Fases de la recogida de información

CARMELITA TAN and RODOLFO TAN, petitioners, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and FRANCISCO TAN (alias Tan Uh Bak and Tan Seng Ka), respondents.

G.R. No. L-22793 May 16, 1967

FACTS:

Francisco Tan was sued for acknowledgement and support by Carmelita and Rodolfo Tan through their mother Celestina Daldo. However, after petitioners have presented their evidence, an amicable settlement was reached which led to Carmelita to move the case to be dismissed. She also subscribed to an affidavit stating that Tan “is not the father of my said minor children named Carmelita and Rodolfo but another person whose name I cannot divulge” and that she prepared said affidavit “to record what is true and correct what misinterpretation may arise in the future.” RTC dismiss the action.

After some time after the dismissal of the case, petitioners through their maternal grandfather Servillano Daldo as guardian ad litem filed action for acknowledgment and support involving the same parties, cause of action and subject matter. RTC dismissed the case based on res judicata. Tan appealed to the CA, which reversed RTC decision and dismissed the complaint.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the testimonies made by petitioner’s witnesses in the former case may be admissible as evidence under Section 41 of Rule 130.

RULING:

No. The witnesses are available. They are not dead nor are they outside the Philippines. They just refused to testify. Thus, they do not come within the legal purview of those “unable to testify.” Petitioners also failed to avail court remedies to secure their attendance. Petitioners tried to prove that Daldo and Tan lived together as husband and wife for more than 8 years. Carmelita and Rodolfo were allegedly fruits of such cohabitation. Respondent denies such and alleges that he is very much a married man with several children. Daldo by her own admission, had been a nursemaid (yaya) in the respondent’s residence but for a short period of not less than one year. Carmelita was born on May 8, 1942 and Rodolfo on September 11, 1944. The validity of the testimony of petitioner’s witnesses was downgraded by the affidavit of Celestina. In such affidavit, Daldo deposed that petitioners were not fathered by Tan but by another person whose name she could not divulge. SC affirmed judgment of CA.

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OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs

HERSCHEL ROBERTS, Defendant-Appellant,

448 US 56 (1980)

FACTS:

Defendant Roberts had stayed at Anita Isaacs apartment for a few days. During his stay, defendant used checks and credit cards under Bernard Isaacs’s name.

At the preliminary hearing, Anita was called by defendant’s counsel and asked at length about granting permission to defendant.

She denied granting permission and thereafter during the trial, Anita was not available despite an extensive search by the prosecution and her family.

Therefore, the prosecution submitted her preliminary hearing testimony as 1evidence. Defendant objected but the trial judge allowed the evidence.

Defendant was convicted, but the appellate court and the Supreme Court of Ohio sided with defendant in not allowing the admissibility of the evidence presented by the prosecution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the preliminary hearing testimony made by an unavailable witness is admissible in evidence.

RULING:

Yes, the introduction in evidence of the testimony of the daughter in the preliminary hearing was constitutionally permissible.

The admission of the preliminary hearing testimony does not violate defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution.

The witness was unavailable, but the prosecution made a good-faith effort in trying to locate her.

There were also several factors that demonstrated the reliability of her testimony such as defendant’s counsel asker her leading questions at length during the preliminary hearing.

The daughter’s prior testimony at the preliminary hearing bore sufficient “indicia of reliability”.

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TESTIMONY OR DEPOSITION AT A FORMER TRIAL

• The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him.

➢ Requisites for admissibility:

a) The witness whose testimony is offered in evidence is either dead, unable to testify, insane, mentally incapacitated, lost his memory through old age or disease, physically disabled, kept away by contrivance of the opposite party and despite diligent search cannot be found;

b) Identity of parties in the previous and the present case or proceeding;

c) Identity of issues;

d) Opportunity of cross-examination of witness.

➢ If the witness has been subjected to cross-examination in a former trial, the rule is satisfied, and the former testimony may now be used. In applying this proposition, the following details may arise for settlement:

a) Was the testimony given before a court allowing cross-examination by adverse parties and having power to compel answer? If not, the testimony cannot be used.

b) If the testimony was given as a deposition, was the opponent given reasonable notice and opportunity to attend and cross-examine?

c) Whether at a former trial or before a deposition officer, were the then issues and parties so nearly the same as now that the opportunity to cross-examine on the present issues was inadequate? If not, the testimony cannot be used.

d) Was cross-examination prevented by the death or illness or refusal of the witness, after giving his direct testimony? If it was, the direct examination cannot be used.

O pinion Rule – The opinion of a witness is not admissible, except as indicated in the following sections. (Sec. 48-50 Rule 130)

DILAG & CORPORATED VS. MERCED

45 OG 5536 (1949)

FACTS:

This case stemmed when Dilag & Co. filed a case for the theft of a truck bought from International Harvester Company. The incident happened during the Japanese occupation. After deliberation, Dilag saw the truck parked outside a restaurant. Dilag had it seized and filed complaint of theft against Merced. Merced claimed that he bought the truck in good faith and he relied on the copy of the certificate of registration. Dilag presented Jose Aguilar of the Bureau of Public works on the fact of tampering of the motor vehicle number. The court ruled in favor of Dilag and ordered Merced to pay damages. Merced attacked the competency of the testimony of Jose Aguilar ISSUE:

Whether or not Aguilar’s testimony shall be admissible as evidence in court as an expert testimony.

RULING:

Yes. Aguilar’s testimony should be given weight and value.

The law provides that there is no precise requirement as to the mode in which skill or experience shall have been acquired. Scientific study and training are not always essential to the competency of a witness as an expert. A witness may be competent to testify as an expert although his knowledge his knowledge was acquired through the medium of practical experience rather than scientific study and research.

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THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee, vs.

VALENTIN TRONO, ET AL., defendants-appelants.

G.R. No. 1344 January 19, 1904

FACTS:

The defendants, charged with the murder of Benito Perez, were convicted by the trial court of the offense of lesiones menos graves, and sentenced to six months of arresto mayor, the payment of 100 Mexican pesos as damages to the heirs of the deceased, and to the costs of the trial.

From the evidence introduced at the trial it appears that late at night on February 4, 1903, the deceased, Benito Perez, Policarpio Guevarra, and Felipe Bautista, were arrested in their respective houses by the defendants Valentin Trono, subinspector of the municipal police of the town of Hagonoy, accompanied by Jose and Agustin who were municipal policemen and Maximo Angeles. The deceased and his companions were suspected of the theft of a revolver belonging to Maximo Angeles. The three were taken to a place called Sapang-Angelo and there were beaten and illtreated. They were then brought to the municipal building of the town where Benito Perez who has suffered much of the beatings were complaining of severe pain and was not able to properly walk. Nothing was adduced from the investigation of the theft, the three were subsequently released from custody. Benito Perez died the next morning. An investigation ensued and the defense contends that the death of Benito Perez was not due to the wounds inflicted during the beatings, but to a serious illness, from which the deceased had been suffering for a long time, basing such allegation on the certificate and testimony of the physician, Don Andres Icasiano. The trial court convicted the accused of murder. The defendants appealed decisions, relying on the testimony of the expert witness.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court erred in not giving credence to the expert testimony.

RULING:

The court did not erred in not giving credence to the expert testimony. Expert testimony no doubt constitutes evidence worthy of meriting consideration, although not exclusive, on questions of a professional character. The courts of justice, however, are not bound to submit their findings necessarily to such testimony; they are free to weight them, and they can give or refuse to give them any value as proof, or they can even counterbalance such evidence with the other elements of conviction which may have been adduced during the trial. In the present case there are to be found sufficient data which show in a conclusive manner the seriousness of the wounds inflicted upon the deceased, which from the very first moment prevented him from keeping on his feet, and caused him continuous and sharp pains in the abdomen and retention of the urine — symptoms which constantly showed themselves until death came

— which in the absence of satisfactory proof to the contrary may be attributed to these causes, which undoubtedly were sufficient in themselves to bring about the death of the deceased.

We therefore reverse the judgment appealed from and sentence the defendants Maximo Angeles and Valentin Trono to the penalty of fourteen years eight months and one day of reclusion temporal, and Timoteo Natividad to the penalty of eight years and one day of prision mayor, and all three to the payment of an indemnity consisting of 500 pesos, Philippine currency, to the heirs of the deceased, and to the payment of the costs in this instance.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

PABLO ADOVISO, defendant-appellant.

GR Nos. 116196-97June 23, 1999

FACTS:

At around 8:00 in the evening on February 18, 1990, Emeterio uttered that he had been shot.

Their son Bonifacio, who was living in an adjacent house, heard the gunshot and went to their front yard to investigate. Bonifacio saw his father being shot by several persons from the outside, but he could only recognize accused Pablo Adoviso since he was the only one not wearing a mask and that the light from the gas lamp inside the camaligilluminated his face clearly.

On the other hand, Bonifacio’s son Elmer rushed to his grandfather’s house where he also saw several assailants shoot his cousin, Rufino. After seeing Elmer, the gunmen fled the place. Both Emeterio and Rufino were taken to the hospital, but died soon thereafter.

Trial ensued, and the main witnesses presented were Bonifacio and Elmer. However, the accused claims that he was not properly identified by said witnesses due to the darkness of the night.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused had been properly identified.

RULING:

Yes. Visibility is indeed a vital factor in the determination of whether or not an eyewitness could have identified the perpetrator of a crime. However, it is settled that when conditions of visibility are favorable, and the witnesses do not appear to be biased, their assertion as to the identity of the malefactor should normally be accepted. Illumination produced by kerosene lamp or a flashlight is sufficient to allow identification of persons. Wick lamps, flashlights, even moonlight or starlight may, in proper situations be considered sufficient illumination, making the attack on the credibility of witnesses solely on that ground unmeritorious.

In this case, not one but two gas lamps illuminated the place the one placed inside the camalig and that held by Emeterio as he descended from the stairs after the first volley of gunfire. Appellants contention therefore that one particular gas lamp could not have lighted the place because it was placed inside a can is puerile. Further, the bamboo slats of the camalig could not have effectively obstructed the eyewitnesses' view of appellant, considering that the slats were built four meters apart. Besides, it is the natural reaction of relatives of victims to strive to observe the faces and appearance of the assailants, if not ascertain their identities, and the manner in which the crime is committed. A relative will naturally be interested in identifying the malefactor to secure his conviction to obtain justice for the death of his relatives. It must remembered that appellant was not a complete stranger to the eyewitnesses. Bonifacio had known him for ten years, while Elmer had been acquainted with him for four years. Elmer recalled

that appellant used to join the rabuz at the barracks. Familiarity with appellants face and appearance minimized if not erased the possibility that they could have been mistaken as to his identity.

The case also discussed the inadmissibility of polygraph tests in the Philippines. A polygraph is an electromechanical instrument that simultaneously measures and records certain physiological changes in the human body that are believed to be involuntarily caused by an examinees conscious attempt to deceive the questioner. The theory behind a polygraph or lie detector test is that a person who lies deliberately will have a rising blood pressure and a subconscious block in breathing, which will be recorded on the graph. However, American courts almost uniformly reject the results of polygraph tests when offered in evidence for the purpose of establishing the guilt or innocence of one accused of a crime, whether the accused or the prosecution seeks its introduction, for the reason that polygraph has not as yet attained scientific acceptance as a reliable and accurate means of ascertaining truth or deception. The rule is no different in this jurisdiction.

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STATE OF OREGON, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.

ROBERT EDGAR GARVER, Defendant-Appellant.

225 P.2d 771 December 19, 1950

FACTS:

Robert Garver met his accomplices Norman Andrus and Leland Marshall in tavern in downtown Portland, and proposed that they rob one Ancell Abbott, who was a janitor in the Fred Meyer Store.

Garver claimed to have information that Abbott would be leaving the store late in the evening carrying about $5,000 in a shopping bag. Acting upon Garver’s suggestion, Andrus and Marshall stole an automobile, secured two guns, and rejoined Garver at about nine o’clock in the evening in the vicinity of the store. Garver armed himself with one of the guns. They waited until Abbott appeared carrying the shopping bag, and followed him several blocks in the stolen automobile. Andrus remained in the car while the other two got out and held up Abbott with guns in hand. The defendant Garver shot Abbott three times. The three fled, carrying with them the shopping bag, which, as it turned out, contained no money but only some clothes.

Garver raised the defense of insanity. It was shown during the trial that Garver was admitted twice in mental institutions, namely Veteran’s Hospital at Roseburg, Oregon and Oregon State Hospital, as a mentally diseased person. A provisional diagnosis of “psychoneurosis hysteria” was made. Later while on parole, at his mother’s request, he was examined by Dr. Gerhard B. Haugen, a psychiatrist. Dr.

Haugen reported that the basic pattern present in Garver is Psychopathic Inferiority. In addition to Dr.

Haugen’s testimony, the defense also presented the testimony of Garver’s mother, Mrs. Mitchell, and lay testimonies of others tending to show the defendant’s chronic condition of mental abnormality.

Mrs. Mitchell related to the jury the history of her son from infancy to the day of the alleged crime including his illnesses, both mental and physical; his hospitalizations; his moral delinquencies; and his crimes, throw light on his mental condition. She used the expression “in such terrible shape” and

“physically ill”. The Court struck these phrases and Garver was later convicted of murder by the lower court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Mrs. Mitchell can testify as to the mental condition of defendant Garver.

RULING:

Yes, the general rule is that a lay witness may testify only to facts and not to opinions or conclusions. But lay witnesses are frequently permitted to use so-called short hand descriptions, in reality opinions, in presenting to the court their impression of the general physical condition of a person. The court has held it proper in a personal injury case to permit laymen, who were intimately acquainted with

the plaintiff prior to her injury and observed her condition thereafter, to testify that her health and general physical condition had materially changed for the worse. It leaves the witness free to speak his ordinary language, not bewildered by admonitions from the judge to testify to facts, when all the while the witness is sure in his own mind that he is testifying to facts. The jury understands that what the witness means, and the right of cross-examination remove the likelihood of harm to the other side. Too strict adherence to the opinion rule is undesirable.

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.

ORVILLE E. STIFEL, Defendant-Appellant.

433 F.2d 431, October 29, 1970

FACTS:

Daniel Ronec, the victim in this case, had just graduated from Ohio State University and was about to marry Cheryl Jones. On July 8, 1968, barely a month before his wedding, Ronec received a package through the United States mail which consistsof a mailing tube and a screw on top.

When Ronec unscrew the top of the package, an explosion occurred killing him instantly. It was found out that the package contained a bomb and the same when off upon opening.

Ronec’s murder was attributed to Orville Stifel, an employee working at the laboratory of Procter

& Gamble, whom Cheryl Jones had a tempestuous relationship in 1965 to 1966, prior to being engaged to Ronec in 1967. Miss Jones attempted to terminate the relationship in the fall of 1966 but Stifel sent her several threats in the form of letters.

The government presented evidence regarding Stifel’s experience in handling firearms, fireworks, and small rockets. Employees of the Procter & Gamble also testified that the screw top mailing cylinders, mailing stickers, and tape used in the bomb package were similar to that which were found in the stockroom of the company to which Stifel had access.

Expert testimony was introduced to compare the materials found in the bombsite with the materials available at Procter & Gamble. James Scott, a chemist and micro-analyst from the Identification Bureau of the Post Office Department Inspection Service in Washington, D.C., was presented as to his

Expert testimony was introduced to compare the materials found in the bombsite with the materials available at Procter & Gamble. James Scott, a chemist and micro-analyst from the Identification Bureau of the Post Office Department Inspection Service in Washington, D.C., was presented as to his

In document “Hablando de los gitanos”. (página 180-183)