Reducción del precio o resolución del contrato

advantages of what may be perceived as a relaxation of its surveillance efforts ... Viewed against the backdrop of overall Soviet strategic efforts, the Administration cannot dismiss lightly even minor abridgements of provisions governing the launcher replacement process.235

Such a formulation as "not unprepared to ..." fails to specify what the Soviets are prepared to do. While not directly slanderous, this statement is clearly designed to imply patterns of behaviour that are not spelled out in the US State Department report. These patterns support an adversarial image of the Soviets.

(h) Development and Testing of Mobile ABM Radars

Article V(l) of the ABM Treaty states:

Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space- based, or mobile land-based.

Definitional ambiguity emerged over the term 'mobile.'

In an attempt to clarify the matter Common Understanding C of the ABM Treaty, which relates to mobile ABM systems, was made by the US Delegation on January 29, 1972.

Article V(l) of the Joint Draft Text of the ABM Treaty includes an undertaking not to develop, test, or deploy mobile land-based ABM systems and their components. On May 5, 1971, the US side indicated that, in its view, a prohibition on deployment of mobile ABM systems and components would rule out the deploym ent of ABM launchers and radars which were not permanent fixed types. At that time, we asked for the Soviet view of this interpretation. Does the Soviet side agree with the US side's interpretation put forward on May 5, 1971?

235 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 1 7 /8 /7 8 "PRINCIPAL ALLEGED SOVIET VIOLATIONS RELATING TO THE ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY" p.26691.

O n A pril 13, 1972, the Soviet D elegation said there is a general com m on u n derstanding on this m atter.

A ccording to the Congressional Record several rad ars associated with an ABM system have been installed at designated ABM test sites since 1971. Those at Sary Shagan rep o rte d ly 'possess p ro p erties w hich o b scu re the n ecessary d istin c tio n s b etw een n o rm ally verifiable stationary system s and those w ith m obile capabilities236' which could presum ably evade detection. The am biguity rested u p o n the relative rap id ity w ith w hich the new radars could be assem bled. That is, they could be assem bled over a period of m onths rather than years. These p h a se d -a rra y ra d a rs em p lo y electronic ste erin g of the beam for d ire c tio n a n d elev atio n . T hat is im p o rta n t, becau se the o ld er, m echanically- steered rad a rs w o u ld have been too slow for ICBM tracking. E lectrom agnetic steerin g of the beam enables fast and m ultiple target acquisition and tracking.

Evidence given by Senator Percy237 indicates th at the rad ar was judged to be 'rapidly deployable' rather than 'mobile' and that was still built on a substantial concrete base 'that requires an excavation.' According to the Congressional Record the US intelligence com m unity w anted the issue raised in order to gain a negotiated definition of 'mobile' and, by settlin g this m atter, to avoid the p o ten tial for exploiting the am biguity in the treaty language, not only for the ABM Treaty, but,

236 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE. 1 7 /8 /7 8 . p. 26693

237 Briefing on SALT I Compliance HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE O N FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE, 96th CONGRESS, 1st SESSION, SEPTEMBER 25,1979, DECLASSIFIED A N D MADE PUBLIC NOVEMBER 7, 1979. p.26

m ore im portantly, for the SALT II Treaty that was u n d er negotiation at the tim e.238

3.52 Soviet Charges of US Noncompliance a) Shelters over Minuteman Silos

P aragraph 3 of Article V of the Interim Agreem ent states:

Each P arty u n d ertak es n o t to use d eliberate concealm ent m easures w hich im pede verification by national technical m eans of com pliance w ith the p rovisions of this Interim A greem ent. This obligation shall n o t req u ire changes in c u rre n t co n stru ctio n , assem bly, co n v ersio n or o v erh au l practices.

From 1962 to 1972 the U nited States used shelters of either 300 or 700 square feet over M inutem an ICBM silos to provide w eather protection d u r in g in itia l c o n s tru c tio n a n d m o d e rn is a tio n . From 1973, substantially larger prefabricated shelters w ere used th at w ere some 2,700 square feet. These w ere, again prim arily for w eather protection, or, as the US State D ep artm en t p u ts it "environm ental protection" shelters. From four to tw elve of these w ere placed over silos for periods of tim e ranging from 10 days to 4 weeks "depending on the severity of the weather."239