Flexibilizando el nomos: el caso Colombia-Ecuador

Etzioni (1961; 1964) introduces the concepts of control and compliance as major elements of relationships in organisations between those who have power (power holders), and those over whom they exercise it (subordinates). Control is a process by which organisation members are socialised and oriented towards the power exercised by power holders. It is not simply a question of controlling those who falter, but is a continuous process of socialisation, orien- tation and restatement of goals. Compliance is “[…] the relation in which an actor behaves in accordance with a directive supported by another actor’s power and to the orientation of the subordinated actor to the power applied” (Etzioni 1961, 4; cf. Etzioni 1964; Milham et al. 1972). Compliance refers to the obedience of a member of an organisation, and the reasons for this obedi- ence. It is the result of two factors operating within organisations: the orienta- tion of members towards the organisation power system (their involvement), and the means available to power holders for the exercise of their power.

Etzioni (1961, 8) defines power as an actor’s ability to induce or influ- ence another actor to carry out his directives or any other norms they support. Power holders regularly wield permanent power over subordinates because of their organisational position, and use this to influence a person to follow their individual or collective intentions (Etzioni 1961, 5). In organisations, enforcing collective norms is likely to be a condition determining the power holder’s access to the means of power and how they exercise this power toward subor- dinates. The relation between power holders and subordinates plays a central role in Etzioni’s theory, and is a useful tool for comparison between organisa- tions. The relative position of these actors is like the two inseparable sides of the same coin.

In our study, the State and the religious communities are considered to be power holders for religiously-affiliated schools. The State has the power to control school policies under the National Education System, including the policies for religious education in religiously-affiliated schools. Government Regulation No. 55/2007, Article 7.2 stipulates that: “Every school that does not comply with religious education as mentioned in article 3.1, article 4 (2 until 7), and article 5.1 will be subject to administrative sanctions ranging from rep- rimand through closure after first being trained/guided by the national govern- ment or local governments.”58 Religious communities also act as power holders

58

Our translation of: “Satuan pendidikan yang tidak menyelenggarakan pendidikan

agama sesuai dengan ketentuan yang dimaksud dalam pasal 3 ayat (1), pasal 4 ayat (2) sampai dengan ayat (7), dan pasal 5 ayat (1) dikenakan sanksi administrative berupa peringatan sampai dengan penutupan setelah diadakan pembinaan /pembimbingan oleh Pemerintah/ atau pemerintah daerah.”

because they influence policies of religious education in schools to a certain degree, e.g. through their expectation that schools will socialise students in religious education. The schools, and more specifically the school policies on religious education, are considered subordinate to and influenced by the exter- nal powers of State and religious communities (cf. Ziebertz & Kay, 2005; Nietto 2004).

Etzioni (1961; 1964) distinguishes between three types of power used by power holders to control subordinates: normative, coercive and utilitarian power. First we will present these different types of power, based on different means of control exercised by power holders towards subordinates, as well as the response of subordinates to power holders. Next, we analyse how certain powers might be exercised, and how this might influence the policies of reli- gious education in religiously-affiliated schools in Indonesia.

3.1.1. Normative power

Normative power rests on the allocation and manipulation of symbolic rewards and deprivations through allocation of esteem and prestige symbols, admini- stration of rituals, and influence over the distribution of acceptance, acknowl- edgement and positive response. Etzioni distinguishes between two kinds of normative power. The first is based on the manipulation of esteem, prestige and ritual symbols; the second is based on the allocation and manipulation of acceptance, acknowledgement and positive response (Etzioni 1961, 46). Al- though both types of power are found in both vertical and horizontal relation- ships, the first is more frequent in vertical relations, between actors who have different ranks, while the second is more common in horizontal relations, among actors equal in rank. Etzioni explains that the effective application of normative power requires that subordinates be highly committed. If they are only mildly committed – and particularly if they are alienated from the power holders – the application of normative power is likely to be ineffective (Etzioni 1961, 13).

Normative power could also be defined as symbolic power. Bourdieu (1991) refers to symbolic power as an invisible power, inculcated through in- This regulation is confirmed by Regulation of the Ministry of Religious Affairs 16/2010 article 28.1, which states that: “A school that fails to organise the religious education mentioned by article 3.1 and article 4 of Government Regulation 55/2007 on the management of religious education will be subject to administrative sanction, such as a. verbal warning; b. being reprimanded three times; or c. school closure.” Our translation of: “Sekolah yang tidak menyelenggarakan Pendidikan Agama sebagai-

mana dimaksud dalam Pasal 3 ayat (1) dan Pasal 4 Peraturan Pemerintah Nomor 55 Tahun 2007 tentang Pendidikan Agama dan Pendidikan Keagamaan, dikenakan sanksi administratif berupa: a. peringatan dalam bentuk teguran lisan; atau b. peringatan tertulis sebanyak 3 (tiga) kali;atau c. penutupan berupa pencabutan izin operasional pendirian.”

struction, habit and routine. Symbolic power is “[…] a power of constituting the given through utterances, of making people see and believe, of confirming or transforming the vision of the world, and thereby, action on the world and thus the world itself, an almost magical power which enables one to obtain the equivalent of what is obtained through force (whether physical or economic), by virtue of the specific effect of mobilization” (Bourdieu 1991, 170).

In the school context, religiously-affiliated schools tend to decide what type of normative formation is appropriate. To ensure this, they select teaching staff who share the same normative background as the school, thus increasing the likelihood that members will remain morally involved in the school. If the staff would conform to their own goals, then the need for control would be decreased, because the teaching staff would conform to the goals of the school without strict supervision (cf. Etzioni 1961, 260). Furthermore, the more selec- tive a school is when recruiting members, the more committed the member is to conform to the normative orientation of the school.

3.1.2. Coercive power

Coercive power deals not only with negative sanctions, but also with positive sanctions. Baldwin includes both rewards and penalties in his definition of sanction: “[…] if someone is offered a very large reward for compliance, then once his expectations are adjusted to this large reward, he suffers a prospective loss if he does not comply” (Baldwin 1971, 6; cf. Blau 2009, 116). Although these definitions appear simple enough, according to Baldwin there are concep- tual and empirical difficulties in the definition of positive and negative sanc- tions. Like Baldwin, Molm (1997) perceives that coercive power is run by an actor who has capacity to both reward and punish their exchange partners. Etzioni (1961) and most political theorists (cf. Parsons 1963; Blau 2009), how- ever, refer to coercive power as including mainly negative sanctions such as deprivation, corporal punishment, threat of loss of life (cf. Lehman 1969; Markovksy et al. 1993). He insists that coercive power is probably only effec- tive when the organisation is confronted by highly alienated subordinates (Etzioni 1961, 13). Political scientists like Migdal (1988) consider that coer- cion is only acceptable as power by the State. The coercive power of the State has a dual character, both guaranteeing the reproduction of domination and order, and suppressing challenges to State authority. At the same time, it helps to create conditions that allow for voluntary obedience to laws and their legiti- macy. Paradoxically, coercion through the continuous use of force to maintain order may lead to the erosion of legitimacy, and undermine the capacity of the State to rule.

Here, we define coercive power as encompassing both positive and negative sanctions, in contrast to Etzioni’s definition. This implies that the policies of religious education in religiously-affiliated schools might be the result of both gaining positive rewards and avoiding negative sanctions in re-

sponding to the coercive power exercised by other institutions. Coercive power is based upon the expectation of punishment if schools fail to conform to ad- ministrative goals, such as a failure to implement a certain type of religious education. Coercive power is likely to be exercised in religiously-affiliated schools where more emphasis is put on keeping certain standards in religious education than on keeping (good) human relations, and where the supervisor is regarded as a superior and not as a colleague (Etzioni 1961, 8). Although it is similar to normative power, here one conforms to gain acceptance; whereas in coercive power, one conforms primarily to forestall rejection. Etzioni relates coercive power to coercive organisations such as prisons and mental health organisations. We presume that educational organisations, such as religiously- affiliated schools, also use coercion as a secondary source of compliance. School closure, censure, deprivation, reprimand and expulsion are the major means of coercive power.

3.1.3. Utilitarian power

Utilitarian power is based on control over material resources and rewards through allocation of salaries and wages, commission and contributions, fringe benefits and services (Etzioni 1961, 13; cf. 1964). In general, power holders are able to exercise less utilitarian power if the financial resources of religious schools are less dependent on the contribution of the power holder (whether the State or religious community). This makes schools financially more independ- ent, and less submissive to the influence of external powers. As part of the national educational system, in which the State is in charge of financial re- sources to ensure national standards of education, a number of religiously- affiliated schools receive financial support from the State. At the same time, these schools are to some extent also dependent on financial support from the religious community to which they belong; while some schools receive so much money from a religious community that it makes them almost independ- ent of the finances of the State.