o Articles 102 and 103 1. Carpio v. Doroja, 180 SCRA 1 (1989)
Facts: On October 23, 1985, Ramirez, while driving a passenger Fuso Jitney
owned and operated by Toribio, bumped Carpio, a pedestrian crossing the street, as a consequence of which the latter suffered from a fractured left clavicle as reflected in the medicolegal certificate and sustained injuries which required medical attention for a period of 3 months.
Ramirez was charged with Reckless Imprudence. During the trial, the private prosecutor presented evidence to establish civil liability of either Ramirez or Toribio (operator). Ramirez‘s counsel then moved that the court summon Toribio to court for the reason that, because Ramirez was an indigent, any liability that may be adjudged against him cannot be satisfied. The private prosecutor, however, did not move to summon Toribio.
Thereafter, Ramirez was convicted for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Less Physical Injuries. Additionally, civil liability in the form of indemnity was awarded (i.e. P45 for the value of ½ can of tomatoes lost, P200 hospital fees; P1,500 costs). Ramirez later applied for probation.
Private prosecutor appealed to the RTC the civil indemnity and prayed to be awarded more damages (10K moral, 6K compensatory, 5K atty‘s fees). As a result, the court rendered a decision awarding 5K moral damages and affirmed the other civil liabilities (not quoted in the case).
Due to the insolvency of Ramirez, the writ of execution was returned unsatisfied on May 1988. Thus, Carpio moved for a subsidiary writ of execution against the subsidiary liability of Toribio as owner-operator. Said motion was denied based on the fact that (1) the dispositive portion of the RTC (as appellate court) did not mention any subsidiary liability of Toribio; and (2) the nature of the accident falls under culpa contractual and not culpa aquiliana. Hence, this petition. Carpio hinges his petition on the authority of Pajarito v. Seneris which declared that ―the subsidiary liability of the owner- operator is fixed by the judgment, because if a case were to be filed against said operator, the court called upon to act thereto has no other function than to render a decision based on the indemnity award in the criminal case without power to amend or modify it even if in his opinion an error has been committed in the decision.‖
Caprio claims that the tenor of the RTC decision implies that the subsidiary liability of the owner-operator may be enforced in the same proceeding and a separate action is no longer necessary in order to avoid undue delay, notwithstanding the fact that said employer was not made a party in the criminal action.
On the other hand, Toribio claims that the owner-operator cannot be validly held subsidiarily liable for the following reasons, namely: (a) the matter of subsidiary liability was not raised on appeal; (b) contrary to the case of Pajarito, the injuries sustained by the complainant did not arise from the so-called ―culpa-contractual‖ but from ―culpaaquiliana‖; (c) the judgments of appellate courts may not be altered, modified, or changed by the court of origin; and (d) said owner was never made a party to the criminal proceedings.
Issue: Whether or not the subsidiary liability of Toribio may be enforced in the same criminal proceeding against the driver where the award was given.
Held: The law involved in the instant case is Article 103 in relation to Article 100 of the RPC. The subsidiary liability in Art. 103 should be distinguished from the primary liability of employers, which is quasi-delictual in character as provided in Art. 2180.
Under Art. 103, the liability emanated from a delict. On the other hand, the liability under Art. 2180 is founded on culpa aquiliana. The present case is neither an action for culpacontractual nor for culpa-aquiliana. This is basically an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime under Art. 100 of the RPC.
In order that an employer may be held subsidiarily liable for the employee‘s civil liability in the criminal action, it should be shown:
(1) that the employer, etc. is engaged in any kind of industry,
(2) that the employee committed the offense in the discharge of his duties; and (3) that he is insolvent.
The subsidiary liability of the employer, however, arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal action. All these requisites present, the Toribio becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon the Ramirez‘s conviction and upon proof of the latter‘s insolvency (unsatisfied writ of execution).
Moreover, we are not convinced that Toribio has been deprived of his day in court, because the case before us is NOT one wherein the operator is sued for a primary liability under the Civil Code but one in which the subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent upon his employee‘s criminal negligence is sought to be enforced. Considering the subsidiary liability imposed upon the employer by law, he is in substance and in effect a party to the criminal case. Ergo, the employer‘s subsidiary liability may be determined and enforced in the criminal case as part of the execution proceedings against the employee.
The argument that the owner-operator cannot be held subsidiarily liable because the matter of subsidiary liability was not raised on appeal and in like manner, the appellate court‘s decision made no mention of such subsidiary liability is of no moment. As already discussed, the filing of a separate complaint against the operator for recovery of subsidiary liability is not necessary since his liability is clear from the decision against the accused. Such being the case, it is not indispensable for the question of subsidiary liability to be passed upon by the appellate court. Such subsidiary liability is already implied from the appellate court‘s decision.
A separate and independent action is, therefore, unnecessary and would only unduly prolong the agony of the heirs of the victim. Also, Compelling Toribio to pay on the basis of his subsidiary liability does not constitute an amendment of the judgment because in an action under Art. 103 of the RPC, once all the requisites are met, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable, without need of a separate action
Such being the case, the subsidiary liability can be enforced in the same case where the award was given, and this does not constitute an act of amending the decision. It becomes incumbent upon the court to grant a motion for subsidiary writ of execution (but only after the employer has been heard), upon conviction of the employee and after execution is returned unsatisfied due to the employee‘s insolvency.
2. Bantoto v. Bobis, 18 SCRA 690 (1966) See p. 813 of textbook
Facts: Appellant Crispin Vallejo was the registered owner of a "jeepney" named "Jovil 11", with plate TPU-20948, that was operated by him in Bacolod City through driver Salvador Bobis. On 24 October 1948, through the driver's negligence, the "jeepney" struck a 3-year old girl, Damiana Bantoto, a daughter of appellees, inflicting serious injuries that led to her death a few days later.
Bobis was charged with homicide through reckless imprudence, to which Bobis pleaded guilty.
Bantoto et al for themselves and their other children, instituted the present action against Salvador Bobis, Juan Maceda (later absolved) and Crispin Vallejo in the CFI, seeking to have the 3 defendants declared solidarily responsible for damages, consisting of the civil indemnity required of the driver Bobis in the judgment of conviction, plus moral and exemplary damages and attorneys' fees and costs.
Vallejo moved to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action against him, for the reason that the amended complaint did not aver that the driver, Bobis, was insolvent. The court overruled the motion to dismiss. Thus, Vallejo filed an answer setting up as defenses that his liability was only subsidiary, and that the liability had been satisfied. Bobis was declared in default.
At the trial, the CFI admitted the following exhibits: (1) the writ of execution against the driver, Salvador Bobis, issued in the criminal case, and (2) the sheriff's return nulla bona.
Vallejo maintains that his liability is only subsidiary, and thus the lack of averment in the complaint that Bobis was insolvent is fatal.
Issue: (1) Whether Bobis has to be insolvent to make Vallejo subsidiarily liable. (2) Whether the writ of execution + sheriff‘s return are admissible.
(3) Whether the employer (based on his subsidiary liability) maybe held liable for exemplary damages despite its absence in the original judgment.
Held: (1) NO NEED TO BE INSOLVENT. The master's liability, under the RPC, for the crimes committed by his servants and employees in the discharge of their duties, is not predicated upon the insolvency of the latter. Article 103 of the Penal Code prescribes that:
ART. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. — The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employees, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties. The insolvency of the servant or employee is nowhere mentioned in said article as a condition precedent. In truth, such insolvency is required only when the liability of the master is being made effective by execution levy, but not for the rendition of judgment against the master.
The SUBSIDIARY CHARACTER of the employer's responsibility merely imports that the latter's property is not be seized without first exhausting that of the servant. And by analogy to a regular guarantor (who is the prototype of persons subsidiarily responsible), the master may not demand prior exhaustion of the servant's (principal obligor's) properties if he cannot "point out to the creditor available property of the debtor within Philippine territory, sufficient to cover the amount of the debt" (Civil Code). This rule is logical, for as between the offended party (as creditor) and the culprit's master or employer, it is the latter who is in a better position to determine the resources and solvency of the servant or employee.
(2) YES. It is well to move here that this Court has ruled that in the absence of collusion the judgment convicting and sentencing the servant to pay indemnity is conclusive in an action to enforce the subsidiary liability of the master or employer. Anyway, since Bobis, the driver, was also a defendant, the writ of execution issued in the criminal case to enforce the civil indemnity, and its return without satisfaction, are not irrelevant evidence in the action against him and his employer.
(3) NO. As the case was predicated upon the sentence of conviction in the criminal case, the award of exemplary damages was improper. No such damages were imposed on the driver, and the master, as person subsidiarily liable, cannot incur greater civil liability than his convicted employee, any more than a guarantor can be held responsible for more than the principal debtor
But we do not agree that the award of attorney's fees should be disallowed. Appellant had reason to know that his driver could not pay the P3,000.00 indemnity imposed in the criminal case, because if he could, or if he had money or leviable property worth that much, Bobis would be operating his own jeepney instead of another's. In fact, Article 2208, paragraph 9, authorizes the award of counsel's fees "in a separate civil action to recover the civil liability arising from a crime.
3. Yonaha v. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 397 (1996) See p. 814
Facts: In a Criminal Case, Elmer Ouano was charged with the crime of ―Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide.‖ It was alleged that the accused, while driving a Toyota Tamaraw did then and there unlawfully and feloniously maneuver and operate it in a negligent and reckless manner, as a result thereof the motor vehicle he was then driving bumped and hit Hector Cañete , which caused the latter‘s instantaneous death. When arraigned, the accused pleaded ―guilty.‖ The trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt and ordered imprisonment (1 year&1 day to 1 year&8 months) and to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000.00 for the death of the victim; P30,000.00 for actual damages and P10,000.00 as attorney‘s 3 fees.
A WRIT OF EXECUTION was issued for the satisfaction of the monetary award. In his Return of Service, Sheriff stated that he had served the writ on accused Elmer Ouano but that the latter had manifested his inability to pay. Private respondents then presented a ―MOTION FOR SUBSIDIARY EXECUTION‖ with neither a notice of hearing nor notice to
petitioner (Ouano‘s employer). Acting on the motion, the trial court issued an order directing the issuance of a writ of subsidiary execution. The sheriff went to petitioner‘s residence to enforce the writ, and it was then, allegedly for the first time, that petitioner was informed of Ouano‘s conviction.
Petitioner filed a motion to stay and to recall the subsidiary writ of execution principally anchored on the lack of prior notice to her and on the fact that the employer‘s liability had yet to be established.
TC denied petitioner‘s motion.
CA dismissed the petition. Hence this petition. Respondent‘s contention:
Even assuming that issuance of writ of subsidiary execution requires notice and hearing, a hearing in the present case would be sheer rigmarole, an unnecessary formality, because, as employer, petitioner became subsidiarily liable upon the conviction of her accused driver, Elmer Ouano, and proof of the latter‘s insolvency. And if she had any defense to free herself from such subsidiary liability, she could have ventilated and substantiated the same in connection with her (petitioner‘s) motion to stay and recall the writ of subsidiary execution in question. Except for the protestation of violation of due process, and absence of notice, petitioner intimated no defense which could absolve her of subsidiary liability under the premises.
Issue: Whether or not Subsidiary Execution should automatically issue against the one subsidiarily liable (employer) Held: NO. The statutory basis for an employer‘s subsidiary liability is found in Article 103 of the RPC. This Court has since sanctioned the enforcement of this subsidiary liability in the same criminal proceedings in which the employee is adjudged guilty, on the thesis that it really is a part of, and merely an incident in, the execution process of the judgment. But, execution against the employer MUST NOT ISSUE as just a matter of course, and it behooves the court, as a measure of due process to the employer, to determine and resolve a priori, in a hearing set for the purpose, the legal applicability and propriety of the employer‟s liability. The requirement is mandatory even when it appears prima facie that execution against the convicted employee cannot be satisfied. The court must convince itself that:
(a) the convicted employee is in truth in the employ of the employer; (b) that the latter is engaged in an industry of some kind;
(c) that the employee has committed the crime to which civil liability attaches while in the performance of his duties as such; and
(d) that execution against the employee is unsuccessful by reason of insolvency.
The assumption that, since petitioner in this case did not aver any exculpatory facts in her ―motion to stay and recall,‖ which could save her from liability, a hearing would be a futile and a sheer rigmarole is unacceptable. The employer must be given his full day in court.
Subsidiary liability of an employer under Article 103 of the RPC requires: (a) the existence of an employer-employee relationship;
(b) that the employer is engaged in some kind of industry;
(c) that the employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his duties (not necessarily any offense he commits ―while‖ in the discharge of such duties); and
The judgment of conviction of the employee, of course, concludes the employer and the subsidiary liability may be enforced in the same criminal case, but to afford the employer due process, the court should hear and decide that liability on the basis of the conditions required therefor by law. Petitioner shall be given the right to a hearing on the motion for the issuance of a writ of subsidiary execution filed by private respondents, and the case is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings
V. PRIMARY LIABILITY - Civil Code
o Articles 2183 to 2193 (Memorize) A. Possessors/users of animals
1. Vestil v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 179 SCRA 47 (1989)
Facts: 3 year old Theness Tan Uy, was bitten by a dog while she was playing with a child of the Vestils in the house of the late Vicente Miranda, the father of Purita Vestil, at F. Ramos Street in Cebu City. She was rushed to the Cebu General Hospital, where she was treated for ―multiple lacerated wounds on the forehead‖ and administered an anti-rabies vaccine by Dr. Antonio Tautjo. She was discharged after 9 days but was re-admitted one week later due to ―vomiting of saliva.‖ The following day, the child died. The cause of death was certified as broncho-pneumonia.
7 months later, the Uys sued for damages, alleging that the Vestils were liable to them as the possessors of “Andoy,” the dog that bit and eventually killed their daughter.
The Vestils rejected the charge, insisting that the dog belonged to the deceased Vicente Miranda, that it was a tame animal, and that in any case no one had witnessed it bit Theness.
After trial, the CFI of Cebu sustained the Vestils and dismissed the complaint. The IAC reversed and found that the Vestils were in possession of the house and the dog and so should be responsible under Article 2183 of the Civil Code for the injuries caused by the dog. It also held that the child had died as a result of the dog bites and not for causes independent thereof as submitted by the appellees. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether the Vestils are liable for the death of Theness Uy
Purita Vestil insists that she is not the owner of the house or of the dog left by her father as his estate has not yet been partitioned and there are other heirs to the property. Pursuing the logic of the Uys, she claims, even her sister living in Canada would be held responsible for the acts of the dog simply because she is one of Miranda‟s heirs.
However, that is hardly the point. What must be determined is the possession of the dog that admittedly was staying in the house in question, regardless of the ownership of the dog or of the house. Article 2183 reads as follows:
The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered damage.
Purita Vestil‟s testimony that she was not in possession of Miranda‟s house is hardly credible. She said that the occupants of the house left by her father were related to him (“one way or the other”) and maintained themselves out of a common fund or by some kind of arrangement (on which, however, she did not elaborate). She mentioned as many as 10 of such relatives who had stayed in the house at one time or another although they did not appear to be close kin. She at least