MARCO TEÓRICO
2. MARCO TEÓRICO
2.4. EL PREJUICIO ÉTNICO EN EL AULA
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee vs.
AIROL ALING Y MAJURI, accused
96 SCRA 474 (1980)
FACTS:
Accused AirolAling was accused of parricide for allegedly stabbing his wife NorijaMohamad, in the chest. Norija was brought to the hospital but later on died of the stabs she received. AirolAling was investigated by the police. He declared in the Chavacano dialect (his declaration was translated into English) that he killed his wife (whom he married according to Muslim rites because he was informed in prison by his relatives that his wife was living with another man and fooling around with other men.
Before arraignment, accused Airol was willing to plead guilty, however he had no lawyer so acounsel de officio was appointed for him. At arraignment, he pleaded guilty to the accusation that he killed his wife.
He said that he was not coerced nor cajoled into entering a plea of guilty. He admitted that he was a prisoner in the penal colony. He said that his purpose was to be reconciled with his wife but when she saw him, instead of waiting for him, she ran away. He had information that his wife was guilty of infidelity or had a "kabit". That was a grievous offense under Muslim customs. The trial court found Airol guilty of parricide. By automatic review, counsel de oficio contends that the marriage of Airol and Norija was not proven and therefore, Airol cannot be held guilty of parricide.
ISSUE:
Whether Airol is liable for parricide even without evidence introduced to prove marriage.
RULING:
The testimony of the accused that he was married to the deceased was an admission against hispenal interest. It was a confirmation of the maxim semper praesumitur matrimonio and the presumption "that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage"
. He and the deceased had five children. He alluded in his testimony to his father--in--law. That implies that the deceased was his lawful wife. The fact that he bitterly resented her infidelity, her failure to visit him in prison and her neglect of their children are other circumstances confirmatory of their marital status. The fact that he escaped from confinement in order to kill his wife shows a high degree of perversity and incorrigibility
His being a non--Christian cannot serve to extenuate the heinousness of his offense. He understood the gravity of his crime because he had attained some education. He reached first year high school and he used to be a checker in a stevedoring firm. However, he was sentenced only to reclusion perpetua, not the death penalty because of lack of one vote from the justices.
____________________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
EUGENIO TOLEDO and SISENANDO HOLGADO, defendants.
EUGENIO TOLEDO, appellant.
G.R. No. L-28655 August 6, 1928
FACTS:
Sisenando Holgado and Filomeno Morales had disputes about the occupation of certain land situated in the municipality of Pinamalayan, Province of Mindoro. On the morning of June 15, 1927, the two men happened to meet. The argument was renewed, and they agreed to fight. They did engage in a bolo duel with a fatal result for Filomeno Morales, who was killed almost instantly. Sisenando Holgado was also seriously wounded but was able to proceed to a neighboring house. From there Sisenando
Holgado was taken to the municipal building where he made a sworn statement before the municipal president, in which he declared that only he and Filomeno Morales fought. About one month later, Sisenando Holgado died from the wounds received in the fight.
The prosecution and the defense alike agree on the facts above outlined. The disputable point is whether the accused Eugenio Toledo intervened in the quarrel and dealt a mortal blow to Filomeno Morales. For the prosecution, there was presented the witness Justina Villanueva, the querida of Filomeno Morales, who testified to the presence and participation of Eugenio Toledo. Her testimony was partially corroborated by that of the witness Justina Llave. On the other hand, the theory for the defense was that Toledo was in another place when the fight between Morales and Holgado occurred and that his only participation was on meeting Holgado, who was his landlord or master, in helping him to a nearby house.
To this effect is the testimony of the accused and of Conrado Holgado, the son of Sisenando Holgado.
The defense also relied upon the affidavit of Sisenando Holgado, Exhibit 1, which was identified by the municipal president of Pinamalayan.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the evidence presented constitute a declaration against interest.
RULING:
Yes. Hearsay evidence, with a few well recognized exceptions, it has been said on high authority, is excluded by courts in the United States that adhere to the principles of the common law. One universally recognized exception concerns the admission of dying declarations. Another exception permits the reception, under certain circumstances, of declarations of third parties made contrary to their own pecuniary or proprietary interest. But the general rule is stated to be that the declarations of a person other than accused confessing or tending to show that he committed the crime are not competent for accused on account of the hearsay doctrine.
A study of the authorities discloses that even if given application they are not here controlling.
Most of them do not concern the confessions of declarants shown to be deceased. Practically all of them give as the principal reason for denying the admission of a confession of a third person that he committed the crime with which the accused is charged, that it was not made under oath. Here the declarant is deceased and his statements were made under oath. They also read in such a way as to ring with the truth.
When Sisenando Holgado declared "When we fought, there was nobody present," it was at the end of just such a rambling statement as a wounded man would be expected to make. When Sisenando Holgado declared "I met one of my workers named Eugenio Toledo, who accompanied me to the house of Dalmacio Manlisic," he did so in response to a question by the municipal president. Exhibit 1 should have been received not as conclusive evidence of innocence, but as evidence to be taken into consideration in connection with the other proven facts.
Any man outside of a court and unhampered by the pressure of technical procedure, unreasoned rules of evidence, and cumulative authority, would say that if a man deliberately acknowledged himself to be the perpetrator of a crime and exonerated the person charged with the crime, and there was other evidence indicative of the truthfulness of the statement, the accused man should not be permitted to go to prison or to the electric chair to expiate a crime he never committed. Shall Judges trained and experienced in the law display less discerning common sense that the layman and allow precedent to overcome truth?
_____________________________________________________________________________________
ALEJANDRO FUENTES, JR., petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
253 SCRA 430 1996
FACTS:
While attending a benefit dancer, Fuentes, called Malaspina who was with his three friends and put his arm around the former’s shoulder, saying: “Before, I saw you with your long hair, but now you have short hair.” He then stabbed the Malaspina with a hunting knife and fled.
Before Malaspina’s death, he muttered that Fuentes, Jr. was the culprit. However, Fuentes alleged the defense of mistaken identity. He claimed that it was Zolio Fuentes Jr. alias “Jonie” who was the perpetrator and not him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Alejandro Fuentes was indeed positively identified as the killer of Malaspina.
RULING:
Yes. The alleged declaration against interest attributed to Zoilo is inadmissible in evidence as an exception to hearsay. It has not been demonstrated that Zoilo is unable to testify. There is no showing that he is dead, mentally incapacitated or physically incompetent. His mere absence from the jurisdiction does not make him ipso facto unavailable under the Rules.
The records show that the defense did not exert any serious effort to produce Zoilo as a witness.
An innocent declaration by the real culprit should be admissible as evidence.
But this can be open to abuse as when the extrajudicial statement is not even authenticated, thereby increasing the probability of its fabrication. For this case, at least, the prudent course is its exclusion.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
ALEJANDRO FUENTES, JR., petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
253 SCRA 430 1996
FACTS:
While attending a benefit dancer, Fuentes, called Malaspina who was with his three friends and put his arm around the former’s shoulder, saying: “Before, I saw you with your long hair, but now you have short hair.” He then stabbed the Malaspina with a hunting knife and fled.
Before Malaspina’s death, he muttered that Fuentes, Jr. was the culprit. However, Fuentes alleged the defense of mistaken identity. He claimed that it was Zolio Fuentes Jr. alias “Jonie” who was the perpetrator and not him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Alejandro Fuentes was indeed positively identified as the killer of Malaspina.
RULING:
Yes. The alleged declaration against interest attributed to Zoilo is inadmissible in evidence as an exception to hearsay. It has not been demonstrated that Zoilo is unable to testify. There is no showing that he is dead, mentally incapacitated or physically incompetent. His mere absence from the jurisdiction does not make him ipso facto unavailable under the Rules.
The records show that the defense did not exert any serious effort to produce Zoilo as a witness.
An innocent declaration by the real culprit should be admissible as evidence.
But this can be open to abuse as when the extrajudicial statement is not even authenticated, thereby increasing the probability of its fabrication. For this case, at least, the prudent course is its exclusion.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
MEYNARDO SABILI, petitioner vs
COMELEC, respondent
G.R. No. 193261 April 24, 2012
FACTS:
COMELEC denied Sabili’s Certificate of Candidacy for mayor of Lipa due to failure to comply with theone year residency requirement. When petitioner filed his COC for mayor of Lipa City for the 2010 elections, he stated therein that he had been a resident of the city for more than two years.
However, it is undisputed that when petitioner filed his COC during the 2007 elections, he and his family were then staying at his ancestral home in Barangay (Brgy.) Sico, San Juan, Batangas. Librea (private respondent) filed a "Petition to Deny Due Course and to cancel Certificate of Candidacy and to Disqualify a candidate for possessing some grounds for disqualification.
ISSUE:
Whether the information contained in the COC filed by Sabili is a declaration against interest.
RULING:
NO. The exception will not apply where the declarant is available as a witness. The declarant must be dead or is unable to testify for the exception to apply.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
P edigree
PEDRO GRAVADOR, Petitioner-Appellee, vs
EUTIQUIO MAMIGO ET AL., Respondents-Appellants,
G.R. No. L-24989 July 21 1967
FACTS:
The petitioner Pedro Gravador was the principal of the Sta. Catalina Elementary School in Sta.
Catalina, Negros Oriental on August 15, 1964 when he was advised by the then Superintendent of Schools Angel Salazar, Jr., through the respondent Supervisor Teodulfo E. Dayao, of his separation from the service on the ground that he had reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 according to his pre-war records as a teacher in the public schools, including his Employee’s Record Card. He was advised of his separation from service “effective immediately unless you can show valid proof in the form of a baptismal or birth certificate that you are below 65 years of age today” (excerpt from the advice given).
On August 31, 1964 the petitioner wrote the Director of Public Schools, protesting his forced retirement on the ground that the date of his birth is not November 26, 1897 but December 11, 1901.
Attached to his letter was the affidavit, executed on July 26, 1962, of Lazaro Bandoquillo and Pedro A.
Sienes both of Amlan Negros Oriental, in which these two affiants declared that they knew that the petitioner "was born on December 11, 1901, in the Municipality of Amlan formerly known as New Ayuquitan Province of Negros Oriental, Philippines" because, "we were the neighbors of the late spouses, NEPOMUCENO GRAVADOR and AGUEDA REGOROSA [petitioner's parents], and we were present when said PEDRO GRAVADOR was born; furthermore, we were also invited during the baptismal party a few weeks after the birth of said PEDRO GRAVADOR ."
On July 6, 1967 the petitioner asked for the dismissal of the appeal on the ground that the issues posed thereby had become moot with his retirement from the service on December 11, 1966 and the payment to him of the corresponding retirement benefits. We deem it necessary, however, to review the trial court's decision on the merits, considering that the computation of retirement annuities is based among other things, on the number of years of service of a retiree, and that payment of benefits already made to the petitioner on the basis of December 11, 1901 as the date of his birth would not exempt him from the obligation to make a refund should this Court ultimately rule that he was actually born November 26, 1897, as the respondents claim.
ISSUE:
WON the trial court erred in placing full reliance on the post-war records to establish the date of birth of the petitioner.
RULING:
NO. The court gave three cogent reasons:
1. As Moran states, although a person can have no personal knowledge of the date of his birth, he may testify as to his age as he learned it from his parents and relatives and his testimony in such case is an assertion of a family tradition.
2. The import of the declaration of the petitioner’s brother contained in a verified pleading in a cadastral case way back in 1924, to the effect that the petitioner was then 23 years old, cannot be ignored. Made ante litem motam by a deceased relative, this statement is at once a declaration regarding pedigree within the intendment and meaning of Section 33 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
3. The parties are agreed that the petitioner has a brother, Constantino, who was born on June 10, 1898 and who retired on June 10, 1963 with full retirement pay. The petitioner then could not have been born earlier than Constantino, say in 1897 as pre-war records indicate, because Constantino is admittedly older than he.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
ALFREDO ALEGADO Y DELIMA, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 93030-31 August 21, 1991
FACTS:
On April 14, 1988, Alfredo Alegado took Cristina Deang to the second floor of the public market.
He then ordered masturbate him then forcibly pushed her to the floor. He lay on top of her and inserted his penis but it did not penetrate fully before he ejaculated. The appellant gave her P2.00 and then left.
Fearing that he might kill her, the victim told no one. On April 20,1988 Alegado again asked Christina to go second floor, however Christina resisted, the accused shoved her and inserted his penis into the girl’s vagina that eventually bled. The appellant gave her P2.00 and then left. Patrolwoman Evangeline Alfaro saw appellant coming down the stairs and then the victim followed a minute later. She was pale with blood flowing from her thigh and legs. He was charged with two counts of statutory rape by the RTC.
One of the contentions of the accused is that the prosecution failed to prove with certainty the actual age of the offended party.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the age of the offended party was duly proven to be below twelve years old in order for the RPC provision on statutory rape to apply.
RULING:
Yes. The fact that the victim was below twelve years old at the time of the rape was duly proved.
The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the offended party herself and her maternal grandfather, Cornelio Villarosa, as to the fact that the victim was born on September 5, 1976 do not constitute hearsay evidence as claimed by the accused-appellant but rather fall under the exceptions to the hearsay rule as provided under Section 39 and 40 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. The word “pedigree”
under Section 39 includes relationship. Family, genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and places where these facts occurred and the name of the relatives.
The said provision contains three requisites for its admissibility, namely,
(1) that there is controversy in respect to the pedigree of any member of the family;
(2) that the reputation or tradition of the pedigree of the person concerned existed previous to the controversy; and
(3) that the witness testifying to the reputation or tradition must be a member of the family of the said person.
All these preconditions are obtaining in the case at bar considering that the date of birth of the rape victim is put in issue; that the declaration of the victim’s grandfather relating to tradition existed long before the rape case was filed; and that the witness testifying to the said tradition is the maternal grandfather of the rape victim. Moreover, the offended party herself categorically stated in open court that she was born on September 5, 1976. Although a person can have no personal knowledge of the date of his birth, he may testify as to his age as he learned it from his parents and relatives and his testimony in such case is an assertion of a family tradition. Inasmuch as the accused-appellant failed to present contrary evidence to dispute the prosecution’s claim that the victim was below twelve years old at the time of the rapes under consideration, we affirm the trial court’s finding that the victim in these rape cases was under twelve years old.
_____________________________________________________________________________________
CORAZON DEZOLLAR TISON & RENE R. DEZOLLER, Petitioners, vs
COURT OF APPEALS & TEODORA DOMINGO, Respondents
276 SCRA 582 (1997)
FACTS:
This case stems from an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land and an apartment. Teodora Guerrero died and left a parcel of land and an apartment. Her husband, Martin Guerrero adjudicates the said land to him and thereafter sold it to Teodora Domingo.
The petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller are the niece and nephew respectively of the deceased Teodora Dezollar Guerrero, who appears to be the sister of their father Hermogenes Dezoller.
Teodora Guerrero died without any ascendants or descendants, and was survived only by her husband, Martin Guerrero and the herein petitioners. The petitioners hence seek to inherit from Teodora Dezoller Guerrero by right of representation.
Martin Guerrero died and subsequently, the herein petitioners filed an action for reconveyance claiming that they are entitled to inherit one half of the property in question by right of representation.
They presented documentary evidence to prove filial relation.
Teodoro Domingo however, attacks the admissibility of the said documents/evidence presented by
Teodoro Domingo however, attacks the admissibility of the said documents/evidence presented by