• No se han encontrado resultados

3.ALGUNAS PROPUESTAS DE AJUSTE AL SISTEMA NACIONAL DE CIENCIA

Conflict among the FLN leaders had always been the major flaw in the Algerian Revolution. By the early period of de Gaulle’s government, the revolutionaries had nearly lost hope of achieving national independence. Colonel Omar Oumrane described this loss of hope in a letter: “the hour is grave,” he wrote. He indicated that the military situation was worrying and that the revolution was losing its way: “the revolutionary spirit has disappeared among leaders, officers and militants alike, to give away to bourgeoisification, bureaucracy and opportunism.”265

Oumrane urged his colleagues in the FLN to make a speedy proclamation of provisional government, one that would take responsibility of opening a new political approach in the fight for independence. This new diplomatic offensive would take full advantage of the contentious atmosphere of the Cold War, and open a “second front”, promoting instability inside France itself.266 The security emphasis of the French military had to be unmasked and revealed for its basis in human rights violations, and its failure to deal effectively and humanely with the Algerian crisis. In the same vein, Abbas expressed his views in support of Oumrane’s ideas to Belkacem and other leaders of the FLN around the

Wilayas in Algeria, saying that Ramdams’s death had left a blot on the CCE, which could

only be expunged if it were dissolved and swallowed up in the wider framework of a properly constituted government267

The CCE had proven itself to be ineffective and unable to guide the revolution, “while a government in exile could exert more authority and prestige.”268 On 9 September, agreement was reached in Cairo on the principles and structure of a provisional government.

264 Ruedy, D. J. (2005). 265 Horne (1977), pp. 315-16. 266 Horne A. (1977), pp. 315-16. 267

Quoted in: Horne A. (1977), pp. 315-16. 268 Horne A. (1977), pp. 315-16.

82

A press conference was called to announce the creation of the GPRA. Abbas declared that the new Government would assume its duties from that day on. The new government would be located temporarily in Tunisia, the capital of Algeria’s diplomatic representative abroad.269 As to the new government’s ministers, there was strong competition among leaders to take part. One of the strongest positions was taken by Belkacem, who insisted on remaining the Minister of the Armed Forces while continuing his CCE function and serving as Vice- President to Ben Bella, who in turn passed the leadership of the new government to Abbas, who had extensive experience in dealing with the French Government.. The position of foreign minister was taken by Dr. Lamine Debaghine; Ben Tobbal took the Ministry of the Internal Affairs; Boussouf kept the Ministry of Communications, as well as the key role of running the intelligence services.270 Most of the ministers were nominated in absentia.271 The FLN was largely unaffected by the creation of the GPRA, now headed by Abbas. The CCE was disestablished, and Abbas became the first leader of a centralised FLN.

The revolution was now driven by three key powerful men: the “three Bs”, Belkacem, Boussouf and Ben Tobbal, the same men who had brought about the downfall of Ramdane. The military intelligence service, under the leadership of Boussouf, acted energetically in bringing about the exclusion of many capable leaders including Colonel Ouamrane, who was widely thought to have had priority in leadership selection, and especially to have been the most likely candidate to at least share the supreme leadership of the revolution. The GPRA had been his own creation from the beginning. Boussouf, who had occupied a variety of positions in the military and politics of the revolution, departed from his position as commanding general of the Fifth Military Base, leaving Boumédiène in charge. One year later, in December 1959, Boumédiène established an ALN general staff under his direction in competition with GPRA. These two structures, which were ostensibly to be complementary,

269 Horne A. (1977), p. 316.

270 Boussouf was a strong presence in the government, and led the military intelligent services, which quickly developed into the most powerful organisation, and a ‘shadow power’. Rather than serving the expected role of information gathering, investigating unusual events, and preparing and organising military operations and political actions, it developed a spy network to be used against the FLN leaders, creating files on them, and preserving the information for a time when it might be needed. As noted above, Boussouf and Belkacem were accused of murdering Abane Ramdane and many of the other revolutionaries in what became a bloody competition for power. (Sidhum S., personal interview, Algiers, September 2009; Chouchane A., personal interview, London, July 2009).

271

The ministerial positions were divided as follows: the former MTLD leader Dr. Lamine Dabaghine, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Ben Tobbal, Minister of Interior; Boussouf, Minister of Communications (including the key role of running intelligence services); Yazid; who was successful in his missions in New York, as Minister of Information; Benkhadda, the former member of Hadj’s (MTLD), assumed the function of Minister of Social Affairs. In reality, the power still remained in the hands of the “three Bs”: Krim Belkacem, Boussouf and Ben Toubbal. The originator of the new government’s idea, Colonel Ouamrane, was apparently dropped on the grounds of being a political “light-weight” and too intolerant of politicians: see: Horne, A. (1977), p. 316.

83

were soon in conflict with each other. The GPRA had been designed to win the support of the international community and to undertake any eventual negotiations with France regarding Algerian independence.272 The ALN, which had been weakened in 1958-1959 because of its isolation by the French Army, was quartered on the edge of the key neighborhoods, and was soon reorganized.273

It was significant in the context of the internal power struggle that the GPRA received the support of many of the Arab nations, who hastened to recognize the new government. Communist bloc countries, in particular, welcomed the new government, with countries such as China, Russia and other countries in Eastern Europe and even South America giving moral, if not material, support to the GPRA.274