The resolution of the Algerian war came down to Evian, and intensive negotiations over what was arguably the most complicated case in French political history. The Evian accords represented the most significant change in Algerian history. Independence had been won, but it was difficult for the revolutionaries in the FLN to realize that circumstances had changed and that France was now resigned to the reality of a sovereign Algeria. The victory
284 Roger Le Tourneau, Evaluation Politique de l’Afrique du Nord Musulmane (Paris, 1962), p. 308.
285 Algerian National Liberation (1954-1962) <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/algeria.htm>.
286 For more details, see Stora (2001); also Mohammed Bedjaoui, La Revolution Algerienne et le droit (Brussels:
1961); tr. The Law and the Algerian Revolution (London, 1961).
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had raised the hopes of the Algerian people, especially with the ceasefire of March 19, 1961.
It is not an exaggeration to say that the ALN proceeded to dash those hopes in favour of opportunism and selfishness in a bloody competition for power. This behaviour would sow the seeds of the massive of violence that later occurred in the country, and continues to the present day.
It is virtually certain that, had it not been for the large settler community in Algeria, France would never have gone to war to keep Algeria French. Protecting the settlers remained the government’s most passionate and worrisome concern. French peace overtures were made when the Sahara had not yet been included as part of the new country. The GPRA had rejected any agreement that did not regard Algeria as it had been before the French occupation, and this necessarily included the Sahara. The FLN saw this as a secondary question, and hence accepted the initial French proposal except for several points, including the French demand that they keep the French minorities then living in Algeria. As noted repeatedly above, however, protecting the settlers remained the French government’s most passionate and worrisome concern. Nevertheless, there were strong grounds for agreement, including that:
Europeans in Algeria would remain French; they would enjoy Algerian civil rights, at least in the interim, and would be permitted to participate in Algerian political, administrative and municipal life without having to make any formal request to do so.
Within three years of self-determination they could ask to become Algerian citizens.
Algeria would then cease to regard them as French, and thus the unity of the Algerian people would be preserved. France could continue to regard the settlers as French.287 The Algerian negotiators refused the French demand that the Europeans hold dual citizenship as long as they lived in Algeria; after several years France would allow them to renounce their Algerian nationality, if they wished, and remain French. In fact, the settlers quickly found a place for themselves in the rapidly expanding mainland economy; reclaiming farms that had gone to ruin became a common economic pattern. Many settled in the South of France to get the best of both countries, and they became the main political and cultural bridge of the future relationship between the two countries.
287 For more details, See Claude Estier, La Gauche hebdomadair, 1914-1962 (1962), pp. 181-206; Benjamin Stora, Ils Venaient D’Algerie L’immigration Algerienne en France 1912-1992 (France: Librarie Artheme Fayard, 1992).
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The other issue that played a key part in the agreement involved the property rights of the Europeans, and French rights to the petroleum deposits in the Algerian desert, which the French government had already ceded to third parties for the mining and transport of oil and gas. The GPRA agreed to respect the property rights of the Europeans as well as to accord French petroleum companies preferential treatment in the granting of new permits for exploration and exploitation, and to undertake no discriminatory measures against such companies.288
In essence, the parties agreed that the Algerian people consisted only of non-Europeans. The European settlers could choose to become Algerian citizens within a few years of independence, but if they refused, they would remain foreigners. In either case, their rights with respect to language, religion, and other civil liberties would be respected.289
John Talbott has described what de Gaulle was thinking in his declaration of October 1961 when he noted that de Gaulle envisioned the future relationship between France and Algeria to be one of association, not quite a commonwealth arrangement, but not quite a relationship between sovereign states either. France, the senior partner in this association, would continue to supply the junior member with the technical expertise and economic assistance provided under the Constantine Plan, and would still enjoy certain vestigial rights to the use of defense bases, and so on.290 De Gaulle dropped references to ‘association’ and spoke instead of “France’s co-operation291 offered to the new Algeria for its life and development….”292 In other words, France would not take responsibility for Algeria’s well-being, but offered some foreign aid to this new nation. The reality of the situation was now clear: Algeria was to be left in a significantly worse situation, at least initially, than before independence.
288 For more details, see Talbott, J. The War without a Name: France in Algeria, 1954-1962 (New York: Knopf, 1980), p. 229.
289 Quandt, Revolution and political leadership, pp. 38-39; Jean-Claude Vatin, L’Algerie politique; Histoire et Societe (1974), pp. 199-214.
290 Talbott, J., The War without a Name: France in Algeria, 1954-1962.(New York: Knopf, 1980), p. 227.
291 “Cooperation” implied a more remote relationship between the former colonising power and the new state of Algeria.
292 Berque, Jacques, Le Maghreb enter deux guerres (Paris, 1962), p. 244.
90 8. Independence
On 16 March 1962, peace finally, if only temporarily, returned to Algeria’s cities. A ceasefire was also proclaimed in the countryside. The Foreign minister of the GPRA, Belkassem, met with his team of negotiators and digned his name next to those of the French negotiators appointed by General de Gaulle. The French Prime Minister, Michel Dibré, declared: “We are reaching the end of a painful ordeal. Malraux spoke of victory, but it is instead a victory over ourselves. Now everything will depend on what France will become.”293 Three days later, the Organisation Armée Secrete (OAS) leaders proclaimed that the French forces would now be considered “occupation troops” in Algiers. The activist supporters of “Algérie Française” gathered in Bab al-Ouad (a suburb in Algiers) and seized power against the wishes of their government. Armed protestors attacked the military trucks of the French Army as they began their exodus to France, killing 35 and wounding at least 150.
On 26 March protestors from the more extremist settler groups, along with the OAS, declared a general strike in the region of Algiers. They gathered at Glieres Plateau and at Laferriere Square, appearing at first to be nothing more than peaceful protestors. Their real objective was to break through the encirclement around the district.294 At the same time, other protestors met in the central part of Oran, the second largest city, 500 kilometers west of Algiers. The OAS soldiers then attacked a clinic belonging to Doctor Jean-Marie Larribère, a communist militant who was very well known in the city. After this, they turned on bars and well-known cafés, shopping malls and factories. The violence quickly intensified, with the loss of hundreds of Muslim lives as bombs were detonated in public places such as weekly markets and mosques. Socialists, including scholars and intellectuals, were killed in cold blood. The public library and four schools were destroyed. Hundreds of Oranies left their homes in the city in search of safety with their families in the villages and in the countryside.
The violence continued for some time, and the remaining settlers’ flight to France accelerated: “it became apparent that the Europeans of Algeria had begun to leave their native land en masse, headed for the metropole.” 295 Most of the pieds noirs had left Algeria by May, 1962. The OAS leaders who were still free knew they had lost the struggle.
As a French colonial organisation reflecting the fury and despair of a dying society, the OAS continued in ever more destructive paths as the movement toward independence
293 Benjamin Stora, Histoire de L’Algerie Coloniale, 1830 – 1954 (Paris: La Decouverte, 1991).
294 Stora (2001), p. 98.
295 Lacouture, J 1962, Algerie, Nation et societe (Paris: Maspero, 1985).
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accelerated, but it had lost hope of changing the regime in France or altering the course of history. 296
On 18 June 1962, and after the rejection of an agreement between Jean-Jacques Suisini, in the name of OAS, and the FLN, OAS soldiers attacked Oran, and left behind them a city engulfed in smoke and fire. OAS commandos attacked at least six banks following the announcement of the former leader of the first foreign regiment of paratroopers and head of the Oran’s OAS, Colonel Dufour, that “the OAS should lay down its weapons,” and make preparations to flee. Most of the OAS commandos were subsequently captured and the last of them went into exile by the end of June.297
On 1 July 1962, 6 million Algerian voters answered “yes” to the question, “Do you want Algeria to become an independent state cooperating with France under the conditions defined by the declaration of March 19, 1962?” A mere 19,534 voters said “No”, according to results announced on 3 July. Out of 91.23 percent of registered voters, 99.72 percent participated in the poll.298 July 5th, 1962, was the official end of the war, although the violence continued. Hundreds were wounded in Oran alone on the eve of independence.
Nevertheless, this date marked Algeria’s full and final independence, and the end of the French military presence in Algeria. The French continued to control key aspects of Algerian life through their agents. Significantly, on 12 July 1962, Ben Bella moved into Oran, and yet another battle for power among FLN leaders began, and in some respects continues, as will be seen in the following chapters.
The Evian Accords signed in March 1962 gave Algeria immediate independence while providing French aid to help reconstruct the country. The French Sahara, with its oil resources, was also handed over to Algeria. In return, the FLN guaranteed protection and civil rights for the French Algerians choosing to remain in the country, and the option of choosing either French or Algerian nationality after three years.299
After almost eight years of war that had shattered Algeria, with over a million Algerian casualties and over two million Algerians who had lost their homes, the trauma continued. For over a century the French had deprived the Algerians of virtually all
296 John Ruedy, Modern Algeria the Origin and Development of a Nation, second edition (Indiana University Press, 2005), pp. 179-180.
297 Stora, B. (2001), pp. 104-06; see also: the Original Document of the Evian agreements, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 3rd April, 1962, Copy NO. 50 (British National Archives), Chapter 9;
also: Appendix 5, “The Evian Agreements”.
298 For more details see: Stora (2001), pp. 104-06; Talbott, J. The War without a Name: France in Algeria, 1954-1962 (New York: Knopf, 1980), pp. 244-49.
299 See: Appendix 5, “The Evian Agreements”.
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opportunities to become involved in the country’s infrastructure and institutions. Algerians had been held in a subclass of servants, unskilled labourers and peasants. The departure of the French left the country without the skilled labour to keep the country running. Literacy, at 70 per cent before the invasion of the French, had dropped to less than 10 per cent by the end of the colonial period. French military officers and administrators had penetrated the highest levels of Algerian government, however, and some observers believe that this de Gualle’s plan from the beginning.300 Moreover, internal conflicts within the FLN that had been set-aside during the war soon re-emerged, and power struggles between various factions of the FLN began again in earnest.
300 Zitout, M. A., personal interview, London, 12/2013.
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