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From the outset, the Howard government seemed to offer a substantively different approach to foreign policy, as detailed in a Foreign Affairs and Trade White Paper, the first of its kind, in 1997. The paper contained a great deal of implicit criticism of Labor’s policy, stating from the outset that

Preparing for the future is not a matter of grand constructs. It is about the hard-headed pursuit of the interests which lie at the core of foreign and trade policy: the security of the Australian nation and the jobs and standard of living of the Australian people.162

This suggested Evans’ focus on conceptual innovation, such as ‘middle power diplomacy’, had lost sight of the underlying goals of foreign policy. Most

contentiously, the paper promised that ‘Australia does not need to choose between its history and its geography.’163 Relations with Asia did not need to be promoted at the expense of traditional links to Australia’s Anglo-American friends. Moreover, although the paper pledged ongoing attention to multilateral institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and APEC, bilateral relations were now seen as ‘the basic building block [sic] for effective regional and global strategies.’164

Accordingly, most effort would be directed to improving bilateral relations, and the importance of the US alliance was re-emphasised.

Just how substantial the realignment in Howard’s policy was, and how much

rhetorical point scoring, has become a matter of debate. For Camilleri ‘the change of

161

See Jim George, ‘Theory and practice in Australian international relations: The search for identity and security,’ in An introduction to international relations: Australian perspectives, ed. Richard Devetak, Anthony Burke, and Jim George, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 17-18, 25-26.

162

In the national interest: Australia’s foreign and trade policy White Paper, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1997, p. iii.

163

Ibid., p. iv.

164

government represented a less radical break with the past than official rhetoric would suggest.’165 Australia was still active in regional forums such as APEC and the ARF. In contrast, Dalrymple, while also affirming Howard’s continuing effort in regional forums in his first term, emphasises that the approach was based on what Howard termed ‘practical regionalism’, the pursuit of mutual interests rather than a sense that Australia ‘belonged’ in Asia in any cultural sense. Instead, Howard re-emphasised a personal attachment to the United Kingdom and America.166 Goldsworthy has also emphasised this shift, arguing that ‘continuity was not the whole story.’167 Howard had judged the pace of engagement with Asia as both unpractical and undesirable. An emphasis on ‘pragmatic bilateralism’ would provide a more secure foundation for foreign relations. This was a significant change from Labor’s approach, the depth of which was increasingly revealed in Howard’s second and third terms in office. Howard’s increased emphasis on bilateral relations was most evident in trade policy. Australia did remain involved with multilateral negotiations through APEC and the WTO. At the same time, however, and particularly in its second term, the Howard government embarked on a series of bilateral negotiations, aimed at securing Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with individual countries. Agreements were concluded with Thailand and Singapore by the end of 2003, and by the end of the Howard government discussions were underway with China, Japan, India, Malaysia and a conglomerate of Persian Gulf countries.168

Most contentiously, negotiations on the Australia United States Free Trade

Agreement (AUSTFA) were begun early in 2003, and were concluded in February 2004. The economic impact of the agreement is likely to be minimal, and both Capling and Grant have convincingly argued that its negotiation had more to do with political considerations than economic benefits. According to Capling, AUSTFA abandoned Labor’s sensible commitment to multilateral and regional trade regimes:

165

Camilleri, States, markets and civil society in Asia Pacific: the political economy of the Asia- Pacific region, p. 308.

166

Dalrymple, Continental drift: Australia’s search for a regional identity, p. 125.

167

David Goldsworthy, ‘An overview,’ in The national interest in a global era: Australia in world affairs 1996-2000, ed. James Cotton and John Ravenhill, South Melbourne, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 13.

168

Free Trade Agreements, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (accessed 09.05.2008, http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/ftas.html).

The weak economics of the case suggested that Howard’s pursuit of the free trade agreement was being driven by other motives, including Australia’s desire to strengthen its political and strategic links with the United States.169

As Grant argues, the public linkage of trade with the broader US relationship meant that any criticism of the AUSFTA was branded as ‘anti-American’, hampering debate on the intrinsic merits or otherwise of the trade agreement.170

This emphasis on ties with the US was a central component of Howard’s foreign policy agenda. In 1994, Brown mused that

It may well be that the ANZUS Treaty, though never formally abrogated, will drift into the never-never land of nominally current but practically

meaningless treaties.171

But in the 1996 election campaign, Howard promised to ‘reinvigorate’ the

relationship with the United States, a promise which he more than fulfilled. The 1997 White Paper declared that ‘Australia’s alliance relationship with the United States is an asset both redefined and strengthened by the end of the Cold War,’ and that

A key objective of the Government will be to strengthen further the relationship between Australia and the United States by expanding the already close links that exist at the bilateral, regional and multilateral levels.172

Compare this to Labor’s somewhat downbeat assessment that while the alliance continues to be a key element of our defence policy… Our defence

relationship will require careful management… we will need to work hard to make sure that the alliance continues to meet the needs of both parties.173 The true depth of Howard’s turn to the US was only revealed, however, after the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks. Howard invoked the ANZUS treaty and pledged support for US retaliation, claiming the attacks were not only against the United States but ‘an attack upon the way of life we hold dear in common with the Americans.’174 This strong support continued during the US invasion of Iraq, despite

169

Capling, All the way with the USA: Australia, the US and free trade, p. 53.

170

Grant, Fatal attraction: Reflections on the alliance with the United States, p. 134.

171

Brown, Australia’s security: issues for the new century, p. 214.

172

In the national interest: Australia’s foreign and trade policy White Paper, p. 58.

173

Defending Australia: Defence White Paper, pp. 95-96.

174

Transcript of press conference with John Howard, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, 14.09.2001 (accessed 15.09.2005, http://www.pm.gov.au/news/speeches/2001/speech1240.htm).

the largest public opposition preceding any war in Australia’s history, and opposition from major powers such as France and Germany.175

It is true that Labor also fully supported the Afghanistan deployment, and a Beazley or Latham government may well have been as supportive over Iraq, if faced with the pressures of actually controlling foreign affairs. Nonetheless, Howard confirmed the vital importance to Australia of the US alliance in spectacular fashion. The

justification for the relationship was actually not different to that under Labor; United States engagement was crucial for stability in the region, and the alliance gave Australia certain functional benefits in military/strategic terms. What was different to the Labor years was the heightened and very public emphasis on the relationship’s importance.

This rhetoric went hand in hand with a more aggressive military posture. The 2000 White Paper explicitly affirmed a willingness to deploy Australia’s military forces outside of the continent and its immediate approaches.176 This was a distinct

departure from the ‘strategy of denial’ which was at least partly implemented under Labor. Moreover, the White Paper highlighted the importance of developments in Northeast Asia, due to the centrality of Australia’s economic ties in this region, and the possibility that instability there could threaten Australia strategically. Thus, although not made fully public, the Australian military was prepared to take part in conflicts on the Korean Peninsular or in the South China Sea.177

Backing for the US alliance remained crucial to such a strategic stance, providing political and practical support for actions which inevitably draw a hostile reaction from other countries in the region. Seen through a classical realist framework,

As long as the potential use of force and relative force capabilities remain integral components of the Asia-Pacific security environment, Australia has a vital interest in maintaining a healthy politico-strategic relationship with the United States – the one power able to balance any foreseeable threat to Australia’s territorial integrity or critical maritime lifelines for the next ten to fifteen years.178

175

See Camilleri, ‘A leap into the past - in the name of the ‘national interest’.’

176

Defence 2000: Our future defence force, Department of Defence, 2000, pp. 47-52.

177

Cheeseman, ‘Facing an uncertain future: Defence and security under the Howard government,’ p. 202.

178

After the East Timor deployment, Howard’s aggressive military posture reached qualitatively new heights, as discussed in Chapter Six, but the trend was present from the beginning of his government.