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In the UK, one of the most important counter-terrorism policy documents is CONTEST (H.M. Government 2011a), which details how the government intends to Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare against terrorism. The Prevent Strategy is particularly relevant because this includes elements that affect education (as I will discuss in the Chapter 3.6); for this section I will focus on the general implications of current policy guidelines.

Both the previous and current governments used the Prevent Strategy (H.M. Government 2008 and 2011b), albeit with some adjustments in terms of delivery and funding allocation (H.M. Government 2011b:1). The most significant alteration was the separation of community cohesion projects from other Prevent activities, because previous funding allocation had been criticised for its heavy focus on the Islamic community (H.M. Government 2011b:7 and Khan 2009:4). Cantle's politically influential definition of community cohesion stated that it “reflects divisions based upon identifiable communities, generally on the basis of faith or ethnic distinctions, which may reflect socio-economic differences… It is undermined by the disadvantage, discrimination and disaffection experienced by the identifiable community as a whole and by the lack of trust and understanding resulting from segregation and social separateness” (Cantle 2008:54-5). The inclusion of a religious social division influenced the original parameters of community cohesion programmes for Prevent, further demonstrating how it had been “shaped within a specific political context in which there were already very strong and politically dominant views about the dislocation of

Muslim communities” (Husband and Alum 2011:18).

However, despite Prevent funding being reduced for community cohesion programmes, the idea that they can help prevent terrorism still resonates within 2011 version of this policy. I would suggest that the reasons for this are due to the tension between different power-knowledge discourses found at the international and UK level. On an international level, the UK generally follows UN or EU guidelines (see UN 2006:I.2-3), but the implementation of such ideas in the UK has been controversial, with many strongly condemning the attempts made by the 2008 Prevent Strategy. One government report stated the funding was not adequately managed (House of Commons Community and Local Government Committee 2010:61), thus community cohesion projects were decoupled from Prevent because “Prevent depends on a successful integration strategy but that strategy by itself will not deliver the Prevent objectives” (H.M. Government 2011b:30). Furthermore, the policy received negative publicity because “the term

Preventing Violent Extremism… was seen by many Muslim community members and some stakeholders as insulting [and] provocative” (Waterhouse Consulting Group 2008:42. Also Kundani 2009). Therefore, community cohesion approaches are still considered necessary for effective counter-terrorism measures, but they are (supposedly) no longer directly associated with Prevent.

Although this change in funding allocation could be seen as a positive alteration, the 2011 Prevent Strategy still receives criticism over its continued focus on countering al- Qaeda-inspired terrorism above other terrorist groups and ideologies. One study by Miller and Sabir into the propaganda surrounding terrorism suggested that this threat has been over-emphasised and that a more serious and sustained threat to the UK comes

from armed groups in Northern Ireland rather than from “Islamist” groups (Miller and Sabir 2012:87). Furthermore, “official briefings on alleged [al-Qaeda inspired] 'plots' are not always reliable, whether by mistake or design” (Miller and Sabir 2012:90); thus the focus on al-Qaeda may not reflect the reality of potential attacks from this group, which has resulted in some questioning the validity of the policy.

Due to the claims made in the research conducted by Miller and Sabir, it is difficult to conclusively decide on the truth of the situation. However, regardless of whether or not the focus on al-Qaeda is an accurate representation of the terrorist threat, I would argue that this presentation of terrorism is problematic because it affects the wider Islamic community in the UK (Soundings 2011). As Awan noted, the language used in Prevent 2011 could promote the idea that Muslims are the key demographic for countering radicalisation, either through Islamic theological education or through surveillance measures within Islamic communities (Awan 2012:1170), which has the potential to “stigmatize the entire populations” (Awan 2012:1166. Also see H.M. Government 2011b:17-18, 31-32 and 43-49). Allen similarly argued that the association of jihad to terrorism may intensify Islamophobic reactions to Muslim communities (Allen 2010). Therefore, Prevent could actually be counter-productive to community cohesion efforts: focussing on a terrorist threat that is linked to a specific minority community in the UK could intensify those problems that it was attempting to subvert.

3.3.3 Conclusion

The counter-terrorism measures expressed and exercised through UK legislation and policy implementation demonstrate the nature of the discourses found within the political arena. The incorporation of religious motivation into legal documents, as well

as the continued focus on al-Qaeda inspired terrorism within policy documents, has had a profound effect on the perceived criminality of those associated offences, as well as on the counter-terrorism measures put in place to help prevent them from occurring, in particular those measures used within Islamic communities.

The views expressed in political documents has also affected the perceptions of terrorism found within the other arenas because they provide the guidelines by which the boundaries of acceptable beliefs and behaviour have become known. Thus those individuals who choose to act outside these boundaries become categorised as terrorists: a categorisation which remains with them and is used in the other arenas as an accepted description for those individuals or groups under discussion. However, the power of this categorisation not only affects those called “terrorists”, but also those groups or individuals who could (however loosely) be associated with them. The incorporation of religious associations to terrorism within political discourses is particularly problematic because it has resulted in anyone associated with the religion becoming subject to anything from prejudices to physical restrictions in civil liberties (placed under the guise of counter-terrorism measures).