How to present the movement publicly is an important strategic dilemma of visibility in the Namibian and South African lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) social movement organizations (SMOs) I studied. By public presentation, I mean how a social movement organization projects itself to target constituencies and audiences, usually in an effort to gain support (Bob 2005). Without a public presentation that resonates with target constituencies and audiences, SMOs can lapse into invisibility and find it difficult to identify audiences they can influence or constituencies from which to recruit (Benford and Snow 2000). For example, feminist activists in the United States in the 1950s found it difficult to advance women’s rights amid political and social conservatism, specifically public antifeminist attacks. In this hostile environment and amid media outlets’ unfavorable portrayal of feminist leaders and organizations, some feminist activists retreated from public view (Rupp and Taylor 1987:18-23). A public presentation that grips the attention of a constituency or audience can enable SMOs to widen their base of support, extending their visibility to different audiences.
The dilemma of public presentation can be especially vexing for social movement organizations that advocate for unpopular political or social change or that operate in a repressive sociopolitical environment. Prior social movement scholarship demonstrates that it is difficult for social movement organizations to garner support within a hostile or repressive sociopolitical environment (Blee 2002; Earl 2003; Johnston 2006; Koopmans 2004; Koopmans and Olzak 2004; Linden and Klandermans 2006; Tamale 2007). SMOs whose messages and goals are at odds with social convention may find it hard to garner public attention or to sustain dialogues with chosen audiences. In such cases, SMOs sometimes seek out favorable media coverage or publicity in order to generate support for the movement. Kathleen M. Blee (2002) explains that some women who participated in racist movements in the United States volunteered to be
interviewed in the hope of correcting, in their view, unsympathetic and “superficial media reports” (p. 10, see also Blee 2006).
Public presentation is one element of a social movement framing strategy (Benford and Snow 2000). By “framing,” I mean how SMOs “fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves” to “legitimate and motivate collective action” (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996:6; qtd. in Miceli 2005:595). In particular, framing theory usefully elaborates how SMOs assemble messages for particular audiences and demonstrates how messages “resonate” with audiences and constituencies (Miceli 2005; Snow and Benford 1992). How to frame an SMO and present it publicly is a strategic dilemma that some SMOs encounter. SMOs’ success in recruiting and retaining members can hinge on organizations’ public articulation of an attractive, appealing goals and mission with which individuals want to be associated (Friedman and McAdam 1992). In this sense, projecting a movement publicly that is coherent and unified can benefit SMOs by garnering them continued support from target constituencies and audiences.
In this chapter, I explore how Namibian and South African LGBT social movement organizations approached the strategic dilemma of publicly portraying (framing) a pan-African LGBT movement. Namibian and South African LGBT social movement organizations faced the same strategic dilemma of public presentation: whether and how to respond to the charge that homosexuality was unAfrican, a public assertion antigay opponents had increasingly made since the mid-1990s (TRP staff member, interview, 11 July 2006, see also Aarmo 1999; Hoad 2007; Mathuray 2000; Phillips 2001). Not to respond might allow antigay opponents to interpret organizational silence as success in suppressing LGBT organized resistance and as validation for their position. Yet responding could put them at risk for hostile reactions from opponents, as “visibility makes for an excellent target” (Weston 1997:xiii).
Namibian and South African LGBT SMOs confronted the claim that homosexuality was unAfrican on their own soil. Though the South African state had been receptive to LGBT rights, some state leaders openly expressed the view that homosexuality was unAfrican. Most recently, in September 2006, former Deputy Vice-President Jacob Zuma “condemned . . . same-sex marriages, saying they are ungodly and against African tradition” (Memela 2006). Namibian LGBT SMOs also routinely faced public statements from state leaders that homosexuality was unAfrican. As recently as September 2005, Deputy Minister of Home Affairs and Immigration Theopolina Mushelenga publicly stated at a ceremony commemorating fallen national liberation
and anticolonial heroes, “Sexual intercourse between people of the same sex is disgraceful according to our African culture” (Graig 2005). In the same speech, she also blamed gays and lesbians for HIV/AIDS (Graig 2005). Her antigay comments elicited calls from Sister Namibia and The Rainbow Project for Mushelenga to resign.
The Namibian and South African LGBT social movement organizations I studied recognized that this dilemma also had an international dimension. Namibian and South African LGBT social movement organizational staff and members were concerned about a possible growing backlash against LGBT organizing throughout Africa. Thus, Namibian and South African LGBT organizations found ways to forge connections with other African LGBT activists and social movement organizations. By helping struggling LGBT organizations in other African countries, such as Kenya and Uganda, Namibian and South African LGBT organizational staff hoped that they could generate a unified pan-African LGBT movement. If the movement existed in enough African countries, they decided, antigay opponents would find it difficult to ignore African sexual and gender minority organizing and to sustain the claim that homosexuality was unAfrican. Using ethnographic and interview data, I explore how Namibian and South African LGBT SMOs navigated the strategic dilemma of public presentation, specifically by proving that homosexuality was African. First, I examine how Behind the Mask and The Rainbow Project approached the strategic dilemma of being perceived as unAfrican for soliciting and accepting funds from Northern donors. Second, I consider how leaders from Behind the Mask, Sister Namibia, and The Rainbow Project, along with other Zimbabwean and South African LGBT activists, navigated the strategic dilemma of publicly presenting a pan-African LGBT movement to the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Third, I explore how leaders from Behind the Mask, Sister Namibia, and The Rainbow Project approached the strategic dilemma of whether to include transgender persons in the pan-African LGBT activist contingent that would attend the African Commission.