ETAPA DE CONTROL

After Chiluba two terms of office, Zambia went to the polls in 2001 where Levy Patrick Mwanawasa was elected as the Republican President. As already noted above that Zambian economy in the ten years of President Chiluba from 1991 to 2001 did not record meaningful economic growth, this means that, President Mwanawasa came to office at the time when the Zambian economy was not doing fine. It should be noted here that when Mwanawasa came into power in 2001, he found in place the programme of debt cancellation designed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund called HIPC to help reduce the debt burden of mostly poor countries. From what has been discussed above on factors that led to Zambia’s economic challenges, debt kept on accumulating and as a result, it was difficult for Zambia to channel resources from her GDP to improve the livelihood of ordinary Zambians. When Mwanawasa came into office in 2001, because of his passion for economic growth, he had no option but to be part of the HIPC programme. Situmbeko and Zulu, (2004: 17-18) highlight that:

The 1970s and the 1980s saw Zambia’s debt spiral out of control, Zambia’s total external debt rose from US $ 814 Million to US $ 3,244 Million by the end of the decade. The situation then further deteriorated with Zambia’s external debt more than doubling to US$ 6,916 Million by the end of 1980s. By 1998, each Zambian citizen owed US$ 781 or more than twice the average person’s per capita income (GNP)…this appalling situation set the stage for Zambia’s entry into the IMF and World Bank’s HIPC initiative aimed at bringing poor countries’ debt down to sustainable levels.

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From the HIPC programme it is reported that there were little benefits that came alone it, Nicholas Mtetesha tells us that when Mwanawasa came to office he “enjoyed the HIPC completion point debt cancellation hence enjoyed a more freed budget for greater local spending after that debt relief” (2013: n.p). It is further reported that:

Mwanawasa enjoyed a more lucrative government and embarked on poverty alleviating schemes, Zambia could now afford national development planning hence the fifth development plan, greater infrastructural development investments, and lifting of the wage freeze burden. This saw Zambia’s economy begin to grow, prices of commodity prices dropping and general improvement in the livelihood of ordinary Zambians (Mtetesha, 2013: n.p).

What is obvious from Mwanawasa’s administration is that he was able to foster some socioeconomic development in his tenure of office. Mtetesha attest to this when he says that:

Though Mwanawasa came as a minority and unpopular president, he overtime marshalled support from HIPC benefits to gain a parliamentary majority in his incumbency in 2006, Mwanawasa as such remains the most celebrated president of all times given his commitment to channel the freed budget to socioeconomic development but more due to his untimely death which resulted into a deeply divided MMD (Mtetesha, 2013: n.p).

It is worth to note at this point that, although President Mwanawasa scored some economic growth in his tenure of office as a result of the benefits that came from the HIPC completion point, the IMF and IDA report highlights that:

The relief that Zambia is (was) getting under HIPC is (was) proving to be inadequate in removing its debt burden. By the start of 2003, Zambia had received only 5 percent of the debt service reduction committed to it under HIPC. Even when it has reached completion point, Zambia’s debt service will [had] continue [continued] to rise. Assuming that it has reached completion point, debt service paid will be US$ 227 million and US$ 215 million in 2004 and 2005 respectively, compared to US$ 142 million and US$ 138 million in 2001 and 2002 (IMF and IDA, 2003: n.p).

According to IMF and IDA, HIPC benefits had little benefits to the Zambian people. Situmbeko and Zulu, (2004: 19) demonstrate this by stating that:

Not only is HIPC inadequate in delivering debt cancellation, it has also extended the ability of IMF and World Bank to impose conditions on Zambia…to qualify for debt relief under HIPC, Zambia has [had] to: implement conditions as set out in a ‘decision point document’ by the IMF and World Bank; formulate a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) setting out the policy direction of the country, approved by the IMF and World Bank; and be

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on truck with an IMF poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) programme. If any of these conditions are not met debt relief can be withheld. It should be noted here that IMF and World Bank justified the economic conditions for debt relief that “conditions are [were] needed in order to ensure that countries do not get into further debt problems” (Situmbeko and Zulu, 2004: 19), but it is argued that “if IMF and World Bank economic policy conditions really did work, Zambia would not be in its current mess” (Situmbeko and Zulu, 2004: 19). So we see that the benefits that came from the HIPC completion point in Mwanawasa’s regime was temporal and as a result Zambia continued to struggle economically.

In summary it can be said that President Mwanawasa in his tenure of office was known for leading:

A vigorous anti-corruption campaign, spearheaded national debt relief, and made commendable attempts at easing national poverty…it was during his tenure that Zambia managed to shake off the heavy weight of external debt, which had mounted over the years to an unsustainable US$ 7 billion. Repayments were severely affecting the country’s finances … under Mwanawasa, Zambia in 2005 qualified for debt forgiveness, wherein a substantial part of that debt was written off. Soon afterwards the country attained further debt relief under the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) of the G-7 countries (Kapata, 2014: 23-24).