Generalidades de la Mediación Mediación Concursal

Different literature has defined governance differently and with a variety of meanings. Several literatures have defined governance as the structures and processes of deciding resource use and management rules (Agrawal, 2003; Blaikie, 2006; Mearns, 1996; Ostrom, 1999; Pierre, 2000). Two key governance factors, viz., policy enforcement and implementation and local decision making structures and processes (and their interrelationships), can have a significant influence on the participation of local users in resource governance and management (Edmunds & Wollenberg, 2003; Fisher, 2000a; Fisher, 2000b; Meinzen-Dick et al., 2002; Thanh & Sikor, 2006). The

literature suggests that the level of authority that a user group holds and the capacity of the group to govern the resources are the two basic aspects of policy enforcement and implementation, which influence participation of users in resource governance (Agrawal & Gupta, 2005).

Decentralisation or devolution34 _{of resource management transfers some level of}

authority and responsibility to local communities and user groups (Edmunds & Wollenberg, 2003; Ferguson & Chandrasekharan, 2005). The majority of the community forestry programmes in developing countries generally involve devolution of power (in regards to resource management and access rights) from the government to local communities (Edmunds & Wollenberg, 2003; Fisher, 2000a; Fisher, 2000b; Thanh & Sikor, 2006). However, the devolution of power can be categorised as ‘complete’ or ‘restrictive’, based on the local communities’ participation and power to influence decisions (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2002). The restrictive devolution of power gives

resource users authority to implement only the operational rules set by the government. They do not have any influence on the setting-up of operational rules and they have only restricted access to resources. The complete devolution gives resource users

34 Although the words ‘decentralisation’ and ‘devolution’ are used more or less interchangeably, there are some differences between these two terms. Fisher (2000b) defines decentralisation as the relocation of administrative functions from centre to lower level of government, but this relocation does not necessarily transfer the decision-making authority. Devolution, on the other hand, is a transfer of power which includes rights and assets, governance responsibility and specific decision-making powers, away from centre (Fisher, 2000a; Fisher, 2000b; Yuliani, 2004)

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significant influence at the collective level, in regards to how operational rules are set, and they have greater access to resources and participation in resource governance. The authors explain that the level of authority that a user group holds can govern the success of the regime’s implementation: the higher the influence when setting all types of rules (that is, operational, collective and constitutional rules) the more extensive is the participation of local users in resource governance and management.

However, the state exerts a strong influence at the constitutional level, in most cases of government-initiated regimes (Agrawal & Ostrom, 2001; Meinzen-Dick et al., 2002).

The state sets the legal framework within which the resource users should operate, an example of which is the provision of a compulsory registration for a user group to take over resource management responsibilities. Although user groups are more efficient and cost-effective in managing local common property resources and also monitoring and enforcing the rules, they may not achieve the effective participation of users from all categories in resource governance and management, if the state-imposed rules fail to recognise the customary rights of the users and their role in setting operational rules (Agrawal, 1996; Banana & Gombya-Ssembajjwe, 2000; Karmacharya et al., 2003).

Another important aspect of policy enforcement and implementation is the capacity of the group to govern the resources. The success of achieving the users’ participation in resource governance and management depends significantly on the capacity of user groups to govern the resources. The capacity to govern the resources, to a greater extent, depends on the group’s leadership and whether the leaders have ensured the participation of all categories of users, including women, the poor and other disadvantaged groups, when setting the operational and constitutional rules and when obtaining equitable benefits from the forests (Martin & Lemon, 2001; Sekher, 2001). Although devolution means a transfer of access rights and decision-making power from the state to the local communities or user groups, empirical studies reveal that the state still holds authority and power in the distribution of benefits from forests (Agrawal & Ostrom, 2001; Kumar & Kant, 2005; Nguyen, 2006; Sarin et al., 2003). In some

countries, where authority to manage resources has been transferred to the local user groups, the local elites have captured the benefits from such a transfer of authority and the participation of the poor and disadvantaged groups, in relation to resource management and benefits, is almost ignored (Adhikari, 2001; Cornwall, 2003; Nygren, 2005; Oyono, 2005; Shackleton et al., 2002).

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Formal decision-making structures and processes, at the local level, can influence people’s participation in natural resource management decisions. Formal decision- making structures define the users who can participate in decision making processes (Tang, 1991). At a user group level, a formal decision-making structure is the executive committee, and the group members represented on the executive committee are the constituents of the formal decision making structures (Gibson et al., 2005). Resource

users not occupying positions on executive committees are often marginalised from participating in decision processes (Gibson et al., 2005; Sinha, 2003). Studies reveal

that government-initiated participatory forest management, as in the case of joint forest management in India, often results in social networking between the local elites and government officials, which discriminates against women, the poor and lower caste users from participation in decision-making processes (Martin & Lemon, 2001). The local elites, who also hold political power, often take the leadership and dominate the local decision-making structures and processes of forest user groups in developing countries (Agarwal, 2001; Baral & Subedi, 1999; Gauli & Rishi, 2004; Lise, 2000). Women, the poor and marginalised people often have a low capacity for exercising power through their positions in the decision-making structures, for example, executive committees (Lachapelle et al., 2004). The literature suggests that a complex interface

between traditional and formal decision-making structures and processes at local level (as seen in the case of community-based natural resource management in Zimbabwe) also influences people’s participation in resource governance (Nemarundwea, 2004).

Similarly, local-decision making processes are guided by formal rules, in addition to socio-cultural norms and hence, the attitudes and behaviours of local elites, which are also guided by the discriminatory socio-cultural norms, that constrain the participation of the poor, low caste and women in decision-making processes (Agarwal, 2001; Gauli & Rishi, 2004). Evidences from the government initiated community-based forest management regimes in India show that participation in decision-making processes, at the initial stage of forest management implementation, is also limited by certain basic rules imposed by the government (Martin & Lemon, 2001; Sinha, 2003). Furthermore, the leaders often have limited skills in facilitating a participatory way, which constrain the poor, women and marginalised groups from participating in decision-making processes, even though they were not meant to be excluded from participating (Sinha, 2003).

Access to decisions and an adequate information flow are other decision-making process related factors that affect user participation in common property resources

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(Hanna, 1995a). Hanna (1995a) argues that user participation is low, if the decision- making process is top-down and institutional positions designate the decision-makers. On the contrary, a much larger degree of participation of resource users and other stakeholders is experienced, if the decision-making process has a bottom-up approach, where resource users are incorporated into various levels of resource governance and management decisions (Hanna, 1995a).