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GLOBALIZACION, PROTECCIONISMO Y LIBRE COMERCIO Uno de los mas experimentos de libre comercio en la historia comenzó en Enero 1,

In document MANUAL DE POLÍTICA ECONÓMICA 1 (página 138-141)

Efecto de un impuesto selectivo

III.- GLOBALIZACION, PROTECCIONISMO Y LIBRE COMERCIO Uno de los mas experimentos de libre comercio en la historia comenzó en Enero 1,

To sum up, two main philosophical streams for explaining learning and behaviour have been explored: radical behaviourism with its emphasis on operant conditioning and cognitive psychology. Cognitive explanation seeks to understand the internal thought processes and to explore their effect on behaviour. Intentionality has been described as the power of the mind to be about, to represent (Crane, 2007), where systems are ascribed thoughts directed at something other than them- the intentional stance. At the other end, the main characteristic of radical behaviourism and operant conditioning is its avoidance of intentional explanation and the use of a behavioural language which is based on situational/ environmental influences- the contextual stance (Foxall, 2007a). These have until recently been presented as incommensurable theories of behaviour.

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Foxall, although an advocate of behaviour analysis and the proponent of radical behaviourism in consumer behaviour (Foxall, 1986; 1987), argues that the explanations provided by this stream of research is sufficient to predict behaviour in experimental settings but when applied to real situations, it ultimately fails to give a complete explanation of behaviour (Foxall, 2008a). Several aspects of human behaviour like the personal level of explanation, the continuity/ discontinuity of behaviour and the delimitation of human behaviour can better be explained by adopting intentional terms, which can help to provide a more complete and accurate explanation of behaviour.

Consequently, the imperatives of intentionality (what the use of intentional terms adds to behaviour analysis) according to Foxall (2007a; 2007b) are:

 The personal level of explanation- the distinct way each person or group experiences a situation based on their sensations and experiences.

 The continuity of behaviour- an explanation on why a behaviour which is followed by a particular reinforcing stimulus in a setting is re-enacted when encountering a similar setting.

 The delimitation of behavioural interpretation- the examination of open systems rather than focusing on closed/ experimental settings only.

As a result, intentional behaviourism has been proposed (Foxall, 2004; 2007a and b) as a way to accommodate both ways of thinking, a novel way to conduct research and ultimately to facilitate the explanation of behaviour. Based on behaviour analysis and an a-ontological conception of intentional states grounded on Dennett’s intentional stance, new ways of conceiving and researching aspects of behaviour can be crafted which can compensate for the shortcomings of the two aforementioned philosophical stances. It compensates for the shortcomings of behaviour analysis, which due to the lack of

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intentional explanation, results to the three aforementioned issues and those of cognitive explanation which taken alone results to the de-contextualisation of human behaviour.

Intentional behaviourism thus draws attention to the necessity of employing intentional mental language of beliefs and desires, intentions and propositional attitudes to account for what is happening at the personal level of explanation, and hence invokes an intentional explanation thereof. It can be used to explain operant behaviour in experimental but more importantly in real settings where intentional explanation is imperative.

In order to support and extend the interpretation of intentional behaviourism, two issues related to the nature of intentionality and its role in the explanation of behaviour should be clarified further. These two issues as deployed below are interrelated. The use of intentional language as described by Foxall (2007a; 2007b) should be perceived as a linguistic convention that carries with it no ontological implications regarding its nature (Foxall, 2007a; 2008). Intentional objects hold then an a-ontological, linguistic nature. Subjects are attributed the formation of verbal rules which are manifest when the expected influence of contingencies is lost or altered (Foxall, 2008). However this relationship is not enough to attribute causality to intentionality. It is merely to say that when an individual’s actual rule-formulation coincides with the intentions we attribute to them, their behaviour will be predictable in terms of behaviour analysis. The causes of the behaviour are still to be found in the contingencies, though the questions (1) whether the contingencies can consequently be modified by the person’s rule-making, (2) just how initiating causes of overt and covert behaviour private stimuli are and 3) which are the areas that the contextual and the intentional stance are both found to hold, remain to be answered (Foxall, 2000; Foxall, 2008). The explanation of such behaviour and the answer to these questions involve the ascription of intentionality and multiple theoretical and

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empirical endeavours (Foxall, 2007b). According to most recent theoretical arguments rules on the basis of rule-governed behaviour are constructs that can be used in accordance with both models and areas where both explanations can find a simultaneous application (Foxall, 2013; Oliveira-Castro, 2013). This faculty of rules to have a dual nature will find application in the conceptual framework of this thesis.

4.13. Conclusion

This chapter has then provided the necessary knowledge foundations for the better understanding of the propositions put forward by intentional behaviourism. It is this knowledge base that can facilitate the understanding of the conceptual framework of this thesis (chapter 6), which is based on the different approaches to exploring the Behavioural Perspective Model. One of these approaches is based on an extensional understanding (the contextual construal BPM-E) and the other on an intentional (BPM-I).

The subsequent and final chapter of literature review will focus on the description of the emotional approach by Mehrabian and Russell (1974). The application of this model to the examination of the principles of the BPM will be discussed. The variables of this model will act as the main constructs for the present study but their explanatory power will be based on their explanation and use as posited by the behavioural perspective model.

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5. MEHRABIAN AND RUSSELL’S ‘APPROACH TO

In document MANUAL DE POLÍTICA ECONÓMICA 1 (página 138-141)