Gráficos en la IHM

As has been explored in section 5.2 addressing the writ of the state, the state in Afghanistan has been in a condition of crisis of legitimacy for most of its history. The state, as an identity and as institutions, has failed to displace the primacy of tribally based identity, authority, adjudication and territoriality which are predominant in the south and east of Afghanistan, particularly in the borderland. In contrast, Anderson (1979: 67) observes that it is the tribe that has been able to penetrate and in cases manipulate the institutions of state to further tribal interests, resulting in a perpetuation of the failure of the state to assimilate the tribe.76 In the central highlands and north of the country, however, the state has historically had an impact and continues to do so currently. This has been attributed to the fact that the population in the north tends to be predominantly non-Pashtun, exhibiting a less clearly defined segmentary patrilineal culture than the Pashtun in the south. Hence, the northern population tends not to exhibit enduring pre-state structures of polity on a tribal level, creating fewer obstacles for assimilation into the state in comparison to the Pashtun. The numerical inferiority of each of the Tajik, Uzbek and Hazarajat populations vis-à-vis the Pashtun has tended to create a perception among these minority populations, of the state as a vehicle through which to project political influence to counter the numerical domination of Afghanistan by the Pashtun. Structures of the Afghan state, therefore, have always reflected a notable presence of Tajik participants, although the executive function has remained exclusively Pashtun since the tenure of Amir Abdur-Rahman (1880-1901).

Currently, southern and eastern Afghanistan are characterised by the absence of the state. Any semblance of effective administration is limited to Kabul, Jalalabad and Kandahar. Cities in northern Afghanistan manifest a comparatively more effective presence of the state than in the south.77 The cities of Kunduz, Badghis, Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif78 have emerged from the

76 _{This observation was further supported by Dr. Shaista Wahab, in discussions at Omaha, Nebraska}

during December 2008, where Dr. Wahab highlighted the resurgence of Ghilzai authority through Afghan state between 1978 and 1992.

77

Rajiv Chandrasekaran „7 U.S. Troops Killed in Attacks in Afghanistan‟ 6th July,

2009;http://www.washingpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/06/AR2009070600191.html . Accessed 30th January, 2011.

78 _{Although Mazar-e-Sharif has been relatively peaceful and has seen the widespread presence of}

179

post-2001 break down of authority that resulted from the US and NATO led invasion of Afghanistan and do manifest the presence of the Afghan state through structures of civil administration.79 However, the provinces of Kunar, Nangarhar, Paktiya, Paktika, Khost, Ghazni, Zabul, Uruzgan, Helmand, Kandahar and many of the areas surrounding Kabul continue to be characterised by the absence of any effective administration and the absence of the writ of the state.80 In these provinces, almost all structures providing human developmental assistance are NGOs. The ministry of health has effectively relinquished its function to NGOs81 which operate with little or no support from the Afghan government, often in danger of reprisal from militias who see them as an instrument of NATO intervention.82 There is a Ministry of Tribal Affairs, recently renamed as the Ministry of Tribal and Border Affairs,83 but since 2010, it has been eclipsed in function by the Ministry for Refugees. The Ministry of Tribal and Border Affairs is now practically defunct, a fitting metaphor for the presence of the Afghan state amongst the predominantly Ghilzai clans in the vicinity of the Durand Line and Durrani clans in southern Kandarhar province.

The ethno-linguistic and tribal barriers to state consolidation in Afghanistan are compounded by constitutionally mandated centralism. Article one hundred thirty seven of Afghanistan’s 2003 constitution states that, in the context of delegating authority to local government, it seeks to preserve the principle of centralism.84 This is in response to the serious threat of fragmentation along a north-south divide facing the country in the aftermath of the failure of the mujahideen government and the Taliban. However, the centralism of the Afghan state

Cross „Conspiracy theories blossom as violence increases in northern Afghanistan‟17th _November,

2009; http://www.rfi.fr/actuen/articles/119/article_5872.asp . Accessed 29th January, 2011.

79

This is manifest in projects as wide ranging as the construction of a new airport (See: Ministry of transport and Civil Aviation Islamic Republic of Afghanistan; http://www.motca.v.af/?id=104 accessed 23rd January, 2011), and support to the provincial judiciary (See: „Unit Nations Development

Programme Afghanistan Support to Provincial Justice Coordination Mechanism‟;

http://www.undp.org.af/Projects/Justice/PJCM_Q308_Report.pdf accessed 23rd January 2011).

80 _{See Ahmed Rashid „Afghanistan: Taleban‟s second coming‟ 2}nd _{June, 2006;}

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/5029190.stm. Accessed 24th January, 2011.

81 _{World Bank Report „Afghanistan Building an Effective State‟ 10}th _{June, 2008;}

http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/0,,contentMDK:21 799277~pagePK:146736~piPK:146830~theSitePK:223547,00.html. Accessed 12th February, 2011.

82 _{Discussion with representative of the Afghan NGO Safety Office, an EU initiative in Afghanistan,}

who wishes to remain anonymous.

83

The Ministry of Tribal and Border Affairs appeared to have no practical function, not even

addressing the perennial conflicts between migrant Kuchi tribes and the Hazarajat whose lands through which they migrate, an issue ostensibly under the jurisdiction of the ministry. See: Fabrizio Foschini „The Kuchi-Hazara Conflict, Again‟ 17th _{May, 2010; http://www.aan-}

afghanistan.org/index.asp?id=764. Accessed 16th March, 2011. Its minister, Abdul Karim Brahui is a valuable Baluch ally of Karzai, and it appears he is being maintained in an administrative role as a political imperative.

84 _{The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Secretariat of the Constitutional}

functions to impede the development of provincial authority, thereby rendering political and social reforms as centrally mandated. Such centrally mandated provisions are invariably regarded by the tribal Pashtun southerners as an interference by, and imposition of, Kabul based rivals in their affairs.

Another major challenge to the effective establishment of the writ of the state beyond those major cities in the north and Kabul where the state does have a decisive presence, is the dynamic of informal power structures and relationships. Such relationships continue to dominate the political medium in Afghanistan, 85 reducing the effectiveness of institutionalisation of power and influence through transparent structures. These relationships are predominantly tribal and clan in nature, and are considered to represent the actual dynamics of power and authority in Afghanistan. However, this informal dynamic involves the Durrani disproportionately vis-à-vis the Ghilzai. Unlike the Durrani, from whom almost all of Afghanistan’s rulers over the last two centuries have been, the Ghilzai are resistant to the emergence of representation beyond the level of clan (Anderson 1979: 216). This makes it very difficult to assimilate Ghilzai tribesmen into even the informal structures of power. Thus the Afghan state faces tribally based resistance to its writ, predominantly amongst the Ghilzai, impeding the establishment of effective state administration across the borderland and the larger region of Ghilzai presence in the south and east of the country. The failure of the state to establish its effective writ is exacerbated by deep ethno-linguistically based divisions amongst the constituent minorities in Afghanistan, each concentrated in a separate area of the country. The insistence of the state on a centralist political culture, derived from fears of division along ethno-linguistic lines, is functioning to further distance the south from the centre. Concerns of Ghilzai tribesmen in the south over external interference in tribal and clan autonomy are bolstered by the existence of informal power structures that are non- transparent, and tend to be dominated by the Durrani.