Evolución de la administración

The role which President Kabbah played in the conflict was also reflected in the papers’ coverage. The issues in this frame are analysed within the purview of two (2) sub-frames-‘The Kabbah, ECOMOG and Kamajors (CDF) Alliance’ and ‘The Kabbah-Norman Friction’.

The Kabbah, ECOMOG and Kamajors (CDF) Alliance

ST and Awoko reflected the high level of corruption in the upper echelons of the army (see Appendix III286, 372). This was a controversy that was not represented in FDP’s analysis (see Appendix III237, 257). Awoko (see Appendix III54-55) reported the controversies surrounding the supply of rice and the inflated number of personnel in the army, as notable instances of corruption. Thus, whilst officers received up to fifty bags of rice per month; the rank and file received half bag each. When this issue became enigmatic, the SLPP convinced the soldiers that they should be paid with money instead of rice, but the soldiers disagreed.45 Whilst President Kabbah grappled with the problems of reforming the army, the soldiers became disgusted with his actions and Norman’s affiliation and activities with the Kamajors. According to ST (17th and 20th January, 2006), Norman received classified information about a coup plot, which he relayed to President Kabbah. And on 25th May, 1997, a group of disgruntled soldiers toppled the SLPP in a bloody coup that ushered in the AFRC junta (see Appendix III56-57).

44

CDF Trial Judgment, op.cit:123, Awoko, ibid.

45

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President Kabbah and the SLPP stalwarts fled into exile in Guinea. ST (see Appendix III327) also reflected that all the coupists (except Tamba Gborie) were Northerners. But this fact was not seen in the analysis of either FDP or Awoko, though it is authenticated by what is in the existing literature (Hirsch op.cit:56; Penfold, op.cit:17). Hirsch (op.cit) made it clear that all the coupists were from the Binkolo Limba Chiefdom in Bombali District in the North (the home town of former President Momoh). And Gberie (2004:154-155) confirmed the extent to which the coup was dubbed a ‘Northern Affair’. The AFRC hurriedly joined forces with the RUF rebels to loot the State’s treasury, plunder the economy and unleash terror on innocent civilians (Abdallah, 2004:5-6).

ST (Wednesday, 22nd January, 2003:9) commented that it was when the junta refused to relinquish power that the use of force to restore the legitimate government became a common concern. Even CSOs in exile and the media called for military intervention (Standard Times, ibid). ST (see Appendix III370, 389) further analysed how this call also motivated the CDF to form an alliance with ECOMOG to bring back democracy to Sierra Leone. This view is also reflected in Awoko’s (see Appendix III65, 104) critical analysis on the issue. ST (see Appendix III302-303) further stated that the CDF’s formation was an attempt to mitigate the deep seated ethnic cleavages in Sierra Leone’s body- politic, but because the CDF was largely dominated by the Kamajors, it was never seen as having a national face. This is seen in the fact that the CDF’s operations were nationally co-ordinated by Norman, who was himself a Kamajor and the political party (SLPP) that was to be restored was South-Eastern dominated.

The papers reflected the CDF’s hierarchical structure, pointing to President Kabbah as its head (see Appendix III61-62). FDP (see Appendix III230) represented Norman as the figure, who unilaterally created the positions of Regional Coordinators that supervised the distribution of food and logistics to the CDF regionally. The paper (see Appendix III166) also pointed out that the War Council, which hitherto took strategic decisions and enforced discipline in the CDF, became powerless because of Norman’s influence and Kondowai’s disdain of the Council’s insistent on ‘punishing Kamajors that committed atrocities’. Awoko’s (see Appendix III232, 234)

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position on this issue resonated with that of FDP, pointing to the extent to which Norman was becoming more powerful than the War Council.

FDP and Awoko extensively covered Kamajors’ attacks on forces loyal to the junta in the South and the East to make way for ECOMOG’s deployment. Hence Koribondo, Bo, Kenema, Tongo, Moyamba etc. were attacked and the junta dislodged, but serious atrocities were committed against civilians (see Appendix III61, 147, 232). There were also similarities in reporting that General Maxwell Khobe (a Nigerian) was appointed Chief of Defence Staff of the Sierra Leone Army and was asked by President Kabbah to take over the affairs and control of the CDF. Subsequently, General Shelpidi (a Nigerian too) took over ECOMOG’s High Command and control of the CDF (FDP, ibid, ST, ibid and Awoko, ibid).

Thus, the junta launched ‘Operation No Living Thing’, which started in Kono district in the East, came through the North and ended in Freetown. According to FDP (see Appendix III141) the suffering of the masses heightened, when ECOMOG re-grouped and launched its reprisal attack. Essentially, FDP (see Appendix III146) and ST (see Appendix III292) called for the trials of ECOMOG forces for atrocities committed in the fight to take over Freetown. However, Awoko (Wednesday, 11th February, 2004:2) only reported that ECOMOG personnel were not subjected to war crimes trial. There was however a clear uniformity in the coverage that the Kamajors were also enlisted to push back the rebels out of Freetown; and the ensuing deadly battle occasioned the violations of the laws of war by all the warring factions (see Appendix III308). The Kabbah-Norman Friction

All of the papers under scrutiny asked why the chief prosecutor, David Crane, refused to indict Kabbah for war crimes. Indeed, they overwhelmingly called on Crane to indict Kabbah. FDP46 wanted Kabbah to face the SCSL, because he was the Minister of Defence and the head of the CDF. This was how FDP clearly reflected this:

46

See ‘Those Who Bear the Greatest Responsibility: Try Kabbah Now!’- Friday, 15th _{August, 2003:3; ‘Will Kabbah Survive Crane of Mass}

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Kabbah’s role in our just ended ten years rebel war could not be swept under the carpet like that… The numerous crimes against humanity allegedly committed by Commander Norman, for which he is currently being detained, must be in the knowledge of President Kabbah. Kabbah knew majority of the works of Norman’s Kamajors/CDF. Even the arms and ammo used by these fighters may have been financially provided by the President himself. Norman was a poor brat before he became a CDF/ Kamajors head. Who gave him the money to purchase arms? Where did he get the money to buy the arms and ammunition from Bulgaria in the first instance to launch the all-out war to get rid of the murderous band of AFRC/RUF coalition of the willing? ’Kabbah… is a man whose hands are filled with blood and in most cases innocent blood. And sadly though he failed to see that; he was lured into signing a peace accord with rebels, whose atrocities were despicable. He took a shovel, dug his own grave, but it is Norman whom he wants to be buried in it (see Appendix III143).

Even some SLPP stalwarts demanded that he be indicted and tried (‘Embarrassment...SLPP Calls for Kabbah’s Indictment’; ST, Friday, 14th March, 2003). Kabbah’s position statement that he was not aware of Norman’s arrest and would not have interfered was according to the papers unfounded (see Appendix III2-3, 142-143, 284-285).

As ST (Friday 14th March, 2003: 7-8) put it:

‘... He (President Kabbah) should have peacefully convinced Chief Norman to hand over himself to the SCSL, but instead allowed police officers to join forces with SCSL officials to humiliate and brutally arrest him, whilst performing his State functions’.

The treatment meted out to Norman during his initial arrest and detention was given prominence by the papers. The seriousness with which the issue was reported opened the eyes of many Sierra Leoneans to the plight of Norman and the other CDF indictees (now convicts). FDP (see Appendix III150, 166) attacked Penfold’s analysis that some of Norman’s pre-trial rights

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were being violated with impunity as he was locked-up in out-dated cells in Bonthe Island, meant for slaves. FDP (see Appendix III149, 155, 159) commented that Norman should not be given any preferential treatment because his ‘ethnic Kamajors army committed war crimes’ and also stated that ‘he deserved the treatments he received’.

ST (see Appendix III283, 287) and Awoko (see Appendix III2, 3) continued to oppose Norman’s pre- trial detention, until his trial started. Kabbah’s refusal to testify on behalf of Norman, as captured by the papers (see Appendix III238, 399-400) can further strengthen the friction argument. Though Kabbah testified on behalf of RUF’s Issa Sesay, for his role in the peace process; he denied testifying on behalf of Norman, who co-ordinated the operations of the CDF, leading to ECOMOG’s triumph over the junta; and the eventual restoration of the SLPP. Inferentially, the nuances in the coverage of ST and Awoko on ‘the Norman episode’, point to the perception that Norman had become too powerful. Some members of the SLPP had already seen him as a potential successor to Kabbah, who had already begun making ways for his Vice President, Solomon Berewa to succeed him. So, Norman’s ‘trial and indictment’ was reportedly calculated to eliminate him from the political race:

Being a lawyer by profession and believing that he should have knowledge of the operation of the Special Court, President Kabbah might have decided for Special Court as a way of getting rid of Chief Norman. This is probably not the first time President Kabbah has reportedly tried to get rid of Norman. Following the restoration of democracy in 1998, and the seeming popularity of Norman, President Kabbah reportedly craftily tried to get rid of Chief Norman by proposing to send him to Nigeria as Sierra Leone’s ambassador. Chief Norman however refused. He did not however escape the spreading mesh of the Special Court this time (see Appendix III332).

To some (SLPP) party members, President Kabbah and his second in command, Solomon Berewa must have machinated the arrest of Hinga Norman…Some SLPP supporters blame in particular Berewa, who was Attorney- General and Minister of Justice when the Special Court was, set up...that Berewa saw Norman as a rival for the party leadership and that he and Kabbah were happy to see him arrested (see Appendix III465).

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Thus, five (5) other controversial issues attracted serious media attention that appeared to have been central to this friction argument. The first was ‘Norman’s request (whilst in detention) to attend the SLPP’s Convention in 2005’, which was turned down by the SCSL (see Appendix III214, 379). The second was the acrimonious legal tussle that ensued in Sierra Leone’s Supreme Court about Norman’s eligibility to stop the holding of the SLPP’s National Convention in 2005, and the eventual denial of his applications by the Supreme Court (see Appendix III215,

381, _).

The third was the contents of the critical letters (‘From Special Court Detention...Hinga Norman and Co. Write South-Easterners and Kamajors, ‘New Fault Lines in the Southern and Eastern Provinces’) (see Appendix III371), which Norman wrote to the Mendes and South-Easterners, warning them of Kabbah’s and Berewa’s conspiracy against the SLPP and the Mendes (see Appendix III48, 212). The fourth was the emergence of the People’s Movement for Democratic Change (PMDC), as a South-Eastern political party, and how it capitalised on the Kabbah- Norman friction to score a political goal that partially contributed to the demise of the SLPP after the 2007 Presidential elections’ (see Appendix III115, 465). The fifth was ‘Norman’s natural (unnatural) death and its effects on Sierra Leone’s body politic’ (see Appendix III101, 103).

There were similarities and differences in the papers coverage of the above issues. There were also overlaps in the analyses on why Norman was not allowed to attend the SLPP’s National Convention in 2005. The papers (see references above) alluded to the fact that Norman was an accused and would not have been accorded any privilege beyond what is prescribed by the Statute. FDP (see Appendix III262) used the Norman issue in the Supreme Court to project the political turmoil within the SLPP and simultaneously asserted that it would result in the eventual disintegration of the party. ST analysed this issue and blamed the SLPP for its predicaments, which it said were the machinations of Kabbah and Berewa. Awoko (see Appendix III50-51) covered the proceedings and the ruling that subsequently emerged, but its analysis reflected only the merits of the decision. Chief Norman’s warning letters to South- Easterners and the formation of the PMDC, were the other controversial issues, which FDP (see

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Appendix III263) relied on to predict the fall of ‘Torpoi’ (SLPP). This was how ST reflected these issues:

The Southern and Eastern provinces are dominated by the Mende, whose lead the smaller ethnic groups follow. Traditionally the Mende support the SLPP but this is uncertain in the 2007 election given what many perceive as its role in the arrest and indictment of Hinga Norman, ex-head of the Kamajor militia, the core group of the CDF that fought the RUF...In prison, Norman became a rallying point for those opposed to the government and the Special Court, as well as for disillusioned Southern and Eastern Provinces youths who feel they have not benefited from the peace achieved...Margai, the PMDC leader, and long-time Bo resident, was lead defence counsel before the Special Court for one of Norman’s fellow CDF defendants (see Appendix III465).

The circumstances leading to Norman’s death were also extensively reported by the papers (see Appendix III101-103, 258-259, 455-456). Divergences were not seen in the analysis that his death was unnatural, though the papers as well reported the ‘news’ as presented by the SCSL that he died after a successful hip replacement surgery (FDP, ibid, ST, ibid, Awoko, ibid). The papers further commented on his family position, that he died of unnatural cause and demanded another autopsy. The papers put out series of articles, reflecting the then opposition’s (APC’s) position regarding Norman’s death. The APC dubbed the SLPP as ungrateful and accused it of crucifying its own stalwart (see Appendix III103). Both ST (see Appendix III458) and Awoko (see Appendix III106) also captured CSOs’ position and projected the view that Norman was merely eliminated. In the final analysis, the SLPP lost the 2007 elections when the APC formed an alliance with the PMDC. The papers thus reflected Norman’s indictment and trial and the PMDC phenomenon as fundamental factors that led to the SLPP’s demise.

6.2.3 Territorial Integrity/Sovereignty and the Defence of Democracy/the SLPP Government