EXTINCIÓN DE LA CONCESIÓN POR INCUMPLIMIENTO GRAVE DE LAS

As one would expect, the notion of a large U.S. Army laboratory was not greeted with universal praise or enthusiasm. The idea of a government drug manufacturing enterprise would have been feared not only by Squibb but also by every other private pharmaceutical business covetous of lucrative army contracts. Besides, government exercises of this type ran counter to the laissez-faire economic system vehemently defended by entrepreneurs and touted loudly by politi- cians. Fearing resistance from Secretary of War Stanton, Hammond decided not to request formal approval but merely decided to attach his Philadelphia and Astoria labs to their local purveying depart- ments. This was probably wise. When William Procter, professor of pharmacy at the Philadelphia College of Pharmacy (PCP) and editor of its journal, announced Hammond’s plans for government labs, he was a bit equivocal.

Should the war continue, this arrangement may be conducive to economy, if its management falls into able and conscientious hands; yet it may well be doubted whether the result will prove its wisdom as to economy in expenditure. If the same liberal course is pursued that formerly appertained to the Naval Labo- ratory, these establishments may have a useful influence in con- trolling the quality of drugs by exposing imposition, whether the result of ignorance or rascality.51

“Able and conscientious hands”—that would be the key to suc-

cess, and it was proving somewhat problematic. This was demon- strated at the small factory established by army storekeeper Robert T. Creamer, the selfsame who had such difficulty getting his appoint- ment. Stationed at the St. Louis purveying depot, Creamer suggested to Hammond that he try some limited manufacturing of necessary medicines. Hammond agreed, thinking that the effort might save

money. Between March and July of 1863 Creamer was producing comparatively small amounts of quinine sulfate, syrup of squills, catechu, and camphor.52_{The attempt might have been a good proto-}

type for the much bigger operations back East, but Creamer’s quality control was poor and complaints over his products forced Hammond to order his shop closed, his books liquidated, and all further acquisi- tions to come strictly through the purveying depot.

Back in Philadelphia, Smith went at his work earnestly and with al- most cavalier boldness. Finding a suitable building owned by Powers and Weightman, Smith assured Hammond that if either Powers or Weightman objected he would tell them that it would matter little if they rented the structure to the army or not, since the laboratory was going to be established somewhere, with or without their building.53

They did agree and signed a lease agreement for ten years at $208 per month; after adding another building nearby, Smith had the facility fitted out and ready to deliver finished goods by March 1863.54

As mentioned previously, Smith chose John M. Maisch to head the Philadelphia laboratory. Maisch could not have been more different from Creamer. This young German pharmacist held the professor- ship of materia medica at the PCP, and had an exacting mind with a penchant for detail. Described as “of tall and commanding appear- ance,” Maisch impressed virtually everyone who met him.55_{It was no}

wonder that Procter’s announcement of the laboratory experiment in- cluded a delighted mention of the fact that the Philadelphia post would be filled by “our friend Prof. Maisch.”56 _{Procter was easily}

won over. Within a few months of its opening, the editor and voice for American pharmacy noted that “great economy has attended the ex- periments, and all has been done well.”57 _{Procter warned that it}

would take time for a final verdict but observed, “there can be but lit- tle doubt of the expediency of the measure, and under the care of such earnest workers as A. K. Smith and Prof. Maisch it will receive a fair trial.”58

Smith was ecstatic over Maisch’s work at the lab, and by every in- dication there was mutual admiration. Working as a team—with Smith as administrator handling the politics and dealing with the mil- itary brass, and Maisch as the de facto chief of operations monitoring production and all aspects of quality control—the lab was a success. Indeed, Maisch’s lab served as a training ground for some of the nation’s most able pharmaceutical chemists. One, C. Lewis Diehl

(1840-1917), would himself rise to prominence in the postwar years, becoming a prominent Louisville druggist and a leading figure within the American Pharmaceutical Association.59_{Diehl had been injured}

at the Battle of Stones River while serving with the 15th Pennsylva- nia Cavalry, and found another way to serve his country by becoming Maisch’s assistant at his Philadelphia lab. Years later Diehl described his experience working in the facility. As with Dr. Bill’s report on the Squibb plant, Diehl’s description offers a valuable and close-up tour of the army lab operations:

More than forty years have elapsed since I entered upon my duties in the United States Army Laboratory at the N. E. corner Sixth and Oxford Streets, Philadelphia (during April, 1863), and I depend altogether on memory, with the slender reminder of several photographic interiors, for what I am about to say. The grounds on which the laboratory was situated occupied a parallelogram of, I should say, about 150 to 175 feet. The main building, three stories high, with a well-lighted basement throughout, faced west on Sixth Street, flush with a pavement, about 100 feet long and adjoining a one-story building on Ox- ford Street, facing south, about 60 or possibly 75 feet long, and perhaps 60 feet in depth, while on Sixth Street, or the main front, it was separated by a gateway from another one-storied structure, extending eastward about 85 to 100 feet and constitut- ing the northern boundary of the grounds. The remaining por- tion of the northern and southern boundaries were enclosed by a wooden fence, as was also the rear, or eastern boundary, when the laboratory was first opened, but in time was occupied by a frame structure, running the entire length, and used for washing and storage of bottles, the carpenter-shop and other similar pur- poses. The only entrance into the laboratory from the street was an ordinary doorway, immediately adjacent to the gateway men- tioned, which was for the exclusive use of teams. The doorway opened into a short, rather narrow passage, to the left of which was a small office, and immediately adjoining this the office of the Superintendent Surgeon A. K. Smith, and of the Chief Chemist, Professor Maisch, who, however, used it chiefly as an experimental laboratory. Through the short passage mentioned, leading into the packing room, the employees had to pass on their way to and from work, and consequently under surveil-

lance from the office—those employed on the upper floor of the main building reaching their stations by a single (and only) stairway along the east wall of the packing rooms—the latter occupying about one-half the space of the first floor, minus the space occupied by the offices and hallway. The remaining half of the first floor—composing the southwest corner of the main building—was the mill room, where the drugs used were ground and pulverized for further treatment or disposition; this important department being provided with numerous mills, sieves, etc., of suitable variety, size and construction to meet the requirement of the time. Immediately adjacent to this mill room, in the one-story structure on the Oxford Street (south) side of the building complex, was the laboratory for operations requir- ing the application of steam, the entire structure being occupied by this, with the exception of a space in the northeast corner in which the engine and boilers supplying the necessary steam were enclosed—a space over the boilers being so constructed as to form a drying room, which was conveniently reached by a door from the mill room.60

Diehl himself worked in the furnace room, a one-floor building on the northern end of the grounds. There he prepared mercuric sub- stances, including corrosive sublimate (mercuric chloride); silver ni- trate; heavy oil of wine (ethereal oil); solution of chlorinated soda (Labarraque’s solution); potassium carbonate; potassium acetate; ci- trate of iron and quinine, “of which immense quantities were in con- stant requisition; various ferric (iron) solutions; syrup of squills; and a few other items.” He concluded with the following summary:

In the foregoing I have about outlined the work in which I was directly concerned. In order to round up, however, it may be of interest to mention that the entire second and third floors of the main building were occupied almost exclusively for bot- tling, labeling and wrapping the medicaments manufactured in the different departments; in the manufacture of roller ban- dages, the spreading of isinglass plaster, the rolling out of pills, and like operations, by a force of probably 150 women and girls, under the superintendence of Miss Maggie Davis. From here they were turned into the packing rooms, where they were boxed, transferred to the warehouse—a large building situated

on the northeast corner of Sixth and Master Streets—from whence they were delivered on the requisition of the Medical Purveyor. The spacious upper floors of this warehouse, extend- ing through to Marshall Street, were used in the manufacture of sheets, pillow slips, and other similar hospital requisites, in which several hundred women and girls were engaged con- stantly to the end of the war.61

The Astoria lab was not nearly so successful. Charles McCormick dawdled while Maisch produced. By May 1863, while the Philadel- phia lab was beginning production, the Astoria lab had yet to produce anything. It was not for lack of expenditures; McCormick had spent nearly $10,000 for apparatus, over $1,500 in wages, $5,000 for fix- tures, and additional sums for miscellaneous expenses for a total of $17,601.51.62 _{Squibb’s accusation that the Astoria director was a}

“quack” turned out to be an apt word for McCormick. When Ham- mond discovered that his Astoria chief had previously been engaged in selling “Magic Waverly pills,” he had had enough and dismissed him on May 25.63 _{He was replaced by assistant surgeon Bill, who}

had earlier visited and reported on Squibb’s facilities. But Bill was plagued by lack of support and interest, chiefly from Satterlee, who may have been trying to protect the business interests his old friend Squibb operating in the same city. The Astoria lab would not be fully operational until February 1864, and its production was short-lived when, just a year later, it was destroyed in a fire emanating from an

improperly constructed drying room.64 _{By 1865 Hammond was}

gone, replaced by Joseph K. Barnes, and there was little interest in re- starting the plant. Even at its demise, the extent of its production ca- pabilities was small. Squibb easily picked up the Astoria orders for twenty-seven cases of powdered opium, thirty-two ceroons (a bale covered in hide) of ipecac, eighteen ceroons of calisaya bark, and 280 bags of cubebs.

Not so with the Philadelphia lab. From its start in March 1863 through September 1865, Maisch produced 160 different items at a cost of $1,422,525.78.65_{Maisch concluded his report on the labora-}

tory thus:

Notwithstanding the opposition to the Government Labora- tories and the denunciations which this one had to encounter from private parties and Government officials, it has worked its

way through the dark times of civil war, and has a record to show of which it need not be ashamed.66

Maisch claimed he had saved the government $766,019.32.67 _Per-

haps, but George Winston Smith, historian of the Civil War laborato- ries, casts doubt on this optimistic figure. His reasons are fourfold: (1) the valuation of goods produced reflected wartime highs and did not reflect the lower postwar market values; (2) the apparatus was run at capacity, causing a more rapid depreciation of the lab’s durable property; (3) the valuation of the apparatus was probably high, since Powers and Weightman purchased nearly $22,000 of equipment for a mere $4,000; and (4) many of the lab’s costs were expensed out to other government departments, much of it charged to the quartermas- ter.68

Smith is probably right, but that should not be the final verdict. The government laboratories, especially the one managed by Maisch in Philadelphia, had important implications for future pharmaceutical developments in the United States. Far from impeding growth in the private sector, the U.S. government’s first effort at pharmaceutical manufacturing actually stimulated entrepreneurial activity after the war. This was borne out in William A. Brewer’s postwar report on the drug market to his colleagues in the American Pharmaceutical Asso- ciation.69 _{The New York market could boast a healthy retail trade}

“and the character of the dispensing establishments,” Brewer noted, “has been steadily rising.”70_{Likewise, the Philadelphia market wit-}

nessed a good supply of drugs with prices “well maintained.”71

Brewer did not have exact figures for Philadelphia drug production, but he confidently stated, “the amount is very large, and the quality good.”72

All things considered, a fair assessment of the government experi- ment in pharmaceutical manufacturing is that it adequately supple- mented private industry by providing medicines that were in inordi- nately high demand. Fears that government labs would destroy private initiative and investment in the drug industry proved unfounded. In- deed men such as Diehl and others who had, in effect, cut their phar- maceutical teeth under the watchful eye of the meticulous Professor Maisch, especially the hospital stewards detailed to assist with opera- tions there, formed an important postwar cadre ready to carry mass manufacturing processes and standards into the twentieth century.

Chapter 6

The Medicines: A Military Materia Medica and Therapeutics

The Medicines:

A Military Materia Medica