Estudios empíricos recientes sobre microempresa en México y América Latina

during the 1960s and then joined the faculty o f the University o f Michigan. He also worked as a consultant for the RAND Corporation in Santa Monica, California, where he was based during the summer o f 1969. Whiting later became critical o f the “strict limitations” o f the participants in the planning o f Kissinger’s July 1971 secret trip. Whiting would meet with Kissinger for further consultations on August 12, October 14, and December 16, 1971. Whiting, Allen, Name Files (NF), Box 838, NSCF, NPMS, NA. Whiting criticizes that Kissinger neglected “the labors o f John K. Fairbank and A. Doak Barnett, among others, who labored long and hard for public acceptance o f normalization,” and that Kissinger’s disdainful accusation thus hindered a balanced judgement on the basis o f “historical accuracy.” Whiting, Interview with Komine, October 19, 2003; and Allen Whiting, “Sino-American Detente,” China Quarterly, 82, June 1980, p.336, p. 339.

96 Ibid.

97 Letter from Whiting to Kissinger, August 16, 1969, and an enclosed report, “Sino-Soviet Hostilities and Implications for U.S. Policy,” p .l, China, Box 839, NF, NSCF, NPMS, NA.

Perceiving the outbreak of a larger scale clash on the Sinkiang border on August 13 as a deliberate Soviet initiative, Whiting suggested that the U.S. objectives should be: “(1) to deter a Soviet attack on China, (2) to inhibit the use of nuclear weapons in a Sino-Soviet war, and (3) to maximize the possibility of China identifying Russia as its sole antagonist, in contrast with the rest o f the world and particularly with the United

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States.” Finally, Whiting urged that by taking such concrete steps as to resume contacts with the Chinese in Warsaw and through third parties and to lift the trade embargo with China, the U.S. should assure the Chinese o f its opposition to a Soviet attack."

Holdridge, however, was not convinced o f Whiting’s assessment o f the possible Soviet air strike against China. The Soviets would be “appalled at the magnitude of the situation” which would develop if they entered a war with China, with its vast territory and strong resistance from its large population.100 Hence, Holdridge concluded that the Soviets were going to be “very careful about what kind o f decision they make.” 101 On the other hand, Whiting recalls that Kissinger’s (and Holdridge’s) understanding o f the nature o f Sino-Soviet mutual hostility and the Soviet military deployment along the Sino-Soviet border was still “very little” in August 1969.102

After that meeting, Whiting received no feedback from Kissinger and the NSC staff. In November 1971, Kissinger explained to Whiting that: “you know until you brought that memo [of August 1969], we had a laundry list o f things we would do, individual kind o f signals. But we didn’t have it in a strategy. And your presentation put the

98 Ibid., p.8. 99 Ibid., p. 10.

100 Holdridge, Oral History Interview, July 20, 1995, p. 105, FAOHC. See also Holdridge, Crossing the Divide, p.34.

101 Ibid.

102 Whiting, Interview with Komine, October 19, 2003. Whiting regarded Holdridge as a generalist on Asia rather than a China expert.

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whole thing into a strategic context.”103 Overall, despite Kissinger’s omission in his memoirs, the consultation with Whiting in August 1969 provided a crucial opportunity for Kissinger to improve his understanding o f the nature o f Sino-Soviet relations.104

In the meantime, the Soviets remained highly suspicious of a possible Sino-U.S. collusion against them. On August 18, 1969, during a meeting with State Department official William L. Stearman, Soviet Embassy official Boris N. Davydov raised the question o f possible U.S. reactions in the case of their direct air-strike against China’s nuclear installations: “Wouldn’t the US try to take advantage o f this situation?”105 Accordingly, on August 28, William Hyland, Soviet expert in the NSC staff, estimated that a limited Sino-Soviet war would involve Soviet strikes to destroy China’s nuclear facilities, and consequently become a “solution” to China’s nuclear problem.106

On August 29, a group o f outside consultants to the State Department reviewed an on-going interdepartmental policy study - NSSM 63 ‘U.S. Policy on Current Sino- Soviet Differences.’ Among them, the Asian experts, such as A. Doak Barnett, Ralph Clough, and Fred Greene, counter-argued that “any Soviet punitive strike at China or an effort to take out Chinese nuclear facilities would result in strengthening Chinese

103 Ibid.

104 There still remains ambiguity as to what extent Kissinger and the NSC staff came to realize the subtleness o f Chinese diplomatic practice in 1969, because they occasionally failed to grasp the implications o f China’s diplomatic signals in 1970.

105 Memcon “US Reaction to Soviet Destruction o f CPR Chinese People’s Republic Nuclear Capability; Significance o f latest Sino-Soviet Border Clash,” August 18, 1969, p.2, D e f 12, Chicom, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.

106 Hyland to Kissinger, “Sino-Soviet Contingencies,” August 28, 1969, p.2, CF—USSR Vol. IV, NSCF, NPMS, NA.

nationalism and unity, and would solidify Mao’s position.”107 Finally, all the consultants agreed that the NSSC 63 paper “underestimated the danger in a Soviet preemptive strike” and that “even a non-nuclear Soviet strike would have a vast destabilizing effect in Japan, elsewhere in Asia, and in Western Europe.” These experts urged that the U.S. should make clear to the Chinese that the U.S. was “not colluding” with the Soviets.108 Overall, Rodman recalls that the Soviets “tested us and asked us if we would object to a Soviet attack on the Chinese nuclear facilities.”109 In consequence, the U.S. government would privately send a “very important signal” toward Beijing that “we would not welcome a Soviet attack on China.” 110

2.3. The Zhou-Kosygin talks in September 1969

On September 3, 1969, Premier Zhou visited Hanoi to attend Ho Chi Min’s funeral. The event provided a crucial opportunity for U.S. officials to assess the current situation in Beijing-Hanoi-Moscow triangular relations, and President Nixon ordered a large-scale intelligence operation. The State Department’s Bureau o f Intelligence and Research estimated that Premier Zhou and Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin were “likely to cross paths for the first time since February 1965” at funeral ceremonies in Hanoi, however that their “separate consultations” with the North Vietnamese would highlight their different views on the Vietnam War.111 Hanoi in turn would question

107 Miriam Camps (State Department Planning and Coordination Staff) to Richardson, “NSSM 63 - Meeting with Consultants,” August 29, 1969, p. 2, Freedom o f Information Act release to the National Security Archive.

Ibid., pp.2-3.

Rodman, Interview with Komine, October 21, 2003. 1,0 Ibid.

111 Intelligence Note, INR, “Ho Chi Minh’s Funeral - Chou Leads Parade to Hanoi, Soviet Leader to Follow, September 4, 1969, p .l, POL Chicom-USSR, 1967-69, Box 1975, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.

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the Soviets and the Chinese on their respective “intentions in the Sino-Soviet dispute.” 112 State Department officials anticipated that the Chinese might have felt that it would provide an opportunity for conveying to the Soviets their growing concern about the “danger o f war” by emphasizing Chinese “determination to resist if attacked.”113

In public, the State Department took a major step. On September 5, 1969, Under Secretary o f State Elliot Richardson made a speech at a convention o f the American Political Science Association in New York. Richardson stated that the “long-run improvement” o f relations with China was “in our own national interest.” 114 In particular, Richardson made it clear that the United States would “not seek to exploit” the hostility between the Soviet Union and “the People’s Republic” and that ideological differences between the two Communist giants were “not our affair.” 115 The speech was crucial because it officially clarified the U.S. attitude toward the Sino-Soviet border problem during the peak o f its tension. Richardson’s handwritten notes show that he personally prepared the speech combining a set o f recommendations from his staff. Particularly important, it was Richardson himself who changed the terms “Communist China” in the draft speech to “the People’s Republic.”116 Media coverage was generally very favorable to the Richardson speech. For example, the New York Times described the Richardson speech as “one o f the most explicit public statements” on the Nixon Administration’s position regarding the

1,2 Ibid. 113 Ibid., p.4

114 Address by Under Secretary o f State Elliot L. Richardson, September 5, 1969, p. 15, B ox 102, Folder speeches (1), Elliot Richardson Papers, Manuscript Division, Library o f Congress.

115 Ibid.

rift between Beijing and Moscow.117 It also reported that diplomatic observers in Washington viewed the speech as the State Department’s “opposition” to those who argued that it would be a good idea for the two Communist states to “engage into a full-scale war.” 118 The State Department’s Bureau o f Intelligence and Research assessed that, despite its public harshness toward the Nixon administration, since July Beijing had “privately exhibited increased curiosity about US Asian policy,” which appeared to be influenced by a series o f policy statements by Nixon as well as by other senior officials, such as Rogers and Richardson.119

On September 11, 1969, after their separate trip to Hanoi, Premier Zhou and Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin held talks at the Beijing airport. Although rhetoric continued to remain harsh in public, especially from Chinese side, the talks prevented rapid escalation o f tension along the Sino-Soviet border areas.120 On September 12, the State Department’s Bureau o f Intelligence and Research estimated that this first meeting between Zhou and Kosygin since February 1965 may have been suggested by the Soviets, and accepted belatedly by the Chinese unwilling to appear as the obstacle to Communist unity and peaceful reduction in Sino-Soviet tensions. However, the meeting probably “produced no breakthrough in the dispute” between Beijing and Moscow.121 On September 18, Bureau o f Intelligence and Research also reported that

117 The N ew York Times, September 6, 1969, in Box 108, Scrap books (1), Elliot Richardson Papers, Manuscript Division, Library o f Congress.

118 Ibid. W illiam Bundy emphasizes the Richardson speech as the most important public signal during 1969, for it sought to calm China’s worries over a possible U.S. move to the Soviet side. W illiam Bundy, A Tangled Web: The Making o f Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency (Hill and Wang, A D ivision o f Farrar, Straus and Giroux: N ew York, 1998), p .106.

119 Intelligence Note, INR, “Communist China: Increased Curiosity About U S Asian Policy,” September 8, 1969, p .l, POL Chicom-US. 1967-69, Box 1973, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.

120 “Information About A.N. Kosygin’s Conversation with Zhou Enlai on 11 September 1969,” The Cold War in Asia, Cold War International History Project Bulletin.

121 Intelligence Note, INR, “Communist China/USSR: Kosygin Meets Chou at Peking Airport, September 12, 1969, p .l, POL Chicom-USSR, 1967-69, Box 1975, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA. See also Kissinger, White H ouse Years, pp. 184-185.

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the recently published slogans for China’s 20th anniversary celebrations on October 1 warned explicitly of “atomic war.”122

On October 7, 1969, the New China News Agency announced that Beijing had agreed to resume border talks with Moscow at the Deputy Foreign Minister level in Beijing. The State Department’s Bureau o f Intelligence and Research judged that China had been motivated by a combination o f “fear” over a Soviet preemptive attack on its nuclear installations which had surfaced in propaganda in the previous few months.123 On October 8, the Chinese Foreign Ministry called for a mutual withdrawal from disputed border areas.124

The same day, Under Secretary o f State Richardson sent a memorandum to President Nixon describing the decision for the resumption o f Sino-Soviet border negotiations as a “new phase in Sino-Soviet and perhaps ultimately Sino-US relations” and as a “practical move demonstrating a flexible approach” in Beijing’s external behavior.125 State Department officials noted particularly that the Chinese statement of October 7 declared that “irreconcilable differences o f principle” should not hinder the “maintenance o f normal state relations” between China and the Soviet Union on the basis o f the “five principles of peaceful coexistence.” The Chinese further stated that even if no border agreement could be reached, the “status quo” should be maintained, and there should be “no resort to force.”126

122 Intelligence Note, INR, “Communist China: War Fears and Domestic Politics,” September 18, 1969, n .l, POL ChiCom, 1967-69, Box 1962, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.

Intelligence Note, INR, “Communist China/USSR: Peking Agrees to Resume Border Talks,” October 7, 1969, p.2, POL Chicom-USSR, 1967-69, Box 1975, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.

124 Intelligence Note, INR, “Communist China/USSR: Peking Publishes Position Paper on Border, October 10, 1969, pp.1-2, POL Chicom-USSR, 1967-69, Box 1975, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.

125 Ibid., p.3.

126 Richardson to Nixon, “Significance o f Peking’s Agreement to Talk with the Soviets,” October 8, 1969, p .l, POL Chicom-USSR, 1967-69, Box 1975, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA. On October 20, Sino- Soviet border negotiations were finally resumed in Beijing between the Chinese and Soviet Deputy Foreign Ministers Ch’iao Kuan-hua and Vasily V. Kuznetsov.

3. Two lines of policy studies - the NSC and the State Department