FORMA EN QUE SE DEVENGA Y ANTICIPOS

G.R. No. 182434 | March 5, 2010

Facts: Private respondents filed with the Shari’a District Court (SDC) an action for quieting of title of a parcel of land located in Marawi City against petitioner Sultan Jerry Tomawis and one Mangoda Radia. In his answer, Tomawis debunked the private respondents’ claim of ownership and raised, as one of his affirmative defenses, SDC's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. As argued, the regular civil court, not SDC, had such jurisdiction pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.

Issue: Whether the SDC had jurisdiction over the action for quieting of title.

Held: Yes. Judging from the averments in the underlying complaint, it is basically a suit for recovery of possession and eventual reconveyance of real property which, under BP 129, as amended, falls within the original jurisdiction of either the RTC or MTC. The question that comes to the fore is whether the jurisdiction of the RTC or MTC is to the exclusion of the SDC. A reading of the pertinent provisions of BP 129 and PD 1083 shows that the former, a law of general application to civil courts, has no application to, and does not repeal, the provisions found in PD 1083, a special law, which only refers to Shari'a courts. BP 129 was enacted to reorganize only existing civil courts and is a law of general application to the judiciary. In contrast, PD 1083 is a special law that only applies to Shari'a courts. In order to give effect to both laws at hand, we must continue to recognize the concurrent jurisdiction enjoyed by SDCs with that of RTCs under PD 1083. While we recognize the concurrent jurisdiction of the SDCs and the RTCs with respect to cases involving only Muslims, the SDC has exclusive original jurisdiction over all actions arising from contracts customary to Muslims to the exclusion of the RTCs, as the exception under PD 1083, while both courts have concurrent original jurisdiction over all other personal actions. Said jurisdictional conferment, found in Art. 143 of PD 1083, is applicable solely when both parties are Muslims and shall not be construed to operate to the prejudice of a non-Muslim, who may be the opposing party against a Muslim.

People vs. Sitco

G.R. No. 178202 | May 14, 2010

Facts: Officers from the Navotas Police Station conducted a buy-bust operation against accused- appellants. During trial, Police officer Buan identified accused-appellants, the four (4) PhP 500-bill marked money used, and the the drugs confiscated from both accused-appellants. Buan explained during his testimony that the boodle money placed in-between the genuine marked money the buy- bust team used was unavailable as it had been confiscated by a policeman named "Barlin" when he himself (Buan) was arrested for violating Sec. 27 of the Dangerous Drugs Act.

Issue: Whether accused-appellants’ convictions should stand.

Held: No. Buan's involvement as a police officer in illegal drug activities makes him a polluted source and renders his testimony against Sitco and Bagtas suspect, at best. It is like a pot calling a kettle black. To be believed, testimonial evidence should come only from the mouth of a credible witness. Given his service record, Buan can hardly qualify as a witness worthy, under the limited confines of this case, of full faith and credit. And lest it be overlooked, Buan is a rogue cop, having, per his own admission, been arrested for indulging in a pot session, eventually charged and dismissed from the police service. It would appear, thus, that Buan's had been a user. His arrest for joining a pot session only confirms this undesirable habit.

But over and above the credibility of the prosecution's lone witness as ground for acquittal looms the matter of the custodial chain, a term which has gained traction in the prosecution of drug-related cases. There are glaring gaps or missing links in the chain of custody of evidence, raising doubt as to the identity of the seized items and necessarily their evidentiary value. This broken chain of custody is especially significant given that what are involved are fungible items that may be easily altered or tampered with. Given the prosecution's failure to abide by the rules on the chain of custody, the evidentiary presumption that official duties have been regularly performed cannot apply to this case. This presumption, it must be emphasized, is not conclusive. Not only is it rebutted by contrary proof, as here, but it is also inferior to the constitutional presumption of innocence.

Kukan International Corp. v. Reyes

G.R. No. 184850 | September 29, 2010

Facts: Morales filed a complaint with the RTC against Kukan, Inc. for a sum of money. RTC rendered a Decision finding for Morales and against Kukan, Inc. After the decision became final and executory, Morales moved for and secured a writ of execution against Kukan, Inc. The sheriff then levied upon various personal properties found at what was supposed to be Kukan, Inc.'s office. Alleging that it owned the properties thus levied and that it was a different corporation from Kukan, Inc., Kukan International Corporation (KIC) filed an Affidavit of Third-Party Claim. In reaction to the third party claim, Morales interposed an Omnibus Motion praying that, applying the principle of piercing the veil of corporate fiction, an order be issued for the satisfaction of the judgment debt of Kukan, Inc. with the properties under the name or in the possession of KIC, it being alleged that both corporations are but one and the same entity.

Issue: Whether KIC can be made liable for the judgment rendered against Kukan, Inc.

Held: No. The principle of piercing the veil of corporate fiction, and the resulting treatment of two related corporations as one and the same juridical person with respect to a given transaction, is basically applied only to determine established liability; it is not available to confer on the court a jurisdiction it has not acquired, in the first place, over a party not impleaded in a case. Elsewise put, a corporation not impleaded in a suit cannot be subject to the court's process of piercing the veil of its corporate fiction. In that situation, the court has not acquired jurisdiction over the corporation and, hence, any proceedings taken against that corporation and its property would infringe on its right to due process. The bottom line issue of whether Morales can proceed against KIC for the judgment debt of Kukan, Inc. resolves itself into the question of whether a mere motion is the appropriate vehicle for such purpose. In net effect, Morales' adverted motion to pierce the veil of corporate fiction stated a new cause of action, i.e., for the liability of judgment debtor Kukan, Inc. to be borne by KIC on the alleged identity of the two corporations. This new cause of action should be properly ventilated in another complaint and subsequent trial where the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil can, if appropriate, be applied, based on the evidence adduced. Establishing the claim of Morales and the corresponding liability of KIC for Kukan Inc.'s indebtedness could hardly be the subject, under the premises, of a mere motion interposed after the principal action against Kukan, Inc. alone had peremptorily been terminated. After all, a complaint is one where the plaintiff alleges causes of action.

Philippine British Assurance Company, Inc. (PBACI) v. Republic

G.R. No. 185588 | February 02, 2010

Facts: PBACI, a domestic insurance company, issues customs bonds to its clients in favor of the BOC to secure the release of imported goods in order that the goods may be released from the BOC without prior payment of the corresponding customs duties and taxes. The Republic, represented by the BOC, filed a complaint against PBACI with the RTC for collection of money with damages, alleging that PBACI had oustanding unliquidated customs bonds with the BOC. The RTC ruled in favor of the Republic. PBACI appealed the decision to the CA, but the CA dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction. The CA ratiocinated that the jurisdiction over the appeal lies with the CTA because it is a tax collection case. PBACI, thus, appealed to the SC and argued that the CA erred in its ruling. According to PBACI, in as much as the Republic’s right was initially based on its right to collect duties and taxes, the same was converted to a right arising out of a contract, the bond being a contract between the Republic and PBACI.

Issue: WON the CA has jurisdiction over the appeal of PBACI.—YES

Held: The original complaint filed with the trial court was in the nature of a collection case, purportedly to collect on the obligation of PBACI by virtue of the bonds executed by it in favor of the Republic, essentially a contractual obligation. As PBACI correctly points out, an action to collect on a bond used to secure the payment of taxes is not a tax collection case, but rather a simple case for enforcement of a contractual liability. An action based upon a surety bond cannot be considered a tax collection case. Rather, such action would properly be a case based on a contract. Verily, the instant case is not a tax collection case; hence, the CA has jurisdiction over the case.

In addition, even the BOC did not consider the case as one for tax collection. It instituted a complaint for collection of money, decidedly not a tax collection case, before the trial court. It purposefully did not follow the procedure in the proper prosecution of a tax collection case. This may only be explained with the fact that the BOC itself did not consider the action that it instituted as a tax collection case. Certainly, the administrative agencies tasked with the prosecution of cases within their specific area of concern should know the nature of the action to be filed and the proper procedure by which they can collect on liabilities to it.

Office of the Ombudsman v. Sison

G.R. No. 185954 | February 16, 2010

Facts: The Office of the Ombudsman (“Omb”) found Sison, a public official in Samar, guilty of grave misconduct, dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Sison appealed to the CA, which reversed and set aside the Omb decision. The CA held that the Omb failed to adduce substantial evidence in order to convict Sison. The Omb filed an Omnibus Motion for Intervention and to Admit Attached MR, which was denied by the CA. Hence, this petition.

Issue: WON the Omb may be allowed to intervene and seek reconsideration of the adverse decision rendered by the CA.—NO

Held: The allowance or disallowance of a Motion to Intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. To warrant intervention under Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, two requisites must concur: (1) the movant has a legal interest in the matter in litigation; and (2) intervention must not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the parties, nor should the claim of the intervenor be capable of being properly decided in a separate proceeding. The interest, which entitles one to intervene, must involve the matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment.

Clearly, the Office of the Ombudsman is not an appropriate party to intervene in the instant case. It must remain partial and detached. More importantly, it must be mindful of its role as an adjudicator, not an advocate. Judges should detach themselves from cases where their decisions are appealed to a higher court for review. The raison detre for such a doctrine is the fact that judges are not active combatants in such proceeding and must leave the opposing parties to contend their individual positions and the appellate court to decide the issues without the judges active participation.