Fosas sépticas

With regard to Greco-Roman literature, the older distinction made between ε̈ρως and ἀγαπή by Anders Nygren (1953) is now rejected by many scholars. The semantic range of ἀγαπάω (ἀγαπή) and φιλέω (φίλοϛ) is broad and the two concepts are difficult to distinguish from each other (Kloppenborg, 2008:704). Having made a thorough analysis of the word ἀγαπάν, Stauffer (1964:37) concludes that its meaning is imprecise when it is conjoined with έρᾶν or φιλεῖν. However, in pre-biblical Greek, according to Stauffer, έρᾶν “is a passionate love which desires the other for itself” (Stauffer, 1964:35). Religiously such ε̈ρως was a god, which played an important role in the cult and who was considered to be an irresistible power that compels one, but who is never compelled by anyone in return.

Later ε̈ρως infiltrated the philosophical discourse since the time of Plato when it was considered as the uttermost fulfilment of life and elevation. However, in Platonic philosophy ε̈ρως was purged from its sensual traits and re-conceptualized as the ideal of humanity (Stauffer, 1964:36). For Plato, ε̈ρως is “the desire of the lover united with his beloved to produce, to “bring forth in beauty”- a desire which is no longer acquisitive but creative” (Kloppenborg, 2008:703; Cf. Symp. 206b-209e). Kloppernborg argues that ἀγαπάω “to love” is not the exclusive domain of Judean or Christian literature since it was a common word from the time of Homer with a range of meanings which include “to welcome warmly”, “to be content,” “to set one’s heart on” and generally “to love” (Kloppenborg, 2008:703). The concept Φιλῖν (φιλία) refers to the “love of gods for men or friends for friends” (Stauffer, 1964:36). The term ἀγαπάν, however, has neither the power of ε̈ρως nor the war of φιλεῖν, rather it has an imprecise meaning in that it “makes distinctions, choosing and keeping to its object” and therefore its meaning is determined by the presence of its subject. Nonetheless, the “substantive ἀγαπή is almost completely absent in pre- biblical Greek” (Stauffer, 1964:37).

It is hardly possible to discuss all Greco-Roman literature on love, and therefore the focus of this study will be on representative authors from this period. The term φιλέω, in a literal sense means to be a friend but philosophically it has a deeper meaning. For Aristotle, there are levels of love: (1) utility i.e. loving the other for the sake of utility (advantage); (2) pleasure i.e. loving the other for the sake of what is pleasant (Eth. nic. 1156a15-18)14; and (3) character friendship i.e. loving the other for the sake of virtue and it exists between persons who are good and have similar virtues. The first two kinds of relationships are based on self-advancement but the third one is concerned for the other just because of herself/himself

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and for her/his own sake. Both wish the other well but they do not love for self-centred advantage (Eth. nic. 1156b8-10). Such love only occurs where there is equality between people otherwise it is imperfect. Therefore, it is infrequent (Eth. nic. 1156b23-32) and impossible to have many such lovers or friends (Eth. nic. 1170b29-1171a21). In fact, for Aristotle, love begins from self-love as the “other” is the second self (Eth. nic. 1166a1-b29). However, he argues that a human being is a social being and designed (by nature) to share his life (Eth. nic.1169b18-19). Hence, he insists that for the good of oneself one requires concern for the good of another.

Although a human being is a social being, self-sufficiency is the ultimate happiness but self-sufficiency does not presuppose living a life of isolation; rather it presupposes a limited friendship (Eth. nic. 1097a28–b21). This social nature of a human being is the basis of justice which is good in itself (Eth. nic. 1129b11–1130a5). Justice embraces all the virtues because it is practiced towards others. Virtuous people value the good of others for the sake of other people. In doing so, they seek virtuous action for their own sake.

According to the Stoics, such as Seneca, a wise person can reconcile ε͂ρως as divine gift and ε̈ρως as uncontrollable power and destructive madness by suppressing its negative traits (Eph 116.5, Cicero, Fin 3.68). For Plutarch, φιλαδελφία (brotherly love) is “a model for most loving relationships” (Kloppenborg, 2008:705). But Epictetus expressed a similar idea of loving one’s enemy when he speaks of the true Cynic who “while he is being flogged…loves (φλέω) the men who flog him, as though he were the father or brother of them all” (Disc 3.22.54-55)15_{. Love (as φιλαντροπος) and suffering are also connected in}

Epictetus who mentions an earlier Cynic philosopher Diogenes who purportedly “gladly took upon himself all those troubles and physical hardships for the sake of the common weal [humankind]” (Disc 3.24.64). Epictetus believes that loving one’s own interest is part of the human nature (Dis 2.22.15). Gaius Musonius Rufus, the teacher of Epicetus (ca 30-101C.E.), thinks that human beings are not created as being self-centred but they look into others’ interest as well and come together like bees “and toil and work together with the neighbour (πλησίον)” (Lutz, 1947:93). But the connection between the Law and love in the Greco-Roman world is not attested.

Therefore, it can be concluded from the analysis above that love in the Greco-Roman world is not basically different from the biblical concept of love regarding human relationships. It is doing good to another although there is a subjective preference. If Rufus’ understanding of the neighbour is taken as

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representative of the Greco-Roman world, it might refer to any person one encounters in a given community. Particularly Rufus argues that the concept of living together and helping one another is what makes man different from animals. No direct connection between love and the Law is made but there seems to be a connection between love and justice. In light of this, although some similar concepts could be connected to the Greco-Roman concept of love, it is hard to think Matthew in 22:30-44 or Paul in Rom 13:8-10 draw their understanding of the Law-love relationship from it. However, it might be plausible that the audiences of Romans might be able to connect to Paul’s injunction of love and the Law to their context in Romans.