Observación de la estructura del aula virtual presentada por los expertos

The issues here are divided into two sub-frames: ‘The Resurgence of War Crimes Jurisprudence’ and ‘Political Expediency’. I shall sequentially analyse the papers contents in so far as they relate to this sub-frame to determine the respective positions, which they took in the political debates.

The Resurgence of War Crimes Jurisprudence

International judicial intervention, which emerged at the end of World War II, as a robust response to Nazi’s criminality (See 2.1), re-surfaced as a controversial response to intra-states conflicts after the Balkans’ crises;54 and was also replicated in Rwanda after the infamous 1994 genocide.55 The conflict in Sierra Leone ended at a time when the need to subject war criminals to justice had become a common response to some of the most devastating conflicts in the

54

See The UNO’s Resolution 827 of 25th May, 1993.

55

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World. Thus, when Sierra Leone eventually resorted to bring some of its ‘war criminals’ to justice the papers sustained very critical debates regarding the issue. Initially, they appeared to have supported the need to get Sierra Leone’s ‘war criminals’ to judicially account for their actions.

However, the papers’ positions in the political debate changed when the chief prosecutor, David Crane, unsealed the indictments of the leaders of all the warring factions (AFRC, RUF and CDF). ST which initially overwhelmingly supported the establishment of the SCSL suddenly became critical of the court after the CDF leaders were indicted. The paper opposed the SCSL and called it an imperial judicial institution that was meant to target the heroic figures that liberated Sierra Leoneans from the scourges and clutches of tyranny, oppression and carnage;56 and called on the international community (through the ICC) to subject former President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair, to war crimes trials for the atrocities committed by American and British troops in Iraq and Afghanistan (Ibid).

The paper dubbed Crane a ‘racist’, and pointed to his alleged connections with ‘mercenary outfits’.57 ST also alleged that Crane was ‘a biased’ and ‘an unprofessional prosecutor’, who prejudiced the outcome of the CDF trial by pontificating that ‘Chief Norman and the other indictees would never see the dawn of a free day’ (See ST’s Standard Point: ‘What Now, Mr.. Crane’- Wednesday, 4th June, 2003; One Thing and Another: ‘Banning Theophilus Gbenda’- Thursday, 10th March, 2005). The paper further accused Crane of being ‘incompetent’ and of ‘dividing Sierra Leone’, when he announced that he was resigning as SCSL’s Chief Prosecutor. The following quotations from its Friday, 4th March, 2005 (‘Special Courts David Crane Bows out in Shame’) edition, contains some other damning comments which the paper made against Crane:

David Crane came to try people for cases he virtually had little or no idea about. We told him that Chief Norman and his comrades are heroes not villains, but he went about manufacturing witnesses to prosecute them. There is certainly no way one can defame

56

See ST’s Commentary: ‘Special Court’s David Crane Bows out in Shame’- Friday 4th March, 2005: 2.

57

See ST’s One Thing and Another: ‘David Crane, the Runaway Prosecutor’-Monday 7th _{March, 2005:10, ‘Crane and Mercenary Connection’, 12}th

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members of the CDF. Time without number, we have tried to let David Crane understand that he was here on his so-called trials because of the sacrifices of the CDF for as a people we had a right to self-defence, and that was just what the CDF offered. When terrorists hit America in September, 2001, the Americans did not sit with hands between their legs or resign to fate. They did not only fight to forestall another attack, but even went out to strike military installations in suspected locations. Why should David Crane and his employers imagine that the people of this nation should have sat down with hands between their legs and wait to be decimated? David Crane, considering the way he used to brag about his Special Court, one would have imagined that the whole issue of Special Court trials should have long been a thing of the past. One legacy of David Crane would be his conscious attempt to divide our society. For the idea and existence of Special Court has been nothing other than an attempt to put a wedge among us. The question is did he succeed in dividing us? Certainly not, as we still believe in what the CDF did and above all, after all his efforts, it is David Crane that is leaving us. This land is ours and we will continue to stay here, certainly even if he thinks we are ignorant, we will prefer to remain so rather than take his form of enlightenment. Perhaps with reports of widespread human rights violations in Iraq and Afghanistan by US and British troops the service of David Crane would be needed there... When he initially came most of us tried to put sense into his head, since we witnessed the war and all its accompanying ills, but he refused to listen, believing that being a white man and a lawyer, he had all the intelligence and knowledge in his head. We are not lawyers not white Americans but we have the common sense, which is just what it takes to make a lawyer.

In fact, ST opined that the SCSL was created to try the leaders of the AFRC/RUF and not those of the CDF.58 Apparently, the indictment of the CDF leaders was a surprise to Awoko that emphasised the CDF’s patriotic role in the conflict (see references in 6.2.3). FDP however

58

See ‘To Try or Not To Try: The Special Court- A Prophesy (ST, Wednesday, 20th September, 2006), ‘Politicians Appeal for Hinga Norman’s Release (ST, Friday, 6th May, 2005), ‘Kamajors Boss Speaks: Too Bitter to Swallow’ (ST, Friday, 1stSeptember, 2005), ‘Limits to Transitional Justice: Ex-British High Commissioner Bullets Special Court’ (ST, Tuesday, 15th _{March, 2005), ‘Using Hinga Norman as Political Bargaining Chip’}

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reflected the significance of the SCSL in ending impunity. The paper thus catalogued the plethora of human rights violations committed by the Kamajors and further emphasised: ‘how horrific tales of human butchery and cannibalism soiled (the Kamajors’) image of invincibility and fighting for true democracy to one of ulterior motives’!!!’ (see Appendix III203). FDF also drew an analogy between the indictments of the CDF leaders and that of the RUF’s Issa Sesay. The paper stated that had the CDF leaders been given immunity, Issa Sesay should have been exempt from prosecution because of his role in ending the war. FDP critically analysed this controversial issue within the framework of texts and contexts:

Some guys stress the context- Chief Norman was resisting a degenerate rebellion. In that context, whatever else happened should be overlooked. Mr.. Issa Sesay was very instrumental in bringing peace to this land, given that situation, whatever else he did should be discounted. Many on the side of this argument blamed the government for not putting in place safeguards that would have prevented the arrest of persons in whose favour they are arguing for...The other guys stress texts, laws. They believe that contexts should not nullify texts. The question is whether or not the indictees violated legal texts and not for or against whom they violated the law’.59

Political Expediency

Political expediency appeared to have clouded the perceptions of SLPP supporters (mostly South-Easterners), regarding the arrest and detention of the CDF leaders. There were clear divergences in the reportage. FDP’s position is inferred from its analysis in the above sub-frame; that the issue of political expediency should not cloud the rule of law in an era when the resurgence of war crimes jurisprudence appeared to be a panacea for gross human rights violations in even intra-states conflict. Awoko’s contention on this issue is seen in the context rationalised in FDP’s critical analysis. However, though Awoko lent credence to war crimes jurisprudence, its analysis was skewed to reflect that only in respect of the trials of the AFRC/ RUF leaders.

59

See FDP’s Peoples Democracy: ‘The Special Courts Arrests- Text and Context’- Monday, 24th March, 2003; ‘The Special Court Arrests’- Wednesday, 26th March, 2003.

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The paper appeared to have taken exceptions to this in respect of the CDF trial, by emphasising what FDP had rationalised as ‘context’ (see 6.5 and 6.6). This ‘context argument’ is what ST appeared to have rationalised and transformed into that of political expediency, by stressing the centrality of the CDF in the SLPP’s political agenda, Norman’s popularity and his influence over the Kamajors in the South-East and the tendency for the trial to cause serious fragmentations in the SLPP. Analytically, within the context of the CDF’s role in the conflict and the protection it offered the SLPP, it appeared that ST took the position that though it was necessary to try the AFRC/RUF leaders, it was ‘politically inexpedient’ for Kabbah to have allowed the CDF leaders to be indicted.

That also appeared to have been the reason why the paper published critical articles against Kabbah and how the SLPP campaign team for the 2007 elections lobbied the Kamajors and the CDF convicts.60 However, FDP which emphasised ‘text’ appeared to have frowned at ‘selective justice’. The paper made this issue quite ‘salient’ in many of its articles against SLPP supporters, who felt the CDF leaders were betrayed.61