As is the case for the rest of the Balkans, Spain never had a special relationship with Kosovo before the 1998 crisis started and, as part of the European Union, it has not taken the lead in this specific area. The majority of political parties in the Spanish Parliament decided to join the NATO campaign in Serbia, even if it only entailed the logistic use of American bases on Spanish soil and eight planes. Once more, after the bombing mission, a Spaniard was appointed to lead the UN Mission – Lieutenant General Juan Ortuño became head of KFOR in 2000.
9.4.1 Spain among the five non-recognising member states
At present, 90 countries in the United Nations (46.6%), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (60%), the Council of Europe (70%) and the European Union (80%), plus the IMF and the World Bank, have recognised Kosovo as an independent state. In the EU, just five countries – Romania, Slovakia, Greece, Cyprus, and Spain – have not yet officially recognised the state that was created in 2008. Among the main non-recognising countries worldwide are the so-called BRICS (emergent countries: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), the Vatican City and some northern African countries such as Morocco, Algeria and Egypt. In the region, the majority of Balkan states, with the exception of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia and Greece, have recognised the new state. So, even if the International Court of Justice226 has declared the legality of the independence process, some
sovereign states maintain their position and are still divided on the topic.
In most cases, this position is due to internal issues and unresolved conflicts and even when, in official documents (UN, EU), the independence of Kosovo is described as an “exceptional and sui generis example”, there is a general distrust in the ‘international community’ doctrine on these matters. This issue is especially sensitive in the Balkans countries, where neither the European Union nor the United Nations states a clear position on secession rights. However, Spain has always maintained the same favourable position to multi-national states. In the case of Kosovo, Spain is against the unilateral declaration of independence but in favour of a negotiated solution.
226 Sentence of International Court of Justice, 22 July 2010, nº 141, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral
The Spanish position cannot be explained without taking into account several questions of domestic realpolitik. First of all, one of the reasons why the socialists entered government in 2004 was due to their strict defence of international law in the face of the Iraq invasion227. The supreme mandate of the
United Nations over international/regional conflicts was one of the main mottos that were made in that electoral campaign. The former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Miguel Angel Moratinos, personified this strict position and interpretation of international law.
However, even if Spain had officially been against the recognition of Kosovo due to procedural reasons – that is, unilateral declaration of independence – in 2010, the Spanish Presidency of the European Union adopted a flexible approach to the issue when it sat down at the same table with all of the relevant parties at the Sarajevo meeting. In addition, it is worth mentioning the declaration of Juan Fernando López-Aguilar in 2009. He opened up the door to the recognition of Kosovo (similar to what was carried out with Israel after 40 years of non-recognition) through the quick recognition of established immediate diplomatic relations between both Madrid and Pristina.228
Following the political change in Spain in November 2011, a more favourable position towards recognition is unlikely. The Popular Party, which is now in power, is the first political party in Spain to be against Kosovo’s declaration of independence. Moreover, not only the elites of the party but also, its followers, are firmly against any process of independence of any nature. The right and central-right newspapers in the country, La Razón, ABC and El Mundo, also support this position. Traditionally, the Popular Party has appealed to rescue the Spanish “national pride”, for instance in the events of the Perejil Island in 2002 under the Aznar Presidency229 and, more recently, on the
Repsol-YPF conflict with Argentina.230
In addition, in 2009, the then Foreign Affairs Minister, José García Margallo, mentioned in a Kosovar newspaper (Kosovo Times) that Spain did not recognise Kosovo because of “principles related to Spain’s Basque and Catalonia autonomous communities, although the situation is not comparable”. He also added that Spain would support Kosovo’s development, even if it could not recognise it. This was one of the first times when a domestic issue was mentioned by a Spanish politician as the reason behind the non-recognition of Kosovo.
On 14 March 2012, the incumbent Spanish Prime Minister, Mariano Rajoy, explained to the nationalists Catalans of Convergencia I Unio in the parliament that the position of Spain towards Kosovo was not going to change. He indirectly invoked “internal factors” in order to justify this stance, “due to the fact this is the most convenient position for the majority of Spanish people”.231
These examples clarify the link between internal affairs and secessionist movements, especially in light of the situation in Cataluña in past years. A non-legal consultation on independence, which was convened by Catalonian authorities, took place on 9 November 2014 and put on the table the possibility of a unilateral declaration of independence. However, the constitutional court declared the consultation illegal and the Catalonian government appealed to new elections later that year on 27September.
227 Vaquer, Jordi (2011), “Spain’s position on Kosovo in Kosovo calling”, International Conference to Launch Position Papers
on Kosovo’s relation with EU and regional non-recognising countries, pp. 12-13.
228 ABC, 14 May 2009.
229 “Los secretos de la Toma de Perejil”, El Pais, 19 March 2006.
230 “Cronología sobre el conflicto entre el gobierno Argentino y Repsol-YPF”, La Razón, 18 April 2012. 231 La Vanguardia, 14 March 2012.
With this hectic domestic situation, the Spanish position on these matters was unambiguous – no recognition of any state was declared independent unilaterally. In spring 2014, the same line followed for Crimea’s independence.
Consequently, there are two main reasons that have motivated the non-recognition of Kosovo by Spain: (1) the position of Spain as the ‘protector knight’ of international law, which gave the Rodriguez- Zapatero Government part of its legitimacy, and (2) a ‘fear of contagion’” due to domestic conflicts with historical nationalities.
There are three main differences between Spain and other non-recognising EU member states: 1. Spain is not in the region. Spain and Greece might be the only EU-15 countries that do not recognise Kosovo but Spain is the only one that has not had a conflict, provoked by the dissolution of the Austro- Hungarian, Ottoman and Russia Empires after the First World War. Greece, Cyprus, Slovakia, and Romania were all affected by such events and historical memory has a lot to do with some of the political decisions that are made, especially when they relate to territorial claims: Hungarians in Romania and Slovakia, Turkish and Greek communities in Cyprus and the open conflict of Greece with its neighbours.
2. Spain has never had direct political, economic, trade or even cultural interests in the Balkans. Spain has never paid much attention to this area of Europe, leaving all of the influence to Italy, Germany, UK or France. Instead, it has focused on Latin America, Northern Africa and the European Union itself. This is in spite of the fact that the events in Kosovo have actually had an impact on the Spanish political class. 3. The Kosovo issue is not on the political agenda of the Spanish Government. As Spain is not in the vicinity of the Balkans, it has avoided some of the problems that affect the region’s neighbour countries, including, for example, migration flows through Kosovo borders and trafficking. For the time being, Kosovo is not a priority for the Spanish government, which is currently more preoccupied with the country’s recession, high unemployment and economic crisis, as well as focused on the Catalonian situation. However, even though Spain has not recognised Kosovo, it has given positive feedback to its partners in the European Union in order to continue the integration process with it.
9.4.2 Implications for Spain’s relations with Kosovo
The main problem that Spain has with Kosovo is related to the ‘procedure’ by which it declared independence, namely that it happened unilaterally. Even if EU official documents speak of a sui generis case, Spanish authorities are undoubtedly worried about the precedent that Kosovo could set elsewhere in Europe, as happened last year with the independence referendum in Crimea or the one in Scotland, differences aside.
Therefore, an agreement between Serbia and Kosovo is seen in a very positive light. Thus, Spain has been proactive in helping to bring about such an outcome through the diplomatic work that was carried out in Belgrade. In essence, Spain uses its privileged relationship with Serbia due to the fact that it is perceived as a loyal friend. In this sense, more regional integration, not just political but social, logistical, commercial and so on, is perceived to be important in order to persuade the non-recognising countries inside the EU to change their positions. This would signal to the member states that past conflicts belong in the past and that regional cooperation is possible.
9.5 CONCLUSION
The Spanish case study prompts three main conclusions:
1. Leadership: The Spanish approach to the Balkans was shaped by the action of individual figures such