G.R. No. 176014 | September 17, 2009
Facts: Maria and Clemente Alipit executed an SPA in favor of Milagros de Guzman to sell their property. Pursuant to her authority, de Guzman executed a Deed of Absolute Sale conveying to New Vista a parcel of land. New Vista immediately entered into possession. However, the property delivered to and occupied by New Vista and specified in the SPA was not the same property specified in the deed of absolute sale.
More than a decade later, Vitangcol claimed the parcel of land on the strength of a Deed of Absolute Sale between Vitangcol and Maria. New Vista commenced a suit for quieting of title, eventually filing an Amended Complaint. Unlike in the original complaint, the SPA was not attached. It, however, averred that the Alipits had ratified and validated the sale.
Defendants motions to dismiss were denied. The RTC held that the amended complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action. Vitangcol sought reconsideration, attaching to the motion a copy of the SPA. The RTC granted reconsideration. It found that not attaching the SPA to the amended complaint is fatal to New Vista’s cause of action for quieting of title because its action is based on a document. The CA reversed.
Issue: Whether the Amended Complaint sufficiently states a cause of action.
Held: Lack of cause of action is not a ground for a dismissal of the complaint through a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. Lack of cause of action is determined only during and/or after trial. That mode refers to a failure of the complaint to state a cause of action, based on Sec. 1(g) of Rule 16. When a motion to dismiss is grounded on the failure to state a cause of action, what is considered, as a rule, is only the facts alleged in the complaint. The focus is on the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material allegations. The test of sufficiency of facts alleged in the complaint constituting a cause of action lies in whether or not the court, admitting the facts alleged, could render a valid verdict in accordance with the prayer of the complaint. To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, it must be shown that the claim for relief in the complaint does not exist, rather than that a claim has been defectively stated, or is ambiguous, indefinite, or uncertain.
The SPA was correctly taken into account, as it was introduced during the hearing of the Motion to Dismiss. However, notwithstanding the variance in lot descriptions, the amended complaint contained a clear statement of New Vista’s cause of action. It alleged that after the purchase and compliance with its legal obligations, it was immediately placed in possession of the subject lot, but which Maria Alipit, by herself, later sold to Vitangcol to New Vistas prejudice.
Bildner vs. Ilusorio
588 SCRA 378 | June 05, 2009
Facts: Ilusorio wrote On the Edge of Heaven where the following statements appeared: (1) The Supreme Court broke up my family.
(2) Was justice for sale? Was justice sold? Nasaan ang katarungan?
(3) If your decision becomes res judicata haven’t you just provided a most convenient venue to separate spouses from each other x x x?
(4) Why did you wait for more than one year and after my husband’s death to deny my motion for reconsideration? Is it because it is easier to do so now that it is academic? Does your conscience bother you at all?
(5) How can the highest court of our land be a party to the break up of my family and, disregarding the Family Code x x x?
(6) [I]f our courts can render this kind of justice to one like myself because I have lesser means, and lesser connections than my well-married daughters, what kind of justice is given to those less privileged?
Issue: Whether or not Ilusorio is guilty of indirect contempt Held: Yes. Ilusorio is guilty of indirect contempt.
Taken together, the foregoing statements and their reasonably deducible implications went beyond the permissible bounds of fair criticism. Erlinda Ilusorio minced no words in directly attacking the Court for its alleged complicity in the break up of the Ilusorio family, sharply insinuating that the Court intentionally delayed the resolution of her motion for reconsideration, disregarded the Family Code, and unduly favored wealthy litigants. But the worst cut is her suggestion about the Court selling its decisions. She posed the query, Nasaan ang katarungan? (Where is justice?), implying that this Court failed to dispense justice in her case. While most of her statements were in the form of questions instead of categorical assertions, the effect is still the same: they constitute a stinging affront to the honor and dignity of the Court and tend to undermine the confidence of the public in the integrity of the highest tribunal of the land.
Crossing the permissible line of fair comment and legitimate criticism of the bench and its actuations shall constitute contempt which may be visited with sanctions from the Court as a measure of protecting and preserving its dignity and honor.
Heirs of the Late Jose De Luzuriaga v. Republic
591 SCRA 299 | June 30, 2009
Facts: OSG received the May 24, 1999 Decision on June 22, 1999. It did not file a notice of appeal. Instead, it filed an unverified petition for relief from judgment on November 24, 1999.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the petition for relief from judgment of the OSG was filed out of time 2. Whether or not the pleading is fatally defective because it is unverified
3. Whether or not the petition for relief from judgment and the special civil action for quieting of title cannot proceed separately
Held:
1. Yes, the unverified petition for relief from judgment of the OSG was filed out of time. Such a
petition must be filed within: (a) sixty (60) days from knowledge of judgment, order, or other proceedings to be set aside; and (b) six (6) months from entry of such judgment, order, or other proceedings. The OSG admits receiving the May 24, 1999 Decision on June 22, 1999. The OSG belatedly filed its petition only on November 24, 1999, or more than five months from receipt or knowledge of the May 24, 1999 RTC Decision.
2. The requirement on verification is simply a condition affecting the form of pleadings. Non-
compliance with it is not jurisdictional, and would not render the pleading fatally defective. A pleading required by the Rules of Court to be verified may be given due course even without a verification if the circumstances warrant the suspension of the rules in the interest of justice.
Note: The Court relaxed the application of the rules in this case because the OSG had properly made out a prima facie case of double titling over the subject lot, meriting a ventilation of the factual and legal issues relative to that case.
3. No. Both actions may proceed independently. The case involved in the petition for relief from
judgment and the suit for quieting of title in Civil each involves different concerns and can proceed independently. The cause of action of the Republic’s petition for relief from judgment of double titling of the subject lot is different from DAALCOs quest for quieting of title. From another perspective, DAALCO basically seeks to nullify the issuance of OCT No. RO-58 in the name of the De Luzuriaga heirs, while the Republic’s petition assails the grant of ownership to De Luzuriaga, Sr. over a parcel of land duly registered under OCT No. 2765 in the name of Lizares, who thereafter transferred the title to his heirs or assigns. In fine, both actions may proceed independently, albeit a consolidation of both cases would be ideal to obviate multiplicity of suits.
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board vs. Antonio-Valenzuela
602 SCRA 698 | October 02, 2009
Facts: Respondent banks filed a complaint for nullification of the BSP Report of Examination (ROE) with application for a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction before the against the BSP and its officers. They prayed that BSP be enjoined from submitting the ROE or any similar report to the Monetary Board (MB), or if the ROE had already been submitted, the MB be enjoined from acting on the basis of said ROE, on the allegation that the failure to furnish the bank with a copy of the ROE violated its right to due process. Judge Valenzuela issued an Order granting the prayer for the issuance of TROs
Issue: Whether or not the issuance of preliminary injunction by RTC is proper Held: No. The issuance of preliminary injunction by RTC is not proper.
The respondent banks have failed to show that they are entitled to copies of the ROEs. They can point to no provision of law, no section in the procedures of the BSP that shows that the BSP is required to give them copies of the ROEs. Sec. 28 of RA 7653, or the New Central Bank Act, which governs examinations of banking institutions, provides that the ROE shall be submitted to the MB; the bank examined is not mentioned as a recipient of the ROE.
The respondent banks have shown no necessity for the writ of preliminary injunction to prevent serious damage. Under the law, the sanction of closure could be imposed upon a bank by the BSP even without notice and hearing. This "close now, hear later" scheme is grounded on practical and legal considerations to prevent unwarranted dissipation of the bank’s assets and as a valid exercise of police power to protect the depositors, creditors, stockholders, and the general public. The writ of preliminary injunction cannot, thus, prevent the MB from taking action, by preventing the submission of the ROEs and worse, by preventing the MB from acting on such ROEs.
The respondent banks have failed to show their entitlement to the writ of preliminary injunction. The requirements for the issuance of the writ have not been proved. No invasion of the rights of respondent banks has been shown, nor is their right to copies of the ROEs clear and unmistakable. There is also no necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
Marcos-Araneta v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 154096 | August 22, 2008
Facts: Irene Marcos-Araneta alleged that Benedicto, as trustor, placed in his name and in the name of his associates, as trustees, shares of stocks with the obligation to hold those shares and their fruits in trust and for the benefit of Irene. Several years after, Irene demanded the reconveyance of said stockholdings, but the Benedicto Group refused to oblige.
Irene instituted before the RTC complaints for covenyance and recovery of the shares. The Benedictos filed a Motion to Dismiss, grounded on, among others, improper venue. During hearing on the motion, a Joint Affidavit of the household staff at the Marcos Mansion in Batac, Ilocos Norte was presented. It stated that Irene did not maintain residence there. In fact, she only visited the mansion twice in 1999, did not vote in Batac in the 1998 national elections, and was staying at her husband’s house in Makati City. Against the unrebutted joint affidavit, Irene presented her PhP 5 community tax certificate (CTC) issued on 11/07/99 in Curimao, Ilocos Norte.
On June 29, 2000, the RTC dismissed both complaints for another reason. Irene interposed a MR for the dismissal. Pending resolution of the MR, Irene filed on July 17, 2000 a Motion to Admit Amended Complaint in which additional plaintiffs appeared, as Irene’s new trustees, from Ilocos Norte. The amended complaint stated practically the same cause of action. During the August 25, 2000 hearing, the RTC dictated in open court an order denying Irene’s motion for reconsideration, but deferred action on her motion to admit amended complaint. On October 9, 2000, the RTC issued an Order entertaining the amended complaint.
Issue:
(1) Whether the admission of the amended complaint was proper.
(2) Whether Batac is the proper venue for an action to reconvey the shares.
Held:
(1) Sec. 2 of Rule 10 of the Rules of Court makes it abundantly clear that the plaintiff may amend
his complaint once as a matter of right, i.e., without leave of court, before any responsive pleading is filed or served. A motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading for purposes of Sec. 2 of Rule 10. The RTC did not err in admitting petitioners amended complaint because an answer had not yet been filed. The finality of the June 29, 2000 dismissal order had not set in when Irene filed the amended complaint on July 17, 2000, having sought reconsideration. The MR was only resolved on August 25, 2000. Thus, when Irene filed the amended complaint on July 17, 2000, the order of dismissal was not yet final, implying that there was strictly no legal impediment to her amending her original complaints.
(2) Sec. 2 of Rule 4 indicates that when there is more than one plaintiff in a personal action case,
the residences of the principal parties should be the basis for determining proper venue. The word principal has been added to prevent the plaintiff from choosing the residence of a minor plaintiff or defendant as the venue. Irene stands undisputedly as the principal plaintiff, the real party-in-interest. As self-styled beneficiary of the disputed trust, she stands to be benefited or
Irene’s new designated trustees. As trustees, they can only serve as mere representatives of Irene. Following Sec. 2 of Rule 4, the subject civil cases ought to be commenced and prosecuted at the place where Irene, and not her trustees, resides. Therefore, as to the venue of the action, it is Irene’s residence that is determinative.
One can easily secure a basic residence certificate practically anytime in any BIR or Treasurer’s Office and dictate whatever relevant data one desires entered. That Irene holds a CTC No. 17019451 issued sometime in June 2000 in Batac and in which she indicated her address as Brgy. Lacub, Batac, Ilocos is really of no moment. Accordingly, Irene cannot, in a personal action, contextually opt for Batac as venue of her reconveyance complaint. Irene was a resident during the period material of Forbes Park, Makati City. She was not a resident of Brgy. Lacub, Batac, Ilocos Norte.