Water allocation at the canal level is the second major task of water management bodies. Primarily a responsibility of the Provincial Irrigation and Drainage Authority (PIDA, previously a responsibility of the Irrigation and Power Dept.), water is allocated on the principle of warabandi, a rotational system of water distribution. This system, in theory, provides a degree of equality in terms of water supplies as each farm is entitled to a fixed amount of water once a week.634 Two types of warabandi
allocation exist, pacca warabandi – rotation fixed by the canal officer – and kacha warabandi, a temporary rotational schedule determined by the farmers in collective decision.635 Pacca warabandi is credited with reducing the opportunities for conflict
among the farmers because the schedule of water supplies is set by officials.636 It is, however, another example of supply management (as opposed to demand management) that does not take into account the status of the resource as such.
631 IBRD/IDA: Management report, op. cit., p. 41. 632 IBRD/IDA: Management report, op. cit., p. 100 – 103.
633 The gap between theory and reality is exposed by the many pledges in favour of IWRM, like
Hafeez A. Randhawa: Water development for irrigated agriculture in Pakistan: Past trends, returns and future requirements; Proceedings of the international conference Regional Consultation on Investment in Land and Water, hosted by FAO; Bangkok, 3 – 5 Oct. 2001, p. 279. When it comes to practical steps, political or status interests dominate water concerns.
634 Each farm is entitled to withdraw water from the canal once a week for a fixed period – usually up
to a full day, according to the farm size, which means that each farmer can withdraw as much water as he needs within his time frame. Cf. Don Jayatissa Bandaragoda: Design and practice of water allocation rules: lessons from warabandi in Pakistan’s Punjab; IWMI Research Report no. 17, 1998, p. 5 – 8. Cf. Fahlbusch et al.: The Indus Basin, op. cit., p. 294 – 298, 306.
635 Bhatti & Kijne: Irrigation allocation, op. cit., p. 50.
636 Ibidem. Gadi remarks that this system, introduced by the colonial administration, has replaced the
traditional community-based water allocation system, a move which has caused a wave of protests among farmers; cf. Mushtaq Gadi: Re-colonizing the Indus Basin irrigation system; in: Kaiser Bengali, ed.: The politics of managing water; Karachi: OUP, 2003, p.100.
Its lack of flexibility may lead to insufficient water supplies as well as over-supply because it does not correspond to the needs of the individual farmer, as Bhatti and Kijne point out: The rigidity implicit in the warabandi system prevents farmers from maximising private and social net benefits from scarce water.637 Kacha warabandi, in turn, reflects the individual farmer’s needs and effectively renders water supplies a collective private-sector responsibility. But both types, as Bandaragoda concludes, are based on a universal, constant flow regime, ignoring the great variations in water availability over time and space.638
The political dimension of water allocation is most acutely felt at the canal or farm level as this practice of water allocation tends to benefit large farms at the canal head disproportionately more than small farms at the tail end of the canal.639 Officially,
inequitable distribution has been termed a problem, but in practical terms reform has not altered the condition of small farmers.640 While big landowners at the canal head are in a position to convert their economic dominance into political influence, the economic situation of smaller farmers, especially at a lower canal position, is at risk.641 At the downstream canal level, the combination of lack of land and lack of water is the major determinant of poverty among farmers.642 The economic vulnerability of tail-end farmers rises with the uncertainty of getting the necessary supplies.643
This asymmetry between canal head and tail end users is a replication of the upstream – downstream discrepancy on the level of the provinces. At both levels, canal and river, the hydrological factor is exacerbated by the political factor. Though in theory, there is be no distinction between upstream and downstream water users, in reality it is always the downstream users that are prone to receive less water, with corresponding economic disadvantages. Studies have found that the widespread inequality in water supplies and the poverty among farmers resulting from it is to be blamed not only on social-economic patterns but on institutional deficits of water
637 Ibidem.
638 Bandaragoda: Design and practice, op. cit., p. 23. Fahlbusch et al. remind us that the initial
objective of the Indus irrigation system was to spread water over a maximum possible area: Henning Fahlbusch et al.: The Indus Basin, op. cit., p. 284.
639 Syed Akbar Zaidi: Issues in Pakistan’s economy; Karachi: Oxford U.P., 2005, p. 76 – 77 and 27 –
29 (on the early political status of landlords). The allocation of water on the tertiary (farm) level, by no means static, brings specific social structures (tribal affiliations, traditional legal systems) into the equation, as Abro and Shah point out, often resulting in conflict between villages: Altaf Abro & N. Shah: Water and conflict: the case of upper Sindh; in: Kaiser Bengali, ed.: The politics of managing water; Islamabad: SDPI, 2003, p. 155 – 156. For a list of similar cases: Daanish Mustafa, M. Akhter & N. Nasrallah: Unterstanding Pakistan’s water – security nexus; Peaceworks no. 88; Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2013, p. 19. Another threat to the stability of fixed allocation are illegal diversions of water, cf. Azad: Sindh water resources, op. cit., p. 23.
640 E.g. on the website of Punjab’s PIDA (as of May 2001). 641 Mustafa: Colonial law, op. cit., p. 832.
642 Zaidi: Issues, op. cit., p. 77.
643 Even in dry months, canal head farmers can expect that they will get at least some water of
allocation, too.644 Ironically, small farms are found to achieve higher water productivity than large farms, as Zaidi points out.645
Assessing the existing system of water allocation, Meinzen-Dick has discussed the potential of market mechanisms to raise water productivity and avert water shortage.646 Privatization has obvious advantages over water management that is entirely state-run. Privately controlled tubewells have on average demonstrated a higher productivity than publicly owned and operated wells as they allow more precise and more reliable irrigation.647 As most tubewells are privately owned, a market has evolved, with positive effects not only on water productivity but also on water distribution to previously disadvantaged farmers.648 The limits to groundwater use are only dictated by the rising of the water table which causes waterlogging and salinity, and the question of ownership. The latter is a case of legal pluralism as water rights in Pakistan are not clearly defined and often overlapping.649 This means that in conflicted cases ownership is a matter for negotiation.
In sum, the system of groundwater markets is highly informal, according to Meinzen- Dick. Its main advantage is that it provides water in a much more flexible way than the fixed pattern of warabandi regulation. In other words, it is demand-oriented, rather than supply-oriented.650 Dinar et al. reiterate the most important criteria from the water users’ perspective:
- flexibility in water supplies,
- security of tenure of water rights/entitlements, - equitable opportunities, and
- predictability of allocation patterns.651
644 United Nations Development Programme: Human Development Report 2006; New York: UNDP,
2006, p. 188 - 191. The report finds that people living within the basin area are as much affected by poverty as people outside the basin. In other words, while some farmers, particularly those operating at or near the canal head, enjoy economic benefits associated with the availability, for others there is no material benefit at all.
645 Zaidi: Issues, op. cit., p. 76 – 77.
646 Ruth S. Meinzen-Dick: Public, private, and shared water: groundwater markets and access in
Pakistan; in: Bryan Bruns & R. Meinzen-Dick, eds.: Negotiating water rights; Delhi: Vistaar, 2000, p. 248, 252.
647 Ibidem, p. 248.
648 Ruth S. Meinzen-Dick: Groundwater markets in Pakistan: Participation and productivity;
International Food Policy Research Institute Research Report no. 105, 1996, p. 9. The transferability, however, is limited by space: water cannot be transported over a great distance because of the heat, insufficient infrastructure and lack of lack of large vehicles; cf. Meinzen-Dick: Public, private water, op. cit., p. 259. The capital required for tubewell installation and operation can be obtained from the Agricultural Development Bank which is open to all landowning farmers; the actual access to credits is limited because of formalities which seem to deter many small farmers from applying, according to Meinzen-Dick: Groundwater markets, op. cit., p. 64.
649 Meinzen-Dick: Public, private water, op. cit., p. 258 – 259.
650 Murgai notes that warabandi is commonly adjusted informally to requirements at the farm level
whenever individual needs require farmers to do so; cf. Rinku Murgai: Skirting the rules: collective management and informal exchange of formal water rights in Pakistan; paper presented at the conference of the International Society for the Study of Common Property, Vancouver, 10 – 14 June 1998, ch. IV; http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/bitstream/handle/10535/2088/murgai.pdf?sequence=1 (July 2011).
651 Ariel Dinar, M. Rosegrant & R. Meinzen-Dick: Water allocation mechanisms – principles and
examples; World Bank Policy Research Working Paper no. 1779; Washington, D.C.: WB, 1997, p. 4 – 5.
These expectations can best be met, according to their argument, through market mechanisms. Markets as allocation modes require transparency and information in order to make trading (and saving) water profitable. The role of public water allocation should be guided by equity, sovereignty and the greater public good, that is, a general interest in economic development and prosperity.652 Major investments
in system infrastructure have to remain within the government’s responsibility. Full public authority over water allocation, however, tends to further inefficient water use, under-pricing of the commodity and misallocation.653