INTERVENCIÓN IN SITU CON LOS DOCENTES DE LAS INSTITUCIONES

Driving Howard’s policy shift was a growing sense that Labor’s policy of

engagement with Asia had not really paid off, and that ostensibly more robust and realistic relationships were needed for troubled times. Indeed, this feeling had begun under Labor itself, resulting in some shift towards bilateralism.179 Economically, APEC had proved a major disappointment, leaving ‘the centerpiece of Australia’s regional diplomatic effort in tatters.’180 The grouping brought together countries with vastly different levels and modes of economic development, and hence with very different political objectives. The non-binding, consensus based decision making structure prevented major ruptures, but was also incapable of providing a basis for meaningful negotiations. While the 1994 Bogor summit set targets for implementing free trade, these were scheduled far into the future, and no practical steps were agreed upon. By the 1995 Osaka summit the emphasis in the conference joint communiqué was on finding a formula acceptable to the multitude of members, but which masked the lack of genuine progress.181

Strategically, tensions increased between the three great powers of the United States, Japan and China over the course of the 1990s, undermining many of the liberal assumptions of Evans’ policy of engagement. Multilateral forums including APEC and the ARF gave no indication that they would be capable of containing these tensions, which were fuelled not so much by actual conflict between the powers, as by the assumption by all parties that such conflict would be inevitable in the

future.182 This was not simply a question of a China-USA confrontation, although that was the focus of public attention. The situation was complicated by the US relationship with Japan, which, although publicly cordial, contained an underlying

179

See Goldsworthy, ‘An overview,’ p. 13.

180

Beeson, ‘American hegemony: The view from Australia,’ p. 121.

181

Camilleri, Regionalism in the new Asia-Pacific order: the political economy of the Asia-Pacific region, pp. 149-164; John Ravenhill, ‘Trade policy options beyond APEC,’ Australian Quarterly 68, no. 2 (1996), pp. 1-5.

182

For a discussion of the various views of regional powers on the potential for China-USA-Japan conflict, see Aileen San Pablo-Baviera, ‘The China factor in US alliances in East Asia and the Asia Pacific,’ 57, no. 2 (2003).

tension and was characterised by mutual distrust. In both the US and Australia, treaty relations with Japan continued to be seen as a preventive measure against Japanese as much as Chinese aggression.183

The potential for conflict between the three powers, in whatever configuration, poses a particular problem for Australia, which has substantial economic, political and strategic ties with the USA and Japan, and rapidly expanding economic ties with China. The latter had become particularly important during the 1990s, as China finally began to fulfill its long heralded economic potential. China’s share of

Australia’s exports increased from 2.6% in 1990-91 to 5.7 in 2000-01.184 Moreover, the rate of absolute increase of trade with China was easily the highest of Australia’s major trading partners in the 1990s, reaching an average of 15.3% between 1990-91 and 2000-01.185

Initially, this growing importance was not reflected in Howard’s foreign policy. Along with the reinvigorated US alliance, he moved to strengthen Australia’s relationship with Japan, casting the two countries as the northern and southern ‘anchors’ keeping the US engaged in the region. At the beginning of Howard’s first term, the strengthened alliance relationships were coupled with an aggressive posture towards China over issues such as Taiwan and human rights.186 Predictably, this drew a hostile reaction from China, which saw the Japan-Australia ‘anchors’ more as American ‘pincers’, containing its regional ambitions. In response, the Howard government followed a more conciliatory line towards China from early 1997, rhetorically emphasising ‘engagement’ rather than ‘containment’. Somewhat paradoxically, this included attempts to draw China into multilateral bodies such as APEC and the WTO, as a way of integrating China into existing frameworks of

183

See Klintworth, ‘Australian interests in the region,’ pp. 150-157.

184

See Table 1.1. China’s share of Australia’s trade spiked to 5.5% in 1960-63, but then dropped off to 1.4% in 1970-71. It then grew to reach 5.7% in 1990-91, and continued to expand thereafter.

185

Edwards and Goldsworthy, eds., Facing North: A century of Australian engagement with Asia: Volume 2: 1970s to 2000, pp. 373-374.

186

Stuart Harris, Will China divide Australia and the US? Sydney, Australian Centre for American Studies, 1998, pp. 47-52, 72-73; Leaver, ‘The economic dimension,’ p. 92; Mohan Malik, ‘Australia and China: Divergence and convergence of interests,’ in The national interest in a global era:

Australia in world affairs 1996-2000, ed. James Cotton and John Ravenhill, South Melbourne, Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 112-116; Craig Snyder, ‘Australia’s regional security environment,’ in

Australia’s security in the 21st century, ed. J Mohan Malik, St Leonards, Allen & Unwin, 1999, pp. 99-105.

international relations.187 Conceptually, this was underpinned by the description of China as ‘one of Australia’s key relationships’ in the 1997 White Paper, while removing references to China as a competitor or threat to the USA.188 Nonetheless, the fundamental contradiction between economic and strategic-political interests remained. As Malik argues,

The contradictory and ambiguous stance of the Coalition government to China’s resurgence became clear as Canberra tried both to conciliate China, stressing that it posed no threat, and to use the changing balance of power in East Asia to justify both new defence spending and a forward defence posture.189

Australia’s dilemma was highlighted in 2004-05 when the government maintained a studied ambiguity about its potential response to conflict over Taiwan, which could hardly have satisfied either of the great powers.190