Los Niveles de Madurez

1. The inherent powers of the State are: (a) Police Power; (b) Power of Eminent Domain; and (c) Power of Taxation

2. Similarities:

a) Inherent in the State, exercised even without need of express constitutional grant.

b) Necessary and indispensable; State cannot be effective without them.

c) Methods by which State interferes with private property.

d) Presuppose equivalent compensation e) Exercised primarily by the Legislature.

3. Distinctions:

a) Police power regulates both liberty and property; eminent domain and taxation affect only property rights.

b) Police power and taxation are exercised only by government;

eminent domain may be exercised by private entities.

c) Property taken in police power is usually noxious or intended for a noxious purpose and may thus be destroyed; while in eminent domain and taxation, the property is wholesome and devoted to public use or purpose.

d) Compensation in police power is the intangible, altruistic feeling that the individual has contributed to the public good; in eminent domain, it is the full

and fair equivalent of the property taken; while in taxation, it is the protecti on given

and/or public improvements instituted by government for the taxes paid. 5 5. Limitations: Generally, the Bill of Rights, although in some cases

the exercise of the power prevails over specific constitutional guarantees.

The courts may annul the improvident exercise of police power, e.g., in Quezon City v. Ericta, 122 SCRA 759 and in Philippine Press Institute v.

Comelec, 244 SCRA 272.

Constitutional Law B. Police Power

1. Definition. The power of promoting public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property.

2. Scope/Characteristics: Police power is the most pervasive, the least

limitable, and the most demanding of the three powers. The justification is foun d

in the Latin maxims: salus populi est suprema lex, and sic utere tuo ut alienum non

laedas.

a) Police power cannot be bargained away through the medium of a

treaty or a contract [Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814; Ichong v. Hernandez, 1 01

Phil. 1155].

b) The taxing power may be used as an implement of police power [Lutz v. Araneta, 98 Phil. 148; Tiu v. Videogram Regulatory Board, 151 SCRA 208;

Gaston v. Republic Planters Bank, 158 SCRA 626; Osmena v. Orbos, 220 SCRA 703].

c) Eminent domain may be used as an implement to attain the police

objective [Association of Small Landowners v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343].

d) A law enacted in the exercise of police power to regulate or govern

certain activities or transactions could be given retroactive effect and may reasonably impair vested rights or contracts. Police power legislation is applic able

not only to future contracts, but equally to those already in existence. Non-impairment of contracts or vested rights clauses will have to yield to the super ior

and legitimate exercise by the State of the police power [Ortigas & Co. v. Court of

Appeals, G.R. No. 126102, December 4, 2000], Thus, despite the retroactive effec t

of PD 957 (Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree), there is no violation of the non-impairment clause, because the decree is a valid exercise o f

the police power, and police power prevails over contracts [PNB v. Office of the President, 255 SCRA 5],

e) It is true that the Court has upheld the constitutional right of every

citizen to select a profession or course of study subject to fair, reasonable an d

equitable admission and academic requirements. But like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, their exercise may be so regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and the general welfare of the people. This regulation assumes particula r

pertinence in the field of medicine, to protect the public from the potentially deadly

effects of incompetence and ignorance [Professional Regulation Commission v.

De Guzman, G.R. No. 144681, June 21, 2004].

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f) The right to bear arms is merely a statutory privilege. The license to

carry a firearm is neither a property or a property right. Neither does it creat e a

vested right. A permit to carry a firearm outside one s residence may be revoked at any time. Even if it were a property right, it cannot be considered as absolu te as

to be beyond the reach of the police power [Chavez v. Romulo, 431 SCRA 534].

g) Like timber permits, mining exploration permits do not vest in the

grantee any permanent or irrevocable right within the purview of the nonimpairme ntanddue

process clauses, since the State, underitsall-encompassing

police power, may alter, modify or amend the same in accordance with the demands of the general welfare [Southeast Mindanao Goldmining Corporation v.

Balite Portal Mining, G.R. No. 135190, April 3, 2002].

h) A license to operate a motor vehicle is not a property right, but a

privilege granted by the State, which may be suspended or revoked by the State in the exercise of its police power, in the interest of public safety and welfar e,

subject to the procedural due process requirements [Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Garin, G.R. No. 130230, April 15, 2005].

i) R.A. 9257, otherwise known as the Expanded Senior Citizens Act of

2003 , is a legitimate exercise of police power. Administrative Order No. 177 issued by the Department of Health, providing that the 20% discount privilege of senior citizens shall not be limited to the purchase of unbranded generic medici ne

but shall extend to both prescription and non-prescription medicince, whether branded or generic, is valid. When conditions so demand, as determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by the due process clause, must yield to the general welfare [Carlos Superdrug Corporation v. DSWD, etal., G.R. No. 166494, June 29, 2007].

3. Who may exercise the power. The power is inherently vested in the

Legislature. However, Congress may validly delegate this power to the President, to administrative bodies and to lawmaking bodies of local government units. Loca l

government units exercise the power under the general welfare clause [Sec. 16, R.A. 7160], and under Secs. 391, 447, 458 and 468, R.A. 7160. .

a) While police power may be validly delegated to the President by law,

R.A. 6939 and P.D. 260, as amended, do not authorize the President, or any other administrative body, to take over the internal management of a cooperative.

Accordingly, Memorandum Order No. 409, issued by the President, constituting an ad hoc committee to temporarily take over and

50 Constitutional Law

manage the affairs of CANORECO is invalid [Camarines Norte Electric Cooperative v. Torres, G.R. No. 127249, February 27, 1998].

b) Unlike the legislative bodies of local government units, there is no provision in R.A. 7924 that empowers the Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA) or its Council to enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. Thus, MMDA may not order the opening of Neptune St. in the Bel-Air Subdivision to public traffi c, as

it does not possess delegated police power [Metro Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association, G.R. No. 135962, March 27, 2000]. While Sec. 5(f ),

R.A. 7924, does not grant the MMDA the power to confiscate and suspend or

revoke drivers licenses without need of any other legislative enactment, the same law vests the MMDA with the duty to enforce existing traffic rules and regulatio ns.

Thus, where there is a traffic law or regulation validly enacted by the legislat ure or

those agencies to whom legislative power has been delegated (the City of Manila, in this case), the MMDA is not precluded and in fact is duty-bound to

confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers licenses in the exercise of its mandate of transport and traffic management, as well as the administration and

implementation of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering servic es

and traffic education programs [Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v.

Garin, G.R. No. 130230, April 15, 2005]

In Francisco v. Fernando, G.R. No. 166501, November 16, 2006, a petition for prohibition and mandamus was filed against the MMDA and its Chairman, Bayani Fernando, to enjoin the further implementation of the Wet Flag Scheme and to compel respondents to respect and uphold the pedestrians right to due process and right to equal protection of the law. (As implemented, police mobile units bearing wet flags with words Maglakadandmag-abang sa bangketa are deployed along major Metro Manila thoroughfares.) It was held that the petitioner failed to

show the lack of basis or the unreasonableness of the Wet Flag Scheme. On the alleged lack of legal basis, the Court noted that all the cities and municipalit ies

within MMDA s jurisdiction except Valenzuela City have each enacted antijaywalking ordinances or traffic management codes with provisions for pedestrian

regulation. This serves as sufficient basis for the respondent s implementation of schemes to enforce the anti-jaywalking ordinances and similar regulations. The MMDA is an administrative agency tasked with the implementation of rules and regulations enacted by proper authorities. The absence of an anti-jaywalking ordinance in Valenzuela City does not detract from this conclusion absent any proof that respondents implemented the Flag Scheme in that city.

c) While concededly, the President has the authority to provide for the establishment of the Greater Manila Mass Transport System, in order OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW

to decongest traffic by eliminating bus terminals along major Metro Manila thoroughfares, EO No. 179, which designates the Metro Manila Development

Authority as the implementing agency for the project, is ultra vires. Under the provisions of EO 125, as amended, it is the DOTC, not the MMDA, which is

authorized to establish and implement such a project. The President must exercis e

the authority through the instrumentality of the DOTC which, by law is the prima ry

implementing and administrative entity in the promotion, development and regulation of networks of transportation. By designating the MMDA as the implementing agency, the President overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by law [Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Viron

Transportation, G.R. No. 170656, August 15, 2007].

4. Limitations (Tests for Valid Exercise):

a) Lawful subject:Theinterestsofthepublicinqeneral.asdistinquished

from those of a particular class, require the exercise of the power. This means that

the activity or property sought to be regulated affects the general welfare; if it does,

then the enjoyment of the rights flowing therefrom may have to yield to the inte rests

of the greater number. See.Taxicab Operators v. Board of Transportation, 119 SCRA 597; Velasco v. Villegas, 120 SCRA 568; Bautista v. Juinio, 127 SCRA 329;

Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323; Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 176 SCRA 719.

i) In Lim v. Pacquing, 240 SCRA 649, it was held that P.D. 771,

which expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits to operate all forms of

gambling facilities (including jai-alai) issued by local governments, was a vali d

exercise of the police power. Gambling is essentially antagonistic to the object ives

of national productivity and self-reliance; it is a vice and a social ill which the

government must minimize (or eradicate) in pursuit of social and economic development. Miners Association of the Philippines v. Factoran, 240 SCRA 100, upheld the validity of Administrative Orders Nos. 57 and 82 of the DENR Secretar y

which effectively converted existing mining leases and other mining agreements into production-sharing agreements within one year from effectivity, inasmuch as the subject sought to be governed by the questioned orders is germane to the objects and purposes of E.O 279, and that mining leases or agreements granted by the State are subject to alterations through a reasonable exercise of the pol ice

power of the State.

ii) In Pollution Adjudication Board v. Court of Appeals, 195 SCRA

112, the Supreme Court held that ex parte cease and desist orders issued by the Pollution Adjudication Board are permitted by law and regulations in situations such as stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and untreated effluents i nto

the rivers and other inland waters. The relevant pollution control

statute and implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of police power, x x x The ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests through th e

exercise of police power.

b) Lawful Means: The means employed are reasonably necessary for

the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive on individuals.

See: Ynotv. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148SCRA 659; Tablarin v. Gutierrez, 152 SCRA 730; Balacuit v. CFI of Agusan del Norte, 163 SCRA 182.

i) Police power concerns government enactments, which precisely

interfere with personal liberty or property to promote the general welfare or th e

common good. Athorough review of the facts and circumstances leading to the issuance of DOLE Order No. 3 (establishing various procedures and requirements for screening performing artists as a prerequisite to the processing of any cont ract

of employment by POEA) shows that the assailed order was issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to a valid exercise of the police power [JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 319].

ii) However, Sec. 2 of Comelec Resolution No. 2772, which

mandates newspapers of general circulation in every province or city to provide free print space of not less than 1/2 page as Comelec space, was held to be an invalid exercise of the police power in Philippine Press Institute v. Comelec, 2 44

SCRA 272,, there being no showing of the existence of a national emergency or imperious public necessity for the taking of print space, nor that the resolutio n was

the only reasonable and calibrated response to such necessity. [This was held to be an exercise of the power of eminent domain, albeit invalid, because the Comelec would not pay for the space to be given to it by the newspapers.]

Similarly, in City Government of Quezon City v. Ericta, 122 SCRA 759, the Quezon City ordinance which required commercial cemetery owners to reserve 6% of

burial lots for paupers in the City was held to be an invalid exercise of the po lice

power, but was, instead, an exercise of the power of eminent domain which would make the City liable to pay the owners just compensation.

iii) The proper exercise of the police power requires compliance

with the following requisites: (a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the intereference by the State; and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. An ordinance aimed at relieving traffic congestion meets the first standard; but declaring bu s

terminals as nuisances per se and ordering their closure or

Constitutional Law 53

relocation contravenes the second standard [Lucena Grand Central Terminal v. JAC Liner, G.R. NO. 148339, February 23, 2005].

iv) In Cabrera v. Lapid, G.R. No. 129098, December 6, 2006, the

Supreme Court upheld the dismissal by the Office of the Ombudsman of criminal charges against respondents local government officials who had ordered and carried out the demolition of a fishpond which purportedly blocked the flow of t he

Pasak River in Sasmuan, Pampanga, The Court agreed with the findings of the Ombudsman that those who participated in the blasting of the subject fishpond were only impelled by their desire to serve the best interest of the general pub lic .

5. Additional Limitations [When exercised by delegate]:

a) Express grant by law [e.g., Secs. 16, 391,447, 458 and 468, R. A.

7160, for local government units]

b) Within territorial limits [for local government units, except when exercised to protect water supply],

c) Must not be contrary to law. [Activity prohibited by law cannot, in the guise of regulation, be allowed; an activity allowed by law may be regulated, bu t

not prohibited.] See: De la Cruz v. Paras, 123 SCRA 569; City Government of Quezon City v. Ericta, 122 SCRA 759; Villacorta v. Bernardo, 143 SCRA 480.

i) In Solicitor General v. Metropolitan Manila Authority, G.R. No.

102782, December 11,1991, reiterated in Tatelv. Municipality of Virac, G.R. No.

40243, March 11, 1992, and in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties, G.R. No. 111097, July 20, 1994, the Supreme Court declared that for municipal ordinances to be valid, they: [a] must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; [b] must n ot be

unfair or oppressive; [c] must not be partial or discriminatory; [d] must not pr ohibit,

but may regulate, trade; [e] must not be unreasonable; and [f] must be general i n

application and consistent with public policy.

ii) In City of Manila v. Judge Laguio, G.R. No. 118127, April 12,

2005, the Supreme Court declared as an invalid exercise of the police power City of Manila Ordinance No. 7783, which prohibited the establishment or operation of businesses providing certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities in the Ermita-Malate area . Concedely, the ordinance was enacted with the best of motives and shares the concern of the public for the cleansing of th e

Ermita-Malate area of its social sins. Despite its virtuous aims, however, the enactment of the ordinance has no statutory or constitutional

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authority to stand on. Local legislative bodies cannot prohibit the operation of sauna and massage parlors, karaoke bars, beerhouses, night clubs, day clubs, supper clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels and inns, or order the ir

transfer or conversion without infringing the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws, not even in the guise of police power.

iii) The authority of a municipality to issue zoning classification is an

exercise of the police power, not the power of eminent domain. A zoning ordinanc e

is defined as a local city or municipal legislation which logically arranges, prescribes, defines and apportions a given.political subdivision into specific l and

uses as present and future projection of needs [Pasong Bayabas Farmers

Association v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 142359 and 142980, May 25, 2004].

C. Power of Eminent Domain

1. Definition/Scope. Also known as the power of expropriation,

a) See: Sec. 9, Art. Ill; Sec. 18, Art. XII; Secs. 4 & 9, Art. XIII.

b) Distinguished from police power. Police power is the power of the

State to promote public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and

property. The power of eminent domain is the inherent right of the State to condemn private property to public use upon payment of just compensation.

Although both police power and eminent domain have the general welfare for their object, and recent trends show a mingling of the two with the latter being used as

an implement of the former, there are still traditional distinctions between the two.

Property condemned under police power is usually noxious or intended for a noxious purpose, hence no compensation is paid. Likewise in the exercise of poli ce

power, property rights of individuals are subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the State. Where a property interest is merely restricted because the continued use thereof would b e

injurious to public interest, there is no compensable taking. However, when a property interest is appropriated and applied to some public purpose, there is n eed

to pay just compensation. In the exercise of police power, the State restricts t he

use of private property, but none of the property interests in the bundle of rig hts

which constitute ownership is appropriated for use by or for the benefit of the public.

Use of the property by the owners is limited, but no aspect of the property is u sed

by or for the benefit of the public. The deprivation of use can, in fact, be tot al, and

it will not constitute compensable taking if nobody else acquires use of the pro

or any interest therein. If, however, in the regulation of OUTLINE ' REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW

the use of the property, somebody else acquires the use or interest thereof, suc h

restriction constitutes compensable taking [Didipio Earth-Savers MultiPurpose Association v. Gozun, G.R. No. 157882, March 30, 2006].

c) It is well settled that eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that need not be granted even by the fundamental law. Sec. 9, Art. Ill of the

c) It is well settled that eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that need not be granted even by the fundamental law. Sec. 9, Art. Ill of the

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