with long lines to enter terminals, and with new security rules. Only persons with a ticket were permitted past security checkpoints and into departure gates, and even the most seemingly innocuous items, such as tweezers, were subject to confiscation by security screeners. By January, 2003, all passengers were addi- tionally required to bring luggage intended to be checked into the hold of the aircraft to a screening point for x-ray or other scanning.
The invisible air marshals.
In contrast to these visible signs of change, there was one change passengers were not likely to notice: the addition of air marshals. In fact, if a marshal’s presence on a routine flight was noticed, that meant he (more than 95% of air marshals are male) was not doing his job correctly. A key element of the marshal program is its invisibility, and this is so for a number of reasons, not least of which is the fact that not every flight has a marshal aboard.At any given moment at the height of business hours, there are approximately 6,000 commercial flights in the air somewhere in the United States. Every day, 25,000 aircraft take off and land, and though the ranks of the marshal program have swelled since September 11, it is not possi- ble to have a marshal on every flight. Officials estimate that even for the highest-priority flights (the determination of which is made by analyzing a number of factors, such as major events that may attract tourist attention), only about 15% had an air marshal on board in the first year after September 11.
The air marshal’s work.
Federal air marshals, known as FAMs, go through a specific procedure when assigned to a flight. They dress in civilian clothes, and before boarding, present their credentials to a ticket agent, who gives them a ticket. Since September, 2001, ticket agents have been trained in this procedure, and are aware of the security precautions involved, which include not drawing any at- tention to the fact that an FAM is present.After receiving his ticket, the FAM enters the terminal by special means that allow him to bypass a security
Air Marshals, United States
A federal air marshal trainee shoots live rounds during a training session in Egg Harbor Township, New Jersey. Thousands of armed, undercover air marshals have joined the service since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and are flying carefully chosen missions, sometimes on an hour’s notice because of new terrorist threats. AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS.
check, because he is armed. Once aboard the plane, the crew has knowledge that a marshal is on board, and therefore, he is permitted access to discreetly check all areas of the plane. Federal air marshals are trained to have a variety of ordinary cover stories available to discourage suspicion about repeated movements in different areas of the aircraft, should they become necessary. The Fed- eral air marshal program motto is Invisus, Inauditus,
Impavidus—unseen, unheard, unafraid.
Hazards of the job.
In the first year after September 2001, FAMs made a dozen arrests, none of them related to terrorism. They filed about a thousand reports of suspi- cious activities on planes, but these numbers have shown signs of decreasing as time as passed. Apparently, in the early months, FAMs tended to be overly cautious or overly reactive to potentially dangerous situations, but experi- ence has made them more judicious.Early assessments of the FAM program suggest that perhaps the greatest routine occupational hazard is a decrease in concentration due to the monotony of being a repeated airline passenger. Flying tends to be taxing enough for civilians who do it regularly, but the FAM does not have the option of going to sleep. Nor is he free to lose
himself completely in a book or magazine article, or an in- flight movie, though he may take part in such activities as a means of blending in. On the one hand, the FAM must try to appear completely ordinary, and on the other, he must be on the alert at all times. Concerned about the effects of flight fatigue on air marshals, the TSA in January, 2003, announced plans to temporarily reassign some FAMs. In order to gain some relief from the boredom and exhaus- tion of flight, some of these agents would serve in airport terminals, providing surveillance. This announcement elic- ited considerable criticism, particularly from airport secu- rity officials, who complained that the FAMs were most needed in the skies, and that airports were already overstaffed with security personnel.
Issues of training and expertise have also raised con- cerns about the FAM program. Prior to September 2001, FAMs received 12 weeks’ worth of training, but afterward, officials of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and later TSA found themselves faced with a demand to hire and train some 800 FAMs a month. As a result, new recruits found themselves on the job with less than seven weeks’ training. Those with previous federal law-enforce- ment experience might be deployed after as little as a single week of compacted instruction.