Falta de conformidad como fuente de responsabilidad

competing views arguably provides some insight into the multiple and complex subjectivities217 competing for a voice in the Carter security state.

Examining these in more detail, I am setting out to show, not the state as actor, nor even the security state as actor, but that within the security state (insofar as it applies to arms control compliance issues) are always factional identities that mobilise and invoke competing world-views; that these are constantly in play; that each has a foundation in history; that each manifests an identity symptomatic of that history and that each exists in relation to other factional identities the specification of which may be inferred from the language and actions [both operating as forms of signifying system] they invoke.

217 Subjectivities: In the context of discourse theory the term represents all that can be signified by a collision/collusion, even conflation of three established senses, described by O'Sullivan, Hartley, Saunders and Fiske (1983:231) in terms of i) Subject of political theory: the citizen as subject of the state, implying the positioning of the subject within networks of power relations, ii) Subject of Idealist philosophy: a site of consciousness implying a division between subject and object, between thought and reality, between self and other (an opposition critiqued by Heidegger and Derrida). In this sense, subjectivity has been traditionally represented as a unitary identity which appears as the source of action and meaning rather than as their product. The individualism of this position fails to account for the role of language and social relations in determining, regulating or producing what any thinking subject can be. iii) The subject of grammar: that which the action is about or determined by.

My use of the term subjectivities (or subjects) refers to that identity which emerges as a symptom of the articulation of the difference (or differance [J. Derrida]) between 'self and 'other' - that product of boundary-making practices which marks a position - upon which further action may be based. The identity so construed is thus historically contingent (insofar as it emerges as a product of historical forces) and socially situated by and through language [or signifying system] (in which naming practices play a significant role).

3.51 US Charges of Soviet Noncompliance: (a) Hardened Silo Construction

Article I of the Interim A greem ent states:

'The Parties u n dertake not to start construction of additional ballistic m issile (ICBM) launchers after July 1, 1972.'

W hen the In terim A g reem en t en tered into force, the n u m b er of operational ICBMs each Party was perm itted to have totalled 1618 for the Soviet U n io n a n d 1054 for the U n ited States. In 1973, US intelligence sources determ ined that an additional 150 silos w ere being constructed by the Soviets at ICBM fields along the Trans-Siberian Railway in Soviet Asia. If these silos w ere destined to contain ICBM launchers, then they w ould have constituted a violation of Article I of the Interim Agreem ent.

The U n ited States raised this concern in the SCC. The Soviets resp o n d ed th at the excavations w ere for h a rd e n ed launch-control facilities for 'testing and training purposes.' The intelligence evidence w as am biguous, p u rp o rtin g to show a rem arkable degree of sim ilarity betw een the characteristics of these 'launch-control' facilities and those of conventional ICBM complexes. The characteristics in question in included their cylindrical shape, w ith 'blow-away' doors and launcher- ty p e su sp en sio n eq u ip m en t. The Congressional Record notes this am biguity as a 'potential cause for concern' on the g rounds th at these launch-control facilities could be virtually dual-capable. T hat said, the use of these facilities for the purposes stated by the Soviet U nion are p erm itted u n d e r the Interim A greem ent, and m oreover, are fu rth er

justified by the U nited States' Letter of Submittal for the ABM Treaty218 w hich held th at lau n ch ers of this type could 'be co n stru cted at operation sites.'

W hile the U.S. State D epartm ent report, taking the view of the SCC (see section Image II in this chapter) concluded that:

"In early 1977, following further discussions d uring 1975 and 1979 and a review of our intelligence on this subject, the US decided to close discussion of this m atter on the basis that the silos in q u e stio n are c u rre n tly u sed as lau n ch -co n tro l facilities."

The legalistic view (Im age I, this chapter) w as p resen ted by the 'haw kish' US Senate expressed in the Congressional Record (17/8/78):

It w o u ld ap p ea r th at the Soviets w o u ld risk the illegal in stallatio n of som e 150 n ew m issiles, k n o w in g th a t a p ro g ram of such m ag n itu d e co u ld n o t go u n d etected . H ow ever, the D ep artm en t rep o rt does not deal w ith the question of w h eth er form er launch control facilities have been p ro p e rly d ism a n tle d , in the lig h t of w h ich the additional silos could theoretically serve a p u rp o se beyond that specified by the Soviet Union.

That these views coincide w ith those of m em bers of the Com mittee on the P resen t D anger show s the extent to w hich the conservative backlash to the Nixon-Ford era of arm s control was already taking hold in the US C ongress. These view s are an im p o rta n t factor in understanding the failure of SALT II ratification.

(b) Concealment Measures impeding Verification by NTM Article XII of the ABM Treaty states:

112

1. For the p u rposes of p ro v id in g assurance of com pliance w ith the p rovisions of this T reaty, each P arty shall use national technical m eans of verification at its disposal in a m an n er consistent w ith generally recognised principles of international law.

2. Each Party u n d ertak es n o t to interfere w ith the national technical m eans of verification of the other Party operating in accordance w ith Paragraph 1 of this Article.

3. Each Party u ndertakes not to use deliberate concealm ent m easures w hich im p ed e verification by national technical m eans of compliance w ith the provisions of this Treaty. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assem bly, conversion, or overhaul practices.

Article V(3) of the Interim A greem ent contains a sim ilar provision: Each P arty u n d ertak es n o t to use deliberate concealm ent m easures w hich im p ed e verification by national technical m eans of com pliance w ith the p ro v isio n s of this Interim A greem ent.

These national technical m eans, as explained elsew here in this chapter, refer p rin cip ally to the use of p h o to reco n n aissan ce satellites and electronic surveillance system s, so concern w ith concealm ent practices can refer to both visual and electronic concealment.

Soviet practices which suggest concealment had been m onitored by the U nited States before an d after the conclusion of the 1972 SALT agreem ents, how ever, d u rin g 1974, the US State D epartm ent Report n o ted th at the extent of concealm ent activities concerning Soviet strategic w eapons program s "increased substantially." The Report also n o ted th at these activities d id not p rev e n t the US from verifying com pliance w ith the p ro v isio n s of eith er the ABM T reaty or the Interim Agreement. There w as concern expressed that if the pattern of co n ce alm e n t c o n tin u e d to e x p a n d , th e n th ese c o u ld im p e d e verification in the fu tu re. The U n ited States raised the issue for discussion w ith the Soviets in the SCC, in p articu lar, there w ere

concerns o v er the p lacing of canvas covers an d p lan k in g over extensive sections of prefabrication, assem bly and re-fit facilities for b a llistic m issile su b m a rin e s (D elta C lass) at the S ev erm o ro sk construction yard on the Kola peninsula. M oreover, sim ilar coverings h ad been noted at the K habarovsk facilities in Siberia, in addition to other strategic construction sites th ro u g h o u t the Soviet Union.

A 1975 review of the intelligence in fo rm atio n on activities in the USSR led the U nited States to conclude th a t there 'no longer' a p p e a re d to be an ex p an d in g p a tte rn of concealm ent activities associated w ith strategic weapons program s.

In 1977, h ow ever, US intelligence in fo rm atio n n o ted a large net covering over an ICBM test lau n ch er u n d e rg o in g conversion at a Soviet test site. The Congressional Record (p.26693) suggests that the site was probably Plesetsk that had been used to test the mobile SS-X-16. C oncern w as expressed to the Soviet delegation in the SCC th at a covering w hich conceals activities at an ICBM silo from national technical m eans of verification "could reduce the confidence and tru st w hich are im p o rtan t to m u tu al efforts to establish an d m aintain strategic arm s lim itations."219

A lth o u g h the Soviets arg u ed th a t the p ro v isio n s of the Interim A greem ent were not applicable in this case, the nets were subsequently rem o v ed .

219 US DEPT OF STATE, BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, SPECIAL REPORT NO.55: