The discussion of the economic cost of stowaways in Chapters Two and Four has shown that stowaways pose a significant financial burden to shipping companies and their P & I Clubs. As a result, seafarers have always been encouraged to prevent stowaways from boarding their ships. A plethora of detailed guidelines and procedures have been provided to seafarers over the years to enable them to cope with the challenges of preventing stowaways. Some of the recommended practices include: controlling access to the ship from both shore and sea while the ship is berthed and at anchor; implementing an identification pass system at the ship’s gangway; roving patrols and the maintenance of a security watch; sealing off restricted areas of the ship; adequate lighting at night; a systematic stowaway search assisted by a checklist prior to departure; making use of technologies such as CCTV cameras, CO2 and heat detectors, automatic intrusion detection devices (AID) and alarm systems to detect stowaways, etc. (Parrit and Parker 1992; Holder 1997; Robertson 1997; NEPIA 2001; Miller 2009; BIMCO 2013; Jones 2014; GARD No Year). While these procedures were recommended as early as during the 1990’s, the introduction of the ISPS code (adopted on 12 December 2002, by resolution 2 of the conference of contracting governments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 1974 (IMO 2014b, p. 375)), formalised these procedures and rendered them mandatory. For instance, a publication by the Nautical Institute titled ‘Stowaways by Sea: Illegal Immigrants-Refugees-Asylum Seekers’, published a decade earlier than the ISPS mentions of a ‘ship security plan’ in relation to stowaways.
Once a company has decided to make a serious attempt to stop stowaways, the first step is to compile a ship security plan. This has the great advantage that the plan can also be used to fulfil IMO and governmental requirements against terrorism and the smuggling of illegal drugs. The security plan should blend together routine crew protection procedures, gangway duties, searching techniques, duties and responsibilities of security guards, locks, CCTV and alarms plus any other overt or covert protection methods which are suitable for the particular vessel. Once in place, the security plan has to be used with common sense. When the threat is high, the measures should be applied with discipline. As soon as the threat is reduced, so should the
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security measures be reduced. High security measures cannot be maintained effectively by a crew for a period of longer than three days. (Parrit and Parker
1992)
This excerpt is interesting not only for mentioning ‘ship security plan’ which is an important topic within the ISPS code, but also the allusion it makes to ‘security levels’ which later came to be clearly stipulated in the code. A publication by the International Maritime Bureau is more revealing. The ‘Anti-Stowaway Plan’ stipulated, has strong resonance with the general security measures detailed in the ISPS code. The ‘Anti-Stowaway Plan’ includes practices such as ‘imposition of access controls to the vessel and restricted areas on board’, implementing an ‘identification pass system’, conducting security patrols, maintaining gangway watch, adjusting security measures to the assessed risk, etc. (Holder 1997, p. 244). Furthermore, long before the ISPS code formalised the practice of assigning Ship Security Officer (SSO) on board, the same publication mentioned the concept exclusively for the purpose of preventing stowaways.
Fundamental to the success of any anti-stowaway plan is the appointment of a Ship Security Officer who is responsible for the operation and maintenance of measures to prevent stowaways getting on board. (Holder 1997, p. 244)
While it is not surprising that these practical guidelines are later included in the code, the point emphasised here is when it specifically comes to the issue of stowaways, most of the security measures were already recommended to seafarers through such publications. However, following ISPS’s formalisation of these and other expansive security measures, the presence of stowaways on board now formally constitutes a breach in ships’ as well as ports’ security. This arguably could be considered incompliance with mandatory security provisions of the code. It is now a standard and mandatory practice to implement at least the basic security measures stipulated in Part A of the ISPS code (IMO 2003).
Despite all these guidelines and procedures, preventing stowaways is not an easy task for seafarers. Responsibility for the initial prevention resides with officials in charge of security measures in and around the port. Annex 4, number 4.3.1.1 of the FAL Convention stipulates that countries should ensure that ‘the necessary infrastructure, and operational and security arrangements for the purpose of preventing persons attempting to stowaway on board ships from gaining access to port installations and to ships, are established in all their ports […]’. Annex 4, number 4.3.1.2 further recommends specific steps the authorities can take to deter
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stowaways (IMO 2011a, pp. 37-38). The ISPS code, which is concerned with security issues as opposed to the facilitation of maritime traffic, which is the purview of the FAL Convention, addresses the whole gamut of ship and port security. While it does not specifically focus on stowaways per se but rather on the wider issues of security, it gives important emphasis to preventing unauthorised access in detailing provisions of what ports should do to prevent access by unauthorised personnel including stowaways.
Part A section 14.2 of the ISPS code makes it very clear that ports should ‘control access to the port facility’, ‘monitor the port facility, including anchoring and berthing areas’, and also ‘monitor restricted areas to ensure that only authorized persons have access’ (IMO 2003, p. 16). Section 16.3.2 of Part A also dictates that a port facility security plan should address, among other things, ‘measures designed to prevent unauthorized access to the port facility, to ships moored at the facility, and to restricted areas of the facility’ (IMO 2003, p. 18). Part B of the code section 16.17.5 also recommends that at Security Level 1, which is the minimum security level, measures should be maintained at all times and access should be restricted to those employed by the port facility or working within it (IMO 2003, p. 74). It further recommends in section 16.21 that restricted areas should be established to ‘protect ships using, and serving, the port facility’ and that restricted areas should have ‘clearly established security measures to control access by individuals’ (section 16.22.1). It also stipulates in section 16.25 that restricted areas may include ‘shore and waterside areas immediately adjacent to the ship’ (IMO 2003, pp. 75-76). ISPS, thus, unambiguously points out the responsibility of ports in preventing stowaways from getting access to the ships in the first place.
Despite the implementation of ISPS, P & I Club sources indicate that the ports that are prone to stowaways remained the same, namely ports of North, South, East and West Africa, certain South American ports as well as ports in the Caribbean (StandardP&I 2009; GARD 2010; IGP&I 2010, 2013; NEPIA 2015). Certain ports in Asia as well as in Europe, such as Le Havre and Zeebrugge, have also been identified as ports where stowaways regularly board ships (NEPIA 2001; StandardP&I 2009; Porter 2010; WestOfEngland No Year). There needs to be a case by case study of each port to identify reasons why these ports experience frequent stowaway embarkations. However, the obvious reason is the presence of many individuals attempting to stow away from these ports. In such circumstances, there is an acknowledgement that there is a limitation on how much ports can do to prevent stowaways from having access to their premises. For instance, one deputy claims director of a P & I Club said the following about limitations of securing ports and the impact of the ISPS:
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In our experience, [ISPS] hasn’t really affected how many stowaways come on board. Other reasons might impact on why stowaways come on board. But overall, the ports where stowaways are most likely to come on board, and again, Africa, South America, various countries like that, you’re talking about often miles and miles and miles of fencing, and it’s almost impossible for one port to keep everything patrolled and secure. So it doesn’t make that much of a difference in itself. I think perhaps pass systems within the port, so stevedores having identification, that being monitored more carefully, maybe is helping a little bit. Ramifications locally for stevedores or companies who may be assisting in coming on board, I think perhaps is helping a little bit. But certainly, the ISPS on its own has not meant the end of stowaways. (Sarah, deputy claims director, P & I Club A)
One P & I Club correspondent based in South Africa also shared a conversation he had with personnel responsible for port security. After observing the success at Richard’s Bay port in preventing stowaways, he inquired why this could not be duplicated in other major South African ports, such as Durban and Cape Town.
I had a couple of meetings with them previously and saying, ‘well, why can’t you duplicate what you do in Richards Bay to Durban and Cape Town and other ports?’ And their biggest problem is that they have so many access points. And they have a lot more labour and traffic moving through the port. And Richards Bay is basically a bulk port. So, they don’t handle a lot of general cargo as such, [and] so all of the labour et cetera is fairly limited. So no one that doesn’t have a permit can come in the port. Whereas Durban, it’s very labour intensive on certain docks that have private access, et cetera, et cetera. And that is very difficult to control the whole port. And whereas in Richards Bay, two access points, that's it. (Robert, P & I Correspondent,
SA)
One owner of a stowaway search company operating in South African ports also explained this limitation further.
If your ship calls Maydon wharf, you know, the sugar loading facilities, et cetera, if it goes to Maydon wharf 5 or 6, I can almost guarantee it will have a stowaway on board. The main reason Durban’s Maydon wharf is so
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notorious is due to the high number of access points owing to the numerous rail sidings and road access points to this wharf. Secondly it is also the nearest point to where the stowaways live in Durban, namely the underground train tunnels bordering the Maydon wharf area. So, there are sort of safer berths. Before, the container terminal, it was very secure and there were no stowaways. And then suddenly, they started popping up. So there’s no such thing as a safe berth, but there are berths that are notoriously dangerous. Cape Town, Landing wharf, where they do the bunkering. I mean, that’s a hollow berth. [Stowaways] come through the tunnel and then they climb through the fenders […]. The problem is that the bunkering berth where stowaways are common is hollow with a tunnel running through it from the main road. Furthermore, there are a lot of abandoned or arrested vessels in the vicinity where stowaways often hide in or take refuge prior boarding vessels in the port. (Phillip, stowaway search company, SA)
As the above quotes indicate, certain ports are difficult to completely secure due to the geography and the type of activity that takes place. A Captain who had a lot of experience calling at West African ports also pointed out similar issues.
The worst ports are those with no control, which you can understand why. Lagos has a river port and so has Abidjan. Huge lagoon. You could see the camps on the other side, and there's canoes around all day long and guys in boats. It's a huge problem for Nigeria and Ivory Coast, because of their river ports, to control the traffic on the riverside. They might control the traffic on...Abidjan was quite good controlling access to the quay, was quite strict. But controlling the riverside was impossible. (Capt. Smith, British)
Hence, because of such limitations in securing the ports completely, the focus has shifted to access control at what is called the ‘ship/port interface’ which is ‘the interactions that occur
when a ship is directly and immediately affected by actions involving the movement of persons, goods or the provisions of port services to or from the ship’ (IMO 2014b, p. 375). What this
effectively does is shift the focus of security interventions to the ship. The following account from a port security officer captures this perfectly.
If you got five kilometres of fencing, where am I going to get 50 guards to patrol it? That’s impossible. Economically, doesn’t make sense. So what we
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do is we do have the patrols to deter. We got the access control to make sure that you get everybody that comes through. And then all we ask from the vessel when they come into our port is implement their security plan. Your security plan is very easy. You’ve got a gangway security, you’ve got aft and forward. So there are three points of entry on your vessel. So, make sure that you have people there. Put a person forward, one on the rear, one on the gangway. No one will board your vessel. But the ships try to save money. They don’t do it. (John, port security officer, SA)
In the case of South Africa, this shift in security interventions to the ‘ship/port interface’ is even starker as we have seen in Chapter Four where ship owners are made responsible not just for ‘stowaways’ but also ‘attempted stowaways’, as construed through the legal distinctions. What this shift in security interventions to the ship does is to exacerbate the challenges seafarers face in managing security obligations vis-à-vis their commercial commitments.