Origen social de los microempresarios y prácticas empresariales

From September to December 1969, the White House secretly sought to make direct contact with the Chinese. On September 9, 1969, President Nixon asked Walter Stoessel, U.S. Ambassador to Poland who returned to Washington for consultations, to “pass a message to the Chinese privately” suggesting that he attempted to talk

directly with the Chinese Charge’ at a diplomatic reception at one of the neutral

• • 2

embassies in Warsaw. Nixon requested for Stoessel to convey that the President was seriously interested in concrete discussions with China. Finally, Nixon emphasized that if the press noted Stoessel’s conversation with the charge d ’affaires, he should be “noncommittal” in his comments.

Without knowing the intentions o f the White House, the State Department was also sending cable messages to Ambassador Stoessel in order to resume the Warsaw ambassadorial talks, which the Chinese had previously cancelled in February 1969. On October 27, 1969, Ambassador Stoessel sent a cable to Paul H. Kreisberg, the Director o f Asian Communist Affairs in the State Department, explaining that he had not yet managed to contact the Chinese because there had not yet been a reception at a mission that maintained relations with them both.3 Stoessel also anticipated that an attempt to talk with the Chinese at a reception would be noticed by other diplomats present and would quickly be picked up by journalists.4 Despite Nixon’s warning in September, Stoessel had an impression that the President might prefer that his effort to talk with the Chinese should “become public.”5 Stoessel thus asked for more specific instructions from Washington regarding the handling o f the press.

2 Memcon, Nixon, Kissinger, and Stoessel, “Conversation with the President Concerning China and U.S.-Chinese Contacts,” September 9, 1969, 3:00pm, The White House, p .l, POL Chicom-US. 1967- 69, B ox 1973, Subject-Numeric Files (SNF), General Records o f the Department o f State, Record Group 59 (STATE-RG59), National Archives (NA). A former State Department official, Walter Jenkins recalls that: ‘I think the first experience o f how we worked together was a cable that came in from Henry Kissinger in early 1969 that said: “It’s time to reopen our China talks. I want you to make contact with the Chinese ambassador to reopen these talks.’” Walter Jenkins, (Deputy C hief o f Mission, United States Embassy, Warsaw, Poland, 1966-1970), Oral History Interview, p.6, Poland, Country Collection, 1996, Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection (FAOHC), Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Special Collections Division, Lauinger Library, Georgetown University.

3 Stoessel to Kreisberg, October 27, 1969, p .l, Country File (CF)-Europe, B ox 700 [1 o f 2], The National Security Council Files (NSCF), Nixon Presidential Materials Staff (NPMS), NA.

4 Ibid., p.2. 5 Ibid.

177

On November 21, 1969, the State Department’s Bureau o f Research and Intelligence reported that in late October or early November, a Chinese diplomat suggested to a Czech journalist that if Washington was to propose an agenda, Beijing might be “receptive to a resumption o f the Warsaw talks” - the first specific hint since the cancellation of the meeting in February 1969.6 In public, the Chinese still maintained a consistent ideological posture against the United States. State Department officials interpreted that by reminding the Soviets o f the possible option of closer Sino-American relations, the Chinese wanted to worry the Soviets.7

Meanwhile, State Department officials were considering possible public moves. On December 2, 1969, Secretary Rogers sent a set o f recommendations to President Nixon to proceed with the remaining measures to relax economic controls against China on the basis o f NSDM-17 (which Nixon approved in June).8 State Department officials estimated that the Sino-Soviet negotiations in Beijing might lead to a “partial rapprochement,” which might take the form o f some restoration o f normalcy in state- to-state relations. Simultaneously, Soviet agreement to negotiate both with China on border problems and with the U.S. on SALT would enable the U.S. to maintain its posture o f “non-involvement in the Sino-Soviet dispute.”9

6 Intelligence Note, Bureau o f Intelligence and Research (INR), “Sino-US-Soviet Relations: Peking’s Double Game,” November 21, 1969, pp.1-2, POL Chicom-US. 1967-69, Box 1973, SNF, STATE- RG59, NA.

7 Ibid., pp.2-3.

8 Rogers to Nixon, “Next Steps in China Policy,” December 2, 1969, p .l, Attached to Memo from Kissinger to Richardson, “Next Moves in China Policy,” December 16, 1969, POL Chicom-US. 1967- 69, Box 1973, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA. The decision allowed unlimited tourist purchases and relaxed limits on trade in non-strategic goods by U.S.-owned firms abroad.

1.2. The December 1969 contacts in Warsaw

On December 3, direct contact with China was finally made when U.S. Ambassador Walter Stoessel spotted the Chinese Charge d'affaires Lei Yang at a Yugoslav fashion show at Warsaw’s Palace o f Culture.10 Stoessel conveyed a message to Lei’s interpreter that: “I was recently in Washington and saw President Nixon. He told me he would like to have serious concrete talks with the Chinese.” 11 Lei agreed to pass the message to Beijing. On December 7, 1969, without any public explanation, China released two Americans who had been held since February 16 when their yacht had strayed into Chinese waters off Kwangtung province.12 On December 10, the Chinese suddenly proposed that Stoessel visit the Chinese embassy the next day. The State Department’s instructions to Ambassador Stoessel directed that he should make a “generalized statement o f US desire for improved relations” and suggest a date and arrangements for formal meetings but avoid any specific discussions on other issues.13 The State Department’s Bureau o f East Asian and Pacific Affairs interpreted the Chinese proposal within the context o f Sino-Soviet difficulties. Green wrote to Rogers, arguing that Beijing’s motives reflected a change in November as a result o f

10 Richard Solomon, Interview with Komine, September 24, 2003; and Jenkins, Oral History Interview, p.6, Poland, Country Collection, FAOHC. Jenkins recalls that Ambassador Walter Stoessel “kept things on an even keel, and very, very professionally. He developed very good relationships with other diplomats and Polish officials, because they really recognized him as a competent professional.” As for initial Warsaw contact see also Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little Brown, 1979), pp. 188-189; and Patrick E. Tyler, A Great Wall: Six Presidents and China, An Investigative History

(New York: Public Affairs, 1999), pp.74-75.

11 Stoessel to Rogers, “Contact with Communist Chinese,” December 3, 1969, p .l, POL Chicom-US. 1967-69, Box 1973, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.

12 Stoessel to Rogers, “Return o f American Yachtsmen; Contact with Communist Chinese,” December 7, 1969, p .l, POL Chicom-US. 1967-69, Box 1973, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA. This was a different from the July incident, which is previously described in p. 140, footnote no. 98.

13 Rogers to Stoessel, “Sino-US Meeting,” December 11, 1969, p .l, POL Chicom-US. 1967-69, Box 1973, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.

179

“deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations” and the beginning of U.S.-USSR SALT talks.14 On the other hand, Kissinger wrote to Nixon, suspecting that the Chinese may have called the meeting “primarily to get a feeling for your Administration’s attitude toward them.” 15 Hence, Kissinger remained cautious: “I do not believe that we should be under any illusions that a whole new era in Sino-US relations is opening.”16 Kissinger judged that Beijing might regard contact with the U.S. as a “tactical step designed to put pressure on Moscow” by showing that the Chinese “have options open which are unpleasant to the Soviets.”17 Kissinger concluded that a “contact of even a limited nature could turn into something more significant if it can be maintained.”18

On December 11, Ambassador Stoessel visited the Chinese Embassy in Warsaw and held talks with Lei Yang. Following the State Department’s instructions, Stoessel formally proposed the resumption of ambassadorial talks at the U.S. Embassy in mid- January, stressing that: “We believe China has an important role in Asia, and that in the last analysis Asian decisions must be taken by Asian nations themselves, a process in which China should take part.”19 Lei agreed to deliver the message to Beijing. On December 12, a State Department spokesman, Robert McCloskey gave a press statement, describing the contact as being held in a “cordial” atmosphere.20 On December 14, 1969, The Washington Post ran the headline that “China Sees Leverage

14 Green to Rogers, “Implications o f PRC Agreement to Meet with US Ambassador - Information Memorandum,” December 10, 1969, p .l, Country File (CF)-Europe, B ox 700 [1 o f 2], NSCF, NPMS, NA.

15 Kissinger to Nixon, “Warsaw Talks, [December 10, 1969],” p i, CF-Europe, Box 700 [1 o f 2], NSCF, NPMS, NA.

16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid., p.2.

19 Stoessel to Rogers, “Sino-US Meeting,” December 11, 1969, POL Chicom-US. 1967-69, Box 1973, SNF, STATE-RG59, NA.