Indeed, the EU and ASEAN disputed over human rights and the East Timor issue not only because their normative natures became divergent from each other after the end of the Cold War. They clashed also because one group’s core norms were refused or violated by the other. From what has been examined so far, it is evident that the more the EU insisted the promotion of human rights, the firmer ASEAN was in its response to the EU’s posture. ASEAN was firmly resisted to the EU’s demand partly because, as
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noted by an Asian scholar, it “had leaders such as Mahathir Mohamad, who did not want the West to impose their values on them and were not afraid to stand up against the EU” (Interview, 2009). It questioned why the EU had become so preoccupied with democracy and human rights because “these same European countries had paid scant attention to democracy or human rights to their Asian subjects during the colonial period. Much the same could have been said about the Cold War period, when Western countries supported authoritarian regimes as long as they were opposed to communism” (Gupwell 2003: 67).
As noted, ASEAN even went further and challenged the whole notion of human rights by disapproving of the UDHR as a Western document because it was formulated when many Asian/ASEAN nations did not even exist (Tay and Goh 1999: 46). This is reflected by the fact that prior to the World Conference on Human Rights in June 1993, ASEAN members sought to bring other Asian countries, notably China, for an intergovernmental meeting in March 1993 in Bangkok (Freeman 1996; 1999). At that meeting, they formulated a Declaration on Human Rights, known as the Bangkok Declaration (1993). In this declaration, while reaffirming their commitment to principles contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, they emphasised their particular understanding of, and approach to, human rights (Freeman 1999: 104-5). For instance, though recognising that the universality of human rights, they stressed that human rights “must be considered in the context of a dynamic and evolving process of international norm-setting, bearing in mind the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds” (Bangkok Declaration 1993; point 8). More importantly, they emphasised the principles of respect for national sovereignty, non-interference in other states’ internal affairs, as well as the non-use of human rights as an instrument of political pressure (Bangkok Declaration 1993, points 4 and 5).
ASEAN’s effort to socialise with other Asian countries as well as its reliance to its core norms of national sovereignty and non-interference to defy the EU on the human rights issue not only showed ASEAN’s confidence in its norms to guide its external relations and its relations with the EU. It also illustrated that it succeeded in creating a broader Asian ‘we-group’ based on its preferred normative framework, which was state- focused, e.g. national sovereignty and non-interference, to distinguish it from as well as to resist a ‘they-group’, i.e. the West and the EU, which was individual-centred, e.g. human rights and fundamental freedoms. More significantly, this example clearly
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demonstrated that the EU and ASEAN were now in a ‘we-group’ versus ‘they-group’ relationship, in which the EU considered, either intentionally or unintentionally, ASEAN as a violator of universal principles or inferior to it and, consequently, sought to export its liberal norms to ASEAN. In contrast, ASEAN vigorously opposed the EU, regarding its assertion on human rights as a new moralism or a neo-colonialism (Yeo 2009a: 48). That insistence versus resistance dichotomy was the fundamental reason behind their disputes over human rights and the East Timor matter, which resulted in creating a stalemate in their cooperation.
Overall, there were three related reasons why the EU and ASEAN clashed over human rights and the East Timor issue in the 1990s. The first concerns the differences of their normative natures, which became salient in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War. The EU was fundamentally premised on a set of liberal cosmopolitan or individual-centred values, e.g. human rights whereas ASEAN was founded on a set of communitarian or state-centric principles, e.g. non-interference. Second, given their own normative nature, the EU was willing to promote its norms to the point of interfering into others’ domestic politics to make sure that its preferred norms were respected. ASEAN was opposed to the EU because that posture of the EU violated the core of its normative cultural. Such opposing postures compounded the disagreements between the two organisations and led them to clash. A third reason for their disputes was the fact that the end of the Cold War not only made their inherent normative differences surface. It also broke the anti-communist bond they shared during the Cold War. Consequently, the two organisations were, to a certain degree, politically disconnected from each other. In fact, as seen, not only did some leaders of ASEAN members, e.g. Malaysia’s Mahathir Mohamad and Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew reject the liberal values promoted by West and the EU. They also promoted their own values, namely the ‘Asian values’, to challenge the Western/European values.
In brief, the examination of the East Timor issue has highlighted a number of important points. Some of these are worth mentioning here. First, by the early 1990s, the EU and ASEAN emerged as two remarkable norm entrepreneurs and normative powers, whose regional and international policies were predominantly norm-based and guided. The defining difference was that the value-systems, which they were founded on as well as sought to advocate were divergent from each other. While the former espoused a set of individual-oriented values, the latter preferred a set of state-centred principles. Second, their normative differences became salient in the 1990s because the
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end of the Cold War not only made their inherent differences, which were rooted in their own historical and cultural background, surface. Many changes within the EU and ASEAN as well as at the international level after the winding down of the Cold War also compounded their normative differences. This means that their regional and international factors defined their respective normative underpinnings and made them divergent from each other. Third, such differences were the reason behind their disagreement over the human rights issue and the East Timor matter in particular and these disputes eventually hindered their interaction. In other words, they disputed partly because of the differences of their normative natures. The EU primarily emphasised individual rights and freedoms whereas ASEAN stressed the importance of collective rights and state sovereignty. Coupled with – or more precisely because of – the differences of their normative premises, they did not accept each other’s preferred norms and this intensified their tensions. While the EU fervently insisted on the respect of its liberal and democratic norms, ASEAN firmly opposed that insertion because it regarded such an act violated its core norm of non-interference. Because of this, they could not find a common solution to the East Timor issue, which resulted in jeopardising their relations in the 1990s. Fourth, the negative consequences that their normative differences brought to their relations illustrate that their conflicting norms were conducive to preventing their cooperation. In addition, it demonstrates that not only EU-ASEAN relations reinforced the identities or norms of the EU and ASEAN. The normative dimensions of the two organisations also shaped the nature, form and outcome of their interregional interaction. In short, the East Timor case supports very well the key hypotheses of the thesis, notably the (1), (2), (3a), (3b), (3c), (3e) and (3f) propositions, which were formulated at the end of Chapter 2. The next chapter, which focuses on the Myanmar problem, will further illustrate these points.