Since the start of its own national unity process in the second half of the 19th century, Italy’s foreign
policy has considered the Balkan region as a key geographic area of political influence and, in time, an economic and even cultural projection. This has made Italy’s history and that of the Balkans increasingly, albeit often problematically, intertwined.177
The past 15 years have been marked by a deepening of Italy’s multi-dimensional and multi-level interaction with non-EU Balkans. Italy’s relationship with the region has many components, the first of which is provided by a deep-rooted tradition of bilateral diplomatic relations and international agreements that cover a variety of aspects.178
176 In addition to the many anonymous interviewees from Italian institutions, NGOs and the private sector, the author would
like to thank in particular Dr Corina Stratulat, Senior Policy Analyst, and Dr Rosa Balfour, Director for Europe in the World, both from the European Policy Centre (EPC), as well as Dr Luisa Chiodi, Director of the Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso (OBC), and Mr Andrea Stocchiero, Research Coordinator at the Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale (CeSPI), for their kind inputs and crucial advice in the preparation of this paper.
177 See, in particular, Bucarelli, Massimo (2004), “L’Italia e le Crisi Jugoslave di Fine Secolo (1991-1999)”, in Botta, Franco and
Garzia, Italo (eds.), Europa Adriatica: Storia, Relazioni, Economia, Bari-Rome: Laterza, pp. 73-116, and Bucarelli, Massimo (2008), La Questione Jugoslava Nella Storia Della Politica Estera Italiana (1945-1999), Rome: Aracne Editrice.
178 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (MFAIC) of Italy (2013), “Rapporti Bilaterali Italia-Balcani”,
Rome: MFAIC, available at: http://www.esteri.it/MAE/IT/Politica_Estera/Aree_Geografiche/Europa/Balcani/ (last accessed on: 2 November 2014).
Trade and investment relations are significant, with Italy being, in 2013, the first commercial partner of Albania and Serbia. They provide a major source of the region’s foreign direct investments in areas like the automotive and textile industries, as well as the banking and insurance sector, among others.179
Italy’s involvement in energy and infrastructure projects offers another source of interconnectedness with the region. This is due to the Tivat-Villanova underwater cable, carrying electric energy from Serbia; the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), connecting Azerbaijan’s gas fields to European markets; the off-shore exploration of hydrocarbon reserves in the Adriatic Sea; the development of renewables in Albania; and a number of potential inter-regional and multi-modal ‘Corridors’, such as the (still underdeveloped) ‘European Corridor VIII’, which links the Adriatic and the Black Seas.180 Until recently,
the (controversial and now abandoned181) South Stream pipeline, which was originally designed to
bring Russian gas through Bulgaria and Serbia, was a prominent factor in Italy-Balkans energy relations. ‘Soft’ and ‘hard’ security commitments are also important, given Italy’s close cooperation with Balkan authorities in the fight against organised crime (for instance, in Albania and Montenegro) and/or in military education and training (for example, in Albania and Serbia). They are also important due to Rome’s long-standing participation in and financial support of NATO and European/Common Security and Defence Policy (E/CSDP) military operations and civilian missions, such as KFOR and EULEX Kosovo.182
The support of inter-governmental and non-governmental regional cooperation platforms represent another major factor of Italy’s politico-diplomatic engagement in the Balkans. Such platforms include the ‘mini-lateral’ and multi-stakeholder Adriatic and Ionian Initiative (AII) and Central European Initiative (CEI), the inter-regional Adriatic Euroregion, the (EU) Adriatic and Ionian Region (whose strategy was formally adopted by the General Affairs Council in October 2014), as well as the more ‘indigenous’ Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) and South-East European Cooperation Process (SEECP).
In particular, Italy deems the further implementation of the EU Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Region (EUSAIR) as a considerable opportunity to advance transnational collaboration between four EU member states (Croatia, Greece, Italy, and Slovenia) and four non-EU Balkan countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia). This will be achieved by maximising synergies among existing projects at a local, regional and national level in four cooperation clusters, that is, “Blue Growth”, “Connecting the Region”, “Environmental Quality”, and “Sustainable Tourism”.183 The EUSAIR should also
179 For more details on the state of Italy’s economic relations with each non-EU Balkan country, see Italian Trade Agency
(2014), “Entra Nel Tuo Mercato: Europa”, Rome: Italian Trade Agency, available at: http://www.ice.gov.it/paesi/europa.htm (last accessed on: 7 December 2014).
180 For more details, see: Santoro, Roberto, “Sulle Tracce Del Corridoio VIII, Italia chiama Balcani Occidentali”, L’Occidentale,
July 2013, available at: http://www.loccidentale.it/node/134283 (last accessed on: 19 April 2015).
181 See, for example: Thorpe, Nick, “Was Russia's South Stream Too Big a 'Burden' to Bear?”, British Broadcasting Corporation, December 2014, available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30289412 (last accessed on: 4 December 2014), and Gotev, Georgi (2015), “Gazprom Buys South Stream Shares from Eni, EDF and Wintershall”,
EurActiv, 2 April 2015, available at: http://www.euractiv.com/sections/energy/gazprom-buys-all-south-stream-shares- eni-edf-and-wintershall-313411 (last accessed on: 19 April 2015). For an analysis of the expected impacts of South Stream’s cancellation on Italy’s energy security, see for instance: Sartori, Nicolò (2014), “Putin Chiude l’autostrada del Gas di South Stream”, Affarinternazionali, December 2014, available at:
http://www.affarinternazionali.it/articolo.asp?ID=2892 (last accessed on: 7 December 2014). According to this analysis, such a policy shift is likely to increase Italy’s reliance on the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline and, more generally, on Turkey’s growing role as a critical energy hub for Europe as a whole.
182 Italy currently deploys 578 military and civilian personnel in CSDP and NATO missions and operations in the Balkans. See
also Ministry of Defence (MoD) of Italy (2014), “Riepilogo Missioni/Attività Internazionali in Corso”, Rome: MoD, available at: http://www.difesa.it/OperazioniMilitari/Documents/SIT%20al%2007%20novembre%202014.pdf (last accessed on: 7 December 2014).
183 European Commission (2014), “EU Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Region”, Brussels: EU, available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/cooperate/adriat_ionian/index_en.cfm (last accessed on 2 December 2014), and Governments of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Greece, Italy, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia (2014), “Joint
act as a sort of ‘incubator’ for the European integration of the Balkan countries concerned, including the encouragement of inter-regional regulatory convergence. However, given the ‘three NOs’ philosophy which characterises the European regional strategies (that is, no additional EU legislation, institutions and funding), the ultimate delivery of the EUSAIR will not only depend on the European Commission’s (initially reluctant) oversight but also, and most importantly, on the political goodwill and bottom-up coordination among national and sub-national actors across the entire region.184
Two factors of cooperation and interdependence are Italy’s (decreasing) governmental development aid (which is currently most focused on Albania due to a progressive phasing out of Italy’s official aid policies in the region) and Italy’s humanitarian assistance (as witnessed by its pledge of 2 million euros at the Brussels Donor Conference in May 2014185 in response to the massive floods affecting Serbia
and Bosnia-Herzegovina). Further factors include the deep-rooted presence of Italian non- governmental organisations (NGOs) since the Balkan wars in early 1990s, people-to-people contacts due to geographic proximity (such as via twinning of cities), the progressive – but sometimes difficult – integration of the larger Albanian (about 502,000 individuals) and the smaller Serbian (around 109,000 people) communities of permanent foreign residents in Italy186, as well as Rome’s long-
standing cultural and linguistic appeal in the region.187
statement of the representatives of the countries participating in the EU Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Region on a governance and management system, set up in partnership with the European Commission, for the implementation of the Strategy”, 18 November 2014, Brussels: EU, available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/cooperate/adriat_ionian/pdf/joint_statement_governance_en.pdf (last accessed on: 17 March 2015).
184 For a detailed analysis, see also Stocchiero, Andrea (2014), “La Prospettiva Della Macroregione Adriatico-Ionica Nella
Politica Estera Italiana”, in Stocchiero, Andrea (ed.), La strategia dell’Unione Europea per la Regione Adriatico-Ionica e la Politica Estera Italiana, Rome: Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale (CeSPI)-Istituto Ricerche Studi Informazioni Difesa (ISTRID), pp. 6-41, available at: http://www.cespi.it/PDF/Macroregione%20Adriatica%20CeSPI%20ISTRID.pdf (last accessed on: 7 December 2014). A Working Paper, devised by the participating countries and the Commission with the aim of guiding the EUSAIR’s governance and management architecture, was also presented at a high-level conference in Brussels in November 2014 and is available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/cooperate/adriat_ionian/pdf/joint_statement_governance_en.pdf (last accessed on: 17 March 2015).
185 Embassy of Italy to Serbia (2014), “Alluvioni Balcani: Conferenza Donatori, Italia Offre due Milioni di Euro Per
Ricostruzione”, Belgrade-Rome: MFAIC, available at:
http://www.ambbelgrado.esteri.it/Ambasciata_Belgrado/Archivio_News/conferenza+donatori.htm (last accessed on: 2 December 2014).
186 For further details see, respectively: Ministry of Labour and Social Policies of Italy (2014), “La Comunità Albanese in Italia:
Abstract del Rapporto Annuale Sulla Presenza Degli Immigrati-2014”, Rome: Ministry of Labour and Social Policies, available at:
http://www.integrazionemigranti.gov.it/Attualita/IlPunto/Documents/rapporti_comunita_2014/Albania.pdf
(last accessed on: 7 December 2014), and ibid., “La Comunità Serba in Italia: Abstract del Rapporto Annuale Sulla Presenza Degli Immigrati-2014, Rome: Ministry of Labour and Social Policies, available at:
http://www.integrazionemigranti.gov.it/Attualita/IlPunto/Documents/rapporti_comunita_2014/Serbia.pdf (last accessed on: 7 December 2014).
187 See, for example, ANSAMed, “Serbia: Dipartimento Italianistica Istituito a Kragujevac”, 11 December 2014, available at:
http://www.ansamed.info/ansamed/it/notizie/rubriche/cultura/2014/12/11/serbia-dipartimento-italianistica-istituito- a-kragujevac_0f746d6f-5c91-428f-bdb7-5bfa60b90bdd.html (last accessed on: 21 April 2015).