Arquitectura del Modelo Propuesto de Recursos
5.2 ETAPA DE PLANIFICACIÓN DEL NUEVO MODELO DE RECURSOS HUMANOS RECURSOS HUMANOS
5.2.1 Etapa de Planificación
Constitutional Law 99
iiigl) The ruling in Purugananwas modified in Government of
HongKong v. Hon. Felixberto Olalia, jr., G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007, where the Supreme Court said that it cannot ignore the modern trend in public
international law which places primacy on the worth of the individual person and the sanctity of human rights. While the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is not a treaty, the principles contained therein are now recognized as customarily binding upon the members of the international community. In Mejoff v. Director o f
Prisons, this Court, in granting bail to a prospective deportee, held that under the
Constitution, the principles set forth in the Declaration are part of the law of the
land. If bail can be granted in deportation cases, considering that the Universa l
Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.
iiig2) Citing Chief Justice Puno s Separate Opinion in
Puruganan, the Court, in Government of HongKong, adopted a new standard to
be used in granting bail in extradition cases, denominated clear and convincing evidence . As Chief Justice Puno explained, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt, but higher than preponderance of evidence. The
potential extraditee must prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court
for entitlement to bail.
iiih) In Roxas v. Vasquez, G.R. No. 114944, June 21, 2001, it
was held that the lack of notice to, or participation of, petitioners (who had a lready
been cleared by the Ombudsman in its original resolution) at the reinvestigation does not render the subsequent resolution (on reinvestigation) null and void, ev en
if the said subsequent resolution reinstated the complaint against them. But in the
Resolution, dated May 29, 2002, on the Motion for Reconsideration in the said case, the Supreme Court said that the petitioners were denied due process when the Special Investigator reinstated the complaint against the petitioners withou t
their knowledge. At the very least, they should have been notified that the complaint against them had not yet been finally disposed of. They should have been apprised of their possible implication in the criminal case, to enable them to
meet any new accusation against them head-on and to prepare for their defense.
iv) The right of a party to cross-examine the witness against
him in a civil case is an indispensable part of due process [Ortigas v. Lufthans a,
64 SCRA 610], But in administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure an d
evidence are not strictly applied. Since nothing on record shows that petitioner asked for cross-examination, he cannot argue that he has been
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100 Constitutional La*
deprived of due process merely because no cross-examination took place [Emin v. De Leon, G.R. No. 139794, February 27, 2002]. Likewise, it was held that wher e
the petitioners were amply afforded the opportunity to register objections to respondent s offer of evidence, there was no denial of due process [Rodson Phil., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141857, June 9, 2004].
iiij) The filing of a motion for reconsideration cures the defect of
absence of a hearing [Chua v. Court of Appeals, 287 SCRA 33; reiterated in Marohombsar v. Judge Adiong, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1674, January 22, 2004]. The
essence of due process in administrative proceedings is an opportunity to explai n
one s side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of [Emin v. De Leon, supra.]. In Quintos v. Comelec, G.R. No. 149800, November 21, 2002, it was held that petitioner was not denied due process
because he subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration which the Comelec considered and acted upon, albeit unfavorably.
iiik) In Villaruel v. Fernando, G.R. No. 136726, September 24,
2003, it was held that there was no denial of due process where the appellate court dismissed petitioner s appeal for failure of the Office of the Solicitor Gen eral
to file the required memorandum. As a rule, the negligence of counsel binds the client. Moreover, petitioner in this case is not entirely blameless for the dism issal
of his appeal. After the OSG s failure to file the answer to the petition for mandamus and damages, and to have the order declaring the petitioner in default lifted, petitioner should have already replaced the OSG with another lawyer. The same principle was reiterated in Borromeo Bros. Estate v. Garcia, G.R. no.
139594-95, February 26, 2008.
iiil) There are cases in which notice and hearing may be
dispensed with without violating due process. Among these are the cancellation o f
the passport of a person sought for the commission of a crime [Suntay v. People, 101 Phil 833], the preventive suspension of a civil servant facing administrativ e
charges [Co v. Barbers, 290 SCRA 717], the distraint of property for tax
delinquency; the padlocking of restaurants found unsanitary or of theaters showi ng
obscene movies, and the abatement of nuisances per se. And in Equitable Banking Corporation v. Calderon, G.R. No. 156168. December 14,
2004, the Supreme Court ruled that no malice or bad faith attended the Bank s dishonor of Calderon s credit card, inasmuch as the dishonor was justified under its Credit Card Agreement which provided that the the cardholder agreed not to exceed his approved credit limit, otherwise the card privilege would be
automatically suspended without notice to the cardholder.
iiim) A person who is not impleaded in a complaint cannot be
bound by the decision rendered therein, for no man shall be affected by a OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW
proceeding in which he is a stranger. In this case, the respondent is adversely affected by such judgment, as he was the subsequent purchaser of the subject property, and title was already transferred to him. It will be the height of ine quity to
allow respondent s title to be nullified without the respondent being given the opportunity to present any evidence in support of his ostensible ownership of th e
property. It is tantamount to a violation of the constitutional guarantee that n o
person shall be deprived of property witout due process of law [National Housing Authority v. Evangelista, G.R. No. 140945, May 16, 2005].
iv) Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing. This is
necessary, because otherwise, the right to a hearing would be rendered
meaningless. Relate this to Sec. 14, Art. VIII, which provides that no decision shall
be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the f acts
and the law on which it is based.
iva) Due process demands that the parties to a litigation be
informed how the case was decided with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court [Insular Life Assurance Co. v.
Young, G.R. No. 140964, January 16, 2002].
ivb) In Lorbes v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139884, February
15, 2001, it was held that courts should be liberal in setting aside orders of d efault,
because judgments of default are frowned upon unless in cases where it clearly appears that the reopening of the case is intended for delay. Where the order of default is immoderate, there is a violation of due process.
6. Publication as part of due process. In Tanada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446,
the Court held that publication is imperative to the validity of laws, president ial
decrees and executive orders, administrative rules and regulations, and is an indispensable part of due process. Thus, in Republic {National
Telecommunications Commission) v. Express Telecommunications, G.R. No.
147096, January 15, 2002, the National Telecommunciations Commission, in
granting Bayantel the provisional authority to operate, applied the 1978 Rules o f
Practice and Procedure, and not the 1993 Revised Rules, because the latter had not yet been published (although the same had already been filed with the Nation al
Administrative Register). 7
7. Appeal and due process. Appeal is not a natural right nor is it part of due process [Tropical Homes, Inc. v. NHA, 152 SCRA 540];
generally, it may be allowed or denied by the legislature in its discretion.
But where the Constitution gives a person the right to appeal, e.g., in the cases coming under the minimum appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court [Sec. 5(2), Art. VIII], denial of the right to appeal constitutes a violation of due process. Where
102 Constitutional Law
there is a statutory grant of the right to appeal, denial of that remedy also constitutes a denial of due process.
a) In Alba v. Nitorreda, 254 SCRA 753, the Supreme Court reiterated
that the right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of due process; it is merely
a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Accordingly, the constitutional requirement of due process may be satisfied notwithstanding the denial of the right to appeal, beca use
the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard and to present evidence in support of one s case. See also Producers Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126620, April 17, 2002. In Barata v. Abalos, G.R. No. 142888, June 6, 2001, it was held that the failure to provide the complainant the right to appea l in
certain cases (e.g., from the decision of the Ombudsman) is not a denial of due process. It may be noted that in appropriate cases involving oppressive or arbit rary
action, the complainant is not deprived of a legal recourse by certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, which applies suppletorily to the Rules of Procedure o f
the Ombudsman.
b) In Sajotv. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109721, March 11, 1999, it was
held that there was no denial of due process where the court denied the appeal due to the negligence of the accused and of his counsel. An appellant must stric tly
comply with the rules inasmuch as appeal is purely a statutory right.
8. Preliminary investigation and due process. It is doctrinally settled that the right to preliminary investigation is not a constitutional right, but is merely a right
conferred by statute [Serapio v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148468, January 28, 2003]. The absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity o f
the information or otherwise render the same defective. The denial of the motion for reinvestigation cannot likewise invalidate the information or oust the court of its
jurisdiction over the case [Budiongan v. De la Cruz, G.R. No. 170288, September 22, 2006], The right may be waived expressly or by failure to invoke it [Benedic to
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125359, September 4, 2001]. It may be forfeited by inaction, and cannot be invoked for the first time on appeal [People v. Lagao, G .R.
No. 118457, April 8, 1997].
a) But where there is a statutory grant of the right to preliminary
investigation, denial of the same is an infringement of the due process clause [ Go
v. Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA 138]. In such cases, the right to preliminary investigation is substantive, not merely formal or technical. To deny it to the petitioner would deprive him of the full measure of his right to due process [Yu sop
v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 138859-60, February 22, 2001].
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i) A preliminary investigation is held before an accused is placed on
trial to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution ,
and to protect him from the trouble, expenses and anxiety of a public trial. It is also
intended to protect the State from having to conduct useless and expensive trial s.
Thus, while the right is statutory rather than constitutional, it is a component of due
process in administering criminal justice [Victor Jose Tan Uyv. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 156399-400, July 27, 2008].
b) It is now provided in Sec. 1, Rule 112, Rules on Criminal Procedure, that a preliminary investigation is required to be conducted before the filing of a complaint or information for an offense where the penalty prescribed by law is a t
least 4 years, 2 months and 1 day, without regard to the fine.
i) However, when a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant
involving an offense which requires a preliminary investigation, the complaint o r
information may be filed by a prosecutor without need of such investigation provided an inquest has been conducted in accordance with existing rules. In the absence or unavailability of an inquest prosecutor, the complaint may be filed b y
the offended party or a peace officer directly with the proper court on the basi s of
the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer. Before the complaint o r
information is filed, the person arrested may ask for a preliminary
investigation in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in the presence of his counsel. Notwithstanding the waiver, he may apply for bail and the
investigation must be terminated within 15 days from its inception. After the fi ling
of the complaint or information in court without a preliminary investigation, th e
accused may, within 5 days from the time he learns of its filing, ask for a preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his defense as
provided in this Rule [Sec. 7, Rule 112, Rules on Criminal Procedure].
ii) Be that as it may, the lack of preliminary investigation is not a ground for a motion to quash. The case must be suspended with respect to the petitioner even if the case is already undergoing trial [Yusop v. Sandiganbayan, supra.]. T he
right is not waived by the filing of motion to be admitted to bail. But the righ t is
waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a p lea
at arraignment [People v. Velasquez, G.R. No. 132635, February 21, 2001;
Benedicto v. Court of Appeals, supra],
iii) The preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ is merely
inquisitorial; it is not a trial on the merits, and its sole purpose is to deter mine
whether a crime has been committed and whether the respondent therein is
probably guilty of the crime. It is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive
of the parties evidence, and upon satisfaction of the investigating OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW
prosecutor that probable cause exists based on the evidence presented, he may terminate the preliminary investigation and resolve the case [Judy Ann Santos v.
People, G.R. No. 173176, August 26, 2008].
c) A preliminary investigation is essentially an inquiry to determine
whether (1) a crime has been committed, and (2) whether there is probable cause that the accused is guilty thereof. The public prosecutor determines during the preliminary investigation whether probable cause exists; thus the decision wheth er
or not to dismiss the criminal complaint depends on the sound discretion of the prosecutor. Courts will not interfere with the conduct of preliminary investigat ion or
reinvestigation or in the determination of what constitutes sufficient probable cause
for the filing of the corresponding information against the offender [Baviera v.
Paglinawan, G.R. No. 168580, February 8, 2007]. In Sanrio Company v. Lim, G.R.
No. 168380, February 8, 2008, the Supreme Court reiterated the policy of noninte rference
with executive discretion in the determination of probable cause. It held
that a public prosecutor is afforded a wide latitude of discretion in the conduc t of
preliminary investigation.
i) The possible exception to this rule of non-interference, as held in
Aguirre v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 170723, March 3, 2008, is where there is
an unmistakable showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction on the part of the public prosecutor. Such grave abuse of discretio n will
then justify judicial intrusion into the precincts of the executive.
d) Consistent with the rights of all persons to due process of law and to speedy trial, the Constitution commands the Office of the Ombudsman to act promptly on complaints filed against public officials. Thus, the failure of said office
to resolve a complaint that has been pending for six years clearly violates this mandate and the public official s rights. In such event, the aggrieved party is en titled
to the dismissal of the complaint [Roque v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 129978, May 12, 1999]. This reiterates Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70, where the Court said that unreasonable delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by t he
Tanodbayan violated the due process clause. But where the delay is due to the complexity of the issues involved [Defensor- Santiago v. Garchitorena, 228 SCRA 214], or is caused by the petitioner s own acts, not by the inaction of the prosec ution
[Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, 253 SCRA 559], there is no violation. i) i) The Court does not interfere with the Ombudsman s
discretion in the conduct of preliminary investigation. The Ombudsman s findings are essentially factual in nature, and the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts [Serapio v. Sandiganbayan, supra.].
Constitutional Law 105
9. Administrative due process. In Ang Tibay v. CIR, 69 Phil 635, the Court enumerated the requisites of administrative due process, as follows: (a) The rig ht
to a hearing, which includes the right to present one s case and submit evidence in support thereof; (b) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (c) T he
decision must have something to support itself; (d) The evidence must be
substantial; (e) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties; (f) T he
tribunal or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent considerati on
of the facts and the law of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a
subordinate in arriving at a decision; and (g) The board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties t o
the proceeding will know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision.
a) Due process in quasi-judicial proceedings before the Comelec
requires notice and hearing. The proclamation of a winning candidate cannot be annulled if he has not been notified of any motion to set aside his proclamation . In
Namil v. Comelec, G.R. No. 150540, October 28, 2003, the Comelec issued the questioned order annulling the proclamation on the basis of private respondent s allegations and the recommendation of the law department, without giving notice to the candidate proclaimed. Thus, the Comelec order was declared void.
C. Equal Protection of the laws. fSec. 1. Art. Ill: x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws .]
1. Meaning; persons protected. All persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities impose d.
Natural and juridical persons are entitled to this guarantee; but with respect t o
artificial persons, they enjoy the protection only insofar as their property is concerned.
2. Scope of Equality.
a) Economic. See constitutional provisions on: (i) Free access to courts
[Sec. 11, Art. Ill]; (ii) Marine wealth reserved for Filipino citizens; and Cong ress
may reserve certain areas of investments [Sec. 2, par. 2, and Sec. 10, Art. XII]
;
(iii) Reduction of social, economic and political inequities [Secs. 1, 2 and 3, Art.
XIII]. See Ichong v. Hernandez, supra., Villegas v. Hiu Chiong, 86 SCRA 275;
Dumlao v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392. i)
i) In Tan v. Del Rosario, 237 SCRA 324, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of RA 7496 limiting the allowable deductions from OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW
gross income of single proprietorships and professionals. It was held that uniformity of taxation does not prohibit classification, provided the requiremen ts of
valid classification are complied with.
b) Political. See constitutional provisions on: free access to courts [Sec.
11, Art. Ill]; bona fide candidates being free from harassment or discrimination [Sec. 10, Art. IX-C]; reduction of social, economic and political inequities [Se c. 1,
Art. XIII].
i) The Constitution, as a general rule, places the civil rights of
aliens on an equal footing with those of citizens; but their political rights do not
enjoy the same protection [Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco, 16 Phil 534]. In Peralta v.
Comelec, 82 SCRA 30, the Court upheld the adoption of block voting, saying that
Comelec, 82 SCRA 30, the Court upheld the adoption of block voting, saying that