Goteo y Acolchado para producir chile para secar

Previously, the Equality Act 2006 (EqA 2006) contained a variety of religious exceptions from religion or belief discrimination. The most relevant concerned ‘organisations relating to religion or belief’:40

this is continued under the EqA 201041

although not applying to organisations that are commercial.42 Under the EqA 2010

36_{S. 202, with the definition of religious premises found in s. 202(4)(3C).} 37 _{S. 202(4)(3A).}

38

See: <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/equalities/lgbt/>, accessed 21st August 2011.

39 _{SI 2011/2661.}

40_{S. 57.}

41_{Schedule 23, para. 2.} 42

such organisations have to have as their purpose the same aims as those of organisations relating to religion or belief seeking exceptions from sexual orientation discrimination.43 Under the EqA 2006 an additional requirement was included whereby the organisation had to ‘improve relations, or maintain good relations, between persons of different religions or beliefs’.44

The EqA 2010 maintains this45 although its wording may be slightly more generous to organisations of religion or belief in that the requirement now is to merely to ‘foster or maintain good relations between persons of different religions or beliefs’.46

As with the religious exception in sexual orientation discrimination under the EqA 2010 both organisations and ministers may restrict the provision of goods and services on grounds of religion or belief.

The exception in the EqA 2006 could be successfully claimed only if the basis of an organisation’s claim was either ‘by reason of or on the grounds of the purpose of the organisation’,47

or ‘in order to avoid causing offence, on the grounds of the religion of belief to which the organisation relates, to persons of that religion’.48

These alternative tests were notably different in scope from those which had to be established by religious bodies in successfully claiming religious exceptions in sex and sexual orientation discrimination. For example, the ‘purpose’ of an organisation was apt to broader interpretation. This test is simplified further by the EqA 2010: it is now defined as ‘because of the purpose of the organisation’.49

The second alternative test is ‘to avoid causing offence, on grounds of the religion or belief to which the organisation relates, to persons of that religion or belief’.50 It is presumed this will have to be interpreted with a degree of subjectivity concerning what ‘persons of that religion or belief’ would find offensive which is likely to create problems of definition for the courts. There are few safeguards in place to prevent the test of ‘avoid causing offence, on the grounds of the religion or belief to which the organisation relates, to persons of that religion or belief’, from being interpreted potentially generously when operation of the exception reaches the domestic courts.

43_{Ibid., para. 2(1).}

44_{S. 57(1)(e).}

45_{Schedule 23, para. 2(1)(e).} 46

Ibid (emphasis added).

47_{S. 57(5)(a).} 48_{S. 57(5)(b).}

49_{Schedule 23, para. 6(a).} 50

The EqA 2010 contains further religious exceptions. For example, charities may require members, or persons wishing to become members, to make a statement which asserts or implies membership or acceptance of a religion or belief.51 Pursuant to this, charities may also provide benefits, including the provision of goods and services, only to persons of a particular religion or belief.52 Moreover, there also exist religious exceptions for schools in the goods and services provision context. The EqA 2006 provided that it was not unlawful for an educational institution, established or conducted for the purpose of providing education relating to, or within the framework of, a specified religion or belief, to restrict the provision of goods or services.53 This is repeated in the EqA 2010 although there is a restriction of the types of relevant provisions. These are expressly confined to matters such as curriculum, admission and acts of worship.54 Furthermore, both schools with a religious character55 and institutions with a religious ethos56 are exempt from their otherwise respective duties not to discriminate on, amongst other grounds, religion or belief in admissions.

5. CONCLUSION

Overall, these exceptions are both narrow and ‘the same in substance as the old law’.57

Arguably, as with the exceptions in employment, ‘it is likely that the narrowness of the exceptions will be continued to be stressed until the exceptions narrow to the extent that they cease to exist’.58

Others have argued that the restricted nature of the exceptions should be expected. For example, Roberts has contended that ‘it was clear from the outset ... that the Government intended the exception for religious organisations to be as narrow as possible’.59

This may prove to be overly negative given that attention in this chapter has been drawn to some of the ways in

51

S. 193(5). The charitable instrument must allow for this: s. 193(1)(a).

52_{S. 193(5).} 53_{S. 59(1)(a).} 54

Schedule 3, para. 11.

55_{Schedule 11, Part 2, para. 5(1).} 56_{Schedule 12, Part 2, para. 5(1).}

57 _{R. Sandberg, ‘The Right to Discriminate’ (2011) 13 Ecclesiastical Law Journal 157, p. 178.}

58_{Ibid., p. 179.}

59

P. Roberts, ‘Religion and Discrimination: balancing interests within the anti-discrimination

framework’ in N. Doe and R. Sandberg (eds.) Law and Religion: New Horizons (Leuven: Peeters,

2010), p. 86 (Roberts argues this in relation to religious exceptions to sexual orientation discrimination, although it is arguably true of the religious exceptions to sex and religion or belief discrimination too).

which religious exceptions in goods and services may be broader than at first blush (it may also be noted that they do not contain a proportionality requirement)60. Nevertheless, irrespective of how the narrowly or broadly the exceptions may eventually be interpreted, there is no escaping the haphazard nature of the definitions, tests and concepts used to draft them. The circumstances in which an exception can be used are highly limited – their use effectively being restricted, as in employment, to religious bodies as opposed to individuals – meaning they serve little practical use in more everyday situations when those with a religious faith may seek particular individual treatment.

60 _{This is not required under EU law in relation to exceptions in goods and services provision given}

CHAPTER 6: REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION AND THE