Most recent interpretations of the way in which Heidegger deals with the problem of the external world in Being and Time focus on area B, the puzzle passages. How are we to interpret and reconcile the “being idealism” and the “entity realism” affirmed in these texts? Let me begin by sketching the space of possible solutions.
According to (a) a minimalist reading of “being idealism,” Heideggerian
“being” is just the meaning or significance that we humans attribute to en-tities; it is what entities are understood as. A maximalist reading (b) would interpret Heideggerian “being” as an entity-constitutive transcendental frame-work à la Kant and Husserl, a position that I call “strong transcendentalism.”
Between (a) and (b), there is an intermediate interpretation (c), according to which “being” is a transcendental framework which is not constitutive of entities but only of that “as what” entities are encountered. Let me call this view “weak transcendentalism.”
With regard to “entity realism,” readings (b) and (c) of “being idealism”
invite us to make a distinction between an empirical and a transcendental point of view. We may then interpret Heidegger’s entity realism either (m) on the empirical level (empirical realism) or (n) on the transcendental level (transcendental realism), or both. Even if we do not make this distinction, we have a choice between (o) restricting entity realism to occurrent (Vorhanden) entities or (p) interpreting it more generally. If we opt for (m) empirical en-tity realism, we may regard questions concerning entities at the transcenden-tal level as either (q) meaningful or (r) meaningless.
In order to produce a complete interpretation of the puzzle passages, we have to combine one element of (a–c) with more than one element of 180 Herman Philipse
(m–r). Some combinations are clearly unsatisfactory. For example, if one unites (b) with (m), (o), and (q), Heidegger would be faced with the tradi-tional problem of the Ding an sich, whereas he claims to have shown that this problem is senseless. We are investigating whether it is possible to de-velop a complete interpretation that explains all relevant texts and is philo-sophically interesting in itself.
Apart from the two puzzle passages I quoted, there is a third one, which seems to exclude both transcendental realism (n) and transcendental ideal-ism concerning entities:
(3) Of course only as long as Dasein is (that is, only as long as an understanding of being is ontically possible),“is there” being. When Dasein does not exist,“indepen-dence”“is” not either, nor “is” the “in itself.” In such a case this sort of thing can be neither understood nor not understood. In such a case even entities within-the-world can neither be discovered nor lie hidden. In such a case it cannot be said that entities are, nor can it be said that they are not. But now, as long as there is an un-derstanding of Being and therefore an unun-derstanding of occurrentness, it can indeed be said that in this case entities will still continue to be.46
In this passage, Heidegger seems to rule out transcendental entity realism because he states that the independence of entities with regard to Dasein is itself dependent upon Dasein, and that there is no “in itself ” without Da-sein. As Cerbone says, “this passage has the effect of nesting the indepen-dence claim within a broader claim of depenindepen-dence, thereby undercutting a straightforwardly realistic understanding of entities.”47 But of course, the passage also seems to exclude transcendental idealism with regard to entities.
For Heidegger says,“In such a case it cannot be said that entities are, nor can it be said that they are not.” I shall come back to the issue of transcendental entity realism later on (sections 7 and 9). Let me first focus on two interpre-tative problems that are somewhat easier to solve: the problems of being idealism and of empirical entity realism.
With regard to being idealism, the minimalist interpretation (a) has been defended by Dorothea Frede, among others. “If a thing’s being consists in its meaning, then it only has a being when there is someone for whom this is its meaning.”48Although she does not explicitly make a distinction between the empirical and the transcendental level, she restricts entity realism to oc-current (vorhanden) entities (o): we interpret these entities as existing indepen-dently from us.49This explains why the “independence” of entities depends on Dasein. As she says, “with things ready-at-hand it is different,” for they
“lose their ontological status as soon as there is nobody who could make use of their practical meaningfulness.”50Furthermore, Frede endorses a variety of (r). Heidegger could reject the demand for proofs of the external world be-cause “things have an ‘in themselves’ only if there is some understanding Heidegger’s “Scandal of Philosophy” 181
within which they are what they are. The question what they are apart from this meaning turns out . . . to be senseless.”51
William Blattner correctly objects to minimalist interpretations of being idealism such as Frede’s that they trivialize Heidegger’s transcendental argu-ments, so that they fail for problem area A. Interpretation (a) makes Heideg-ger’s being idealism true by redefinition. If one defines “being” as “a thing’s meaning” (Frede) or as a thing’s “intelligibility to us” (Olafson),52and if one assumes, plausibly, that we humans give meaning to things, it is trivially true that being depends on Dasein. Such an interpretation is both philosophi-cally sterile, because it trivializes Heidegger’s being idealism, and textually inadequate. For although interpretation (a) seems to fit Heidegger’s defini-tion of “being” as “that in terms of which entities are already understood,”
Heidegger also defines “being” as “that which determines entities as enti-ties.”53 Furthermore, Heidegger explicitly rejects the view that an entity’s being ready-at-hand should be conceived of as a “subjective colouring”
given to some world-stuff that is already there in itself.54
Should we then opt for interpretation (b) of being idealism, the maxi-malist view that entities are constituted by transcendental frameworks? Ac-cording to this view, shared by Kant and Husserl, the most fundamental link between consciousness and entities in the world is perception. In percep-tion, the transcendental subject constitutes empirical entities out of its own subjective sensations. Whereas Kant stipulated a Ding an sich in order to ac-count for the passive aspect of perception at the transcendental level, Husserl held that this notion of a Ding an sich is meaningless, although in 1913 he speculated about God as a theological principle that might explain the order of sensations in transcendental consciousness.55 In other words, whereas Kant was a transcendental realist concerning entities (although he was a transcendental idealist with regard to space and time), Husserl was, like Berkeley, a transcendental idealist concerning entities (with the exception of God and, indeed, other minds).56
Clearly, versions of strong transcendentalism are inadequate as an inter-pretation of Being and Time, although they do imply empirical realism with regard to entities in the world. In the first place, Heidegger explicitly denies that perceptual knowledge is the fundamental link between the world and ourselves. According to his analysis of Dasein as being-in-the-world, per-ceptual knowledge, and, indeed, knowledge in general, is a secondary,
“founded” mode of access to innerworldly things. “All access to such enti-ties is founded ontologically upon the basic structure of Dasein, being-in-the-world,” Heidegger says, summarizing his analysis.57It follows that our being-in-the-world can never be explained in terms of the perceptual rela-tion. In the second place, Heidegger rejects transcendental idealism if it
“signifies tracing back every entity to a subject or consciousness . . . ” but 182 Herman Philipse
this is precisely what strong transcendentalism does.58Finally, it is unclear how strong transcendentalism can avoid the problem of the external world, whereas Heidegger claims that he succeeds in eliminating the problem as meaningless.
I conclude that we should interpret Heidegger’s being idealism in sense (c), weak transcendentalism. Within the context of the transcendental leit-motif, Heideggerian “being” in Being and Time is a transcendental frame-work that is not constitutive of entities but only of that “as what” entities are encountered.59Many authors adopt this interpretation, such as Blattner (1994, 1999), Dreyfus (1991), Mulhall (1996), and Philipse (1998).