Factor funcional FISICO AMBIENTAL

The third age of energy security is a reference to the re-emergence of the notion that energy supplies, at affordable prices, were perceived in the West as being potentially at risk, whilst also mindful that this perception is not new (Leaver 2005: 92). This section analyses the return of geopolitically informed narratives within ‘public’ UK circles, i.e. the media, television, broadsheets and journals, some think-tanks as well as within academia.86 What is noteworthy is not just the extent to which this narrative, and associated ideas, re-emerged, but that a debate about energy security started to appear in the public realm in the most loud and persistent way since the 1970s oil crises (Leaver 2005; Nuttall and Manz 2008; Jegen 2009; Friedrichs 2011). It could be argued that the public nature of the Russia energy story, and the evocative way in which it was

86  _{The  emphasis  here  on  various  media  outlets  as  illustrative  of  the  changing  energy  narrative  recognises}  

arguments  about  the  role  of  the  media  as  a  whole  in  getting  issues  onto  the  political  agenda  (Grant   2000:  125),  but  also  arguments  that  the  media  can  often  reflect  popular  public  ideas.  

narrated, helped to establish the notion that energy supplies might, indeed, be under threat and that energy was, as a result, in crisis.

There are a number of noteworthy aspects of the way in which Russian reforms were covered in the UK print and television media, not least the emergence of notions that energy is powerful and that Russia is to be feared. The Economist’s ‘Special Survey: Russia’, of May 2004, was very much focused on Putin, energy and power.87 One article claimed that, prior to the Yukos affair, Putin’s rather more “steely grip” on power, as opposed to Yeltsin, was welcomed by Western investors who “flocked back” to this now more stable, resource rich economy (Economist 2004b: 3; cf. House of Commons 2002: 80). However, post the arrest of Khodorkhovsky, and the seizure of Yukos assets, it was clear that preference for a stable Russia was being replaced with fears about Putin’s power and autocratic status (Economist 2004b: 3 and 5).

This question of Russia and power was closely linked in media coverage to state control over large energy assets. None of the articles read for this thesis claim anything but energy as a source of potential international influence for Russia (see in particular: Robinson 2006; Simpson 2006; Wagstyl 2006; Ostrovsky 2006; Kendall 2007; Hotton 2007; Powell 2008).88 Russia was understood to be “…flexing its well-oiled muscles…” (Robinson 2006) and in possession of a “…natural resources bonanza…” (Powell 2008: 44-5). Russia was roundly condemned for the arrest of Khodorkhovsky, for seizing assets from Western companies, and for bullying them, but sometimes also with the inference that Russia would suffer as Western investors would, as a result, withdraw investments (The Times 2006).

A number of articles directly claimed that being a major energy provider brings global influence, and that Russia was fast becoming an ‘energy superpower’ (Wagstyl 2006: 3; Simpson 2006; Kendall 2007: 23; Hotton 2007; Ostrovsky 2006). Not only, therefore, was Russia capable of wielding power, but it was also suggested that it was very much willing to do so, not least in reference to Putin’s assertion that Russia was, once again, a

87  _{There  were  number  of  ‘special’  reports  and  surveys  on  Russia,  and  energy,  over  this  time  period.    See}  

also  the  Financial  Times’  Special  Report:  Russia  of  April  21st  2006  and  the  New  Statesman’s  special  on   Energy  of  July  2007.  

88  _{This  suggests  the  re-­‐emergence  of  a  different  understanding  of  energy  in  that  it  is  no  longer}  

“super derzhava” (superpower) (Robinson 2006).89 This narrative intensified significantly after the Russia-Ukraine gas transit dispute. Media reports claimed that Russia had “…turned off the taps…” (Robinson 2006) in open display that it was not only capable of using energy to gain influence, but also to exploit energy as a “weapon” to threaten the West (Wagstyl 2006: 3; Ostrovsky 2006: 5; Rodgers 2007: 5). Geopolitical notions of control over energy assets allowing for more political and economic power were reflected in articles such as that on ‘Who controls the tap?’ (Rodgers 2007). It seemed, perhaps from this perspective, somewhat inevitable that

Europe woke up to the new power of Russia when Gazprom turned off the gas taps to the Ukraine and Moldova (Robinson 2006)

Europe was, in this way, also reminded of its hydrocarbon ‘dependency’ status (Ostrovsky 2006; Simpson 2006; Rodgers 2007: 5).

What springs to mind when looking back over this coverage of Russia and energy is the question of whether perceptions of a security of supply crisis might not have emerged if the country restructuring its energy sector had not been Russia. This is a question to which we will return, here below. What is also striking, and perhaps related, is the degree to which these stories found popular purchase. One BBC television programme, ‘Have I Got News for You’, still includes in the opening titles a depiction of lights going out all over Europe as a Russian soldier turns a gas pipe off, with steely grin on his face.90 Another cartoon style depiction of Russia, energy and threat can be seen on the front cover of The Economist featuring a picture of Putin, dressed in Italian mafia style, wielding a petrol pump as a gun (Economist 2006) under the title ‘Don’t Mess with Russia’. The cartoon, from an article in ‘The World Today’, represented here below is a useful illustration of these kinds of ideas – linking Russia, power and energy together (Sherr 2009).

89  _{The  2003  ‘Energy  Strategy  of  Russia  up  to  2020’  also  suggested  that  Russia  was  willing  to  use  natural}  

resources  as  an  engine  for  economic  and  political  recovery  (Ministry  of  Energy  of  the  Russian  Federation   2003).      Such  a  role  for  natural  resources  was  seen  as  positive  in  that  it  would  enable  recovery,  very   different  from  Western  perceptions.  

90  _See:  

As seen in the last chapter, the UK had anticipated its move to importer of oil and gas in a relatively sanguine manner. This picture was about to change significantly. Such energy coverage, suggesting insecurity of supply, was leading to more questions, about where supplies would come from, what UK capacities were (Leake 2005; CBI 2006), and of the potential hole in the Treasury’s budget (Porter 2005). Phrases such as “…reliance on dubious regimes…” start to enter the debate (Leake 2005). Energy’s socio-economic role starts to take on an alternative tone with references to energy as “…the lifeblood of a modern economy” (CBI 2006: 1).

There were, however, a few dissenters in the pack. Some argued, informed by the economic notion of the ‘Resource Curse’, that Russia’s over reliance on natural resources, to the detriment of a diversified economy, would ultimately result in a reversal once more of its economic and political fortunes (Shevtsova 2008: 34). Others that Russia would not be in a position to be able to develop its natural resources sufficiently in future based on the idea that state interference in the economy always leads to sub-optimal results (Ostrovsky 2006: 5).

Away from journals, newspapers and popular media, UK think tanks were starting to produce analysis informed by a quite geopolitical take on events. In 2007 a politically prominent and influential UK think tank, the Institute for Public Policy Reform (IPPR), produced a report on the UK’s national energy security. Likewise, the IPPR’s report acknowledged mounting fears about UK “…import dependency…” and about future “…supply disruption”. It did also pick up on a perceived trend of emerging political importance for energy based in particular on Russian actions (Bird 2007: 13). The Foreign Policy Centre produced a piece on the ‘Russian Energy Empire’ in September 2004, which focused on Russia’s new role as an ‘energy superpower’. This report suggested that Russia increasingly has the potential to achieve the economic and cultural predominance in Eurasia that the United States has in the Americas, with implications for access to Caspian Basin oil and gas reserves (Hill 2004: 57-8).

In terms of academic circles and analysis of energy, security and Russia, what is most noticeable was the increase not just in terms of volume of work, but in analysis undertaken from alternative perspectives. In chapter one, it was observed that academic energy analysis had been dominated in the UK by neoliberal economics and by technical analysis (CEPMLP 2006). 2006 served as a real turning point in that articles

about ‘energy security’, from a geopolitical perspective, started to become the norm once more, and according to some, to dominate analysis (Goldthau and Witte 2009). A new journal was launched in 2008 entitled the ‘Journal of Energy Security’, which was intended to fill the perceived gap in energy research, but also to provide an outlet for all the new energy security research that was starting to emerge.91

Much of this research has been referenced in chapter one, section two, but as a reminder of how energy in crisis was being explained from a geopolitical perspective we can turn to Paul Roberts:

Energy has become the currency of political and economic power, the determinant of the hierarchy of nations, a new marker, even, for success and material advancement. Access to energy has thus emerged as the over-riding imperative of the twenty-first century (Roberts 2004: 6; see also Klare 2008)

Within such a new depiction of the world, and energy’s role in it, countries heavily reliant on imports will increasingly be at risk from competitive practices, from the influence of exporters and prone to conflict (Klare 2008).

It was around this time also that some academics, and other groups supporting change, started to re-visit arguments about ‘peak oil’. It has been argued that the peak oil debates, which had been prevalent previously in the 1970s, had not found public, or political, traction until renewed energy security fears erupted in this time period (Friedrichs 2010). The re-emergence of this debate, however, served to throw further fuel on the fire of, sometimes quite popular, fears about being able to access sufficient energy supplies in future (Heinberg 2003; Simmons 2005; Leggett 2005; Kunstler 2005; Klare 2008). Peak-oil arguments can be applied in conjunction with zero-sum game assumptions about global energy to instigate debates about who has access to hydrocarbons and who does not (Reihing 2007; Clarke 2007; Klare 2008).

What is also particularly noticeable about academic analysis of energy at this time is the emergence of the notion of ‘politicisation’. Again, as with paradigm and paradigm shift, the term is often used without any explanation of what it means, let alone formal definition. However, some were claiming that Russian energy actions were responsible for “repoliticising” energy in Europe (Jegen 2009: 18). Examples of this argument are

the suggestion that Russia played a role in putting energy security at the top of political agendas, both in terms of their behaviour and in terms of the way in which they designed the agenda for the St Petersburg G8 Summit of 2006 (Offerdahl 2007; Nuttall and Manz 2008). Other prominent UK analysts, and government advisors, have also argued that the notion of ‘energy security’ only really gained political legitimacy again from 2006 onwards (Interviews 14, 15 and 16).

At this point we can return to the argument, above, that the narrative of a security of supply crisis was successful precisely because it was Russia in particular, the old arch enemy, which was renationalising its energy assets. By contrast the return of Venezuela to OPEC and the renationalisation of Petroleos de Venezuela S.A. (PdVSA) had not evoked such responses. The narrative of ‘fear’ and of Russia as threatening contained within it vital elements of credibility and legitimacy drawing as it did upon deeply embedded Cold War perspectives. It became commonplace to start an article, or paper, on energy and Russia by referring to the past. For example an article in the Economist started by suggesting that “…Russia-watchers had looked on in elation as communism crumbled and the Soviet Union collapsed…”, and then contrasting this position of elation with Russia’s re-emergence as potentially threatening (Economist 2004a: 11). There were references back to the Soviet Union as the “evil empire” (Robinson 2006), and to the understanding that “…(t)he Cold War was supposed to be history…” (Powell 2008: 44). One new book, written by a journalist from the Economist, was entitled ‘The New Cold War: How the Kremlin Menaces Both Russia and the West’ (Lucas 2009). This mentality was easy to mine using such terminology in that it had long-standing antecedents – Russia had long been perceived at best as somewhat incomprehensible (Browning 2008), as representing a completely different, read lower, set of morals and values (Kennedy-Pipe 1998), and as evil and threatening (Robinson 2006). Chapter two had suggested that crisis narratives, if they are to find purchase, need to be simple and to have a degree of popular appeal, as well as an equal measure of credibility. Arguably the notion that energy supplies might be threatened was entirely credible for UK audiences given the high degree of existing inter-subjective meaning and the long history of believing that Russia, and oil, can pose a threat. This narrative is, furthermore, predominantly about Russia doing something ‘wrong’ but not necessarily about offering credible solutions to this problem.