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For my thesis, I am most interested in the “religious wave”, because it is here that we currently find ourselves; perceptions of terrorism in the academic arena are dominated by the notion that they are somehow associated with religion. According to Rapoport, post-1980s terrorism saw the beginnings of this “wave”, with Islam “at the heart… [because] Islamic groups have conducted the most significant, deadly and profoundly international attacks” (Rapoport 2004:61). Although there have been historical examples of what some scholars would call Islam-inspired terrorism (Conrad and Milton 2013:318), the most recent “religious wave” began in 1979, where three significant events occurred in the Islamic world: the Iranian Revolution; the beginning of a new Islamic century; and the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union. Rapoport argued that the chronology of terrorist attacks after these events demonstrated that most groups, either religious or secular, were formed in reaction to, or influenced by, a religious ideology and thus 1979 should be considered a turning point in our current understanding of terrorism. An interesting comparison to this interpretation could be the way in which religion was perceived in relation to the Northern Ireland conflict (see Mitchell 2006 and Brewer et. al. 2013), however these discourses go

beyond the scope of this overview.

Other scholars similarly claim that we live in an age of “new terrorism”, which is “a very different and potentially far more lethal threat than the…‘traditional’ terrorist groups” (Hoffman 2006:200). Modern groups have “radically different value systems, mechanisms of legitimisation and justification, concepts of morality and world view” (Hoffman 2006:87). Although some scholars doubt whether “new terrorism” really exists (Gray 2009 and Spencer 2006) because the dynamics of “new terrorism” could be a result of new technologies, such as the Internet, rather than a distinctive change in the nature of terrorism, I would argue that the religious association made to terrorism in recent times has been essential to understanding the academic arena (see Rennie and Tite 2008). I have found that religion, particularly radical Islam, is frequently credited as “the most important defining characteristic...[of] new terrorism” (Schmid 1988:82) and the individuals associated with such groups see their struggle as good against evil and dehumanise their victims (Cronin 2003:41), which has resulted in the indiscriminate killing of civilians (Schmid 1988:88).

One potent example referenced in most of the literature on modern terrorism is al- Qaeda, particularly in post-9/11 texts, which almost always included a comment or overview of the event and its links to the Islamic (and global) nature of current attacks (some examples include Burke 2012, Jenkins et. al. 2011 and Melnick 2011). However, the events of 9/11 do not in themselves demonstrate the current parameters for terrorism definitions and discourses, but rather the current power-knowledge discourses on terrorism: authors have felt it necessary to include such discussions, perhaps to ensure interest or validity, or perhaps in response to current trends within the other arenas of

terrorism discourses. Whatever has caused this inclusion, it is the continued focus upon it that has ensured its remembrance and status within the literature.

According to Burke, the importance placed on 9/11 as an example of terrorism needs to be understood within the context of American perceptions of identity, as expressed by Bush, Huntington and Lewis (Burke 2012:xii). He argued that American non- conservative political thought promotes a global hegemony, be that religiously, culturally, militarily, economically or politically (Burke 2012:87), resulting in an identity that directly opposes the American self-view (and thus requires condemnation). Scholars such as Huntington (1997) and Lewis (2002 and 2004) are used to justify this perception of difference, because they divide the world in global terms: Western capitalist non-Islamic powers versus the Islamic non-capitalist world. These arbitrary differences also express a moral divide because 9/11 can be perceived as a representation of how the Islamic world is “evil” and America is “good” (Foucault 2002:336). The consequence of this has been a rise in anti-Islamic or Islamophobic literature and groups: books by Fallaci (2002) or Pipes (2003), websites such as

www.thereligionofpeace.com, or groups such as the English Defence League, all serve as examples of the strength of these negative perceptions about Islam.

However, these representations are contested, not least of all within the literature on Islam and violence. Some have argued that these examples of terrorism are unfair representations of the faith, that Islam is a religion of peace (for example

www.islamonline.com), thus any violence committed in its name is incorrect and should not be categorised as “Islamic” (al-Quds al-Arabi 2001). Therefore, Huntington's assertion that there is a clash of civilisations “is not a reality” (Ramadan 2004:226).

However, others argue that there are real concerns about Islamic associations to terrorism, therefore Muslims should respond and “recognise the validity [of this sad truth] and not compose articles and speeches declaring our innocence” (al-Rashid 2004). Muslims could instead take practical measures to help “overcome” terrorism within Islamic communities, perhaps through improving youth education or by expanding inter-faith and community relationships (some British groups that have implemented these ideas include the Muslim Council of Britain, the Association of British Muslims, the Islamic Society of Britain and so on). According to Ramadan, peace and cohesion lies at the heart of Islam and Muslims should “develop an understanding of the Western context that will make it possible for them… to integrate… in the culture where they live” (Ramadan 2004:216).

In spite of these efforts though, some scholars think that the continued focus on 9/11 as an example of terrorism has had a lasting, and detrimental, social effect on Muslims, resulting in a lack of employment and continuing prejudice, which makes it difficult for some Muslims to feel integrated into society (Aziz 2009). However, others think that these issues are not related to perceptions of terrorism but rather have other causes (Saggar 2009 and Siddiqui interview in Quartermaine 2014a). I would argue that due to the strength of the perceived terrorist threat, Islamic communities have had community cohesion and integration difficulties in the UK (also see Pantazis and Pemberton 2009), but this debate goes beyond the remit of this thesis.

Another view is that these (perceived) social difficulties and issues have actually resulted in a rise of aggressive responses from al-Qaeda inspired groups. For example, Milton-Edwards stated that “since 9/11, the meaning of modernity has been altered and

is now embedded in the expression of western security interests and the arguments for democratic protectionism. However, this war on terror… is also increasingly understood within Muslim communities as a declaration of war against them and the values that define them and their faith system” (Milton-Edwards 2006:x). In other words, the use of 9/11 as an example of Islamic aggression, and the subsequent responses from American (and allied) forces, has resulted in some Muslims becoming more disillusioned with the possibility of reconciliation between the “West” and “Islam” and have subsequently used this as a rallying point to encourage further acts of aggression (see Nasr 2002 and Said 2008:378). However, by doing so, the negative perceptions of Islam and its links to modern terrorism become further entrenched by those who already agree with such concepts, which has caused some sections of society to experience enhanced community cohesion difficulties (Juergensmeyer 2000 and Afsaruddin 2009).