Chief among those factors is its historical context. In fact, like European integration, the EU’s identity and its norms, ASEAN regionalism, its identity and normative underpinnings have been influentially shaped by Southeast Asia’s historical background. The primary difference is that for the former, it is Europe’s war-torn past whereas for the latter, it is its colonial experience. Such difference is also a defining factor that makes the EU and its norms radically differ from ASEAN and its normative foundation. It also makes regionalism in (Western) Europe and Southeast Asia diverges from each other. As noted by Yeo (2009b: 195), for the former, “regionalism is seen as a restraining force against ultranationalism and a building block towards a new level of governance through the pooling of sovereignty”. In contrast, for the latter, “regionalism will be tailed to complement and strengthen nationalism not replace it”.
Southeast Asia’s colonialism as a defining factor leading to ASEAN’s formation and its ‘ASEAN way’ is widely recognised (Beeson 2002: 550; Katsumata 2003: 112; Nishikawa 2007: 44; Yeo 2009b: 194). In Southeast Asia, all countries, except Thailand, had been colonised and had recently gained their independence. As they had never experienced sovereign statehood (Wunderlich 2007: 73), and even for them, “the concept of a frontier was uncommon, if not unknown” (Tarling 1998: 47), sovereignty has been obviously cherished (Gilson 2011: 236). Furthermore, as they had to fight very hard – in some cases, bloody and deadly wars – against their colonial masters to gain their independence (Yeo 2009b: 194), it is unsurprising that “the region’s first and foremost principle is protection of sovereignty” (Nishikawa 2007: 44). In other words, perhaps like other countries in the Third Word, ASEAN states’ particular commitment to the norm of sovereignty was first developed out of a drawn-out struggle for independence and sovereign equality in international society (Busse 1999: 46; Haacke 2003: 31). Indeed, the genesis of the ASEAN way “is best conceived as both a nationalist struggle and the outcome of a longstanding struggle for recognition and security” (Haacke 2005: 51). It is for this reason that ASEAN states placed a particular emphasis on the principle of non-interference (Katsumata 2003: 112), which has become a guiding principle for ASEAN (Henderson 1999: 16-17), and that “institutional design in ASEAN remains wedded to state sovereignty” (Khong and Nesadurai 2007: 33). Briefly, given their preoccupation with sovereignty, ASEAN
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states were and are still unwilling to allow other member states or external powers to interfere into their internal affairs.
Coupled with their particular emphasis on sovereignty, Southeast Asian countries were also concerned about their domestic stability. This factor defined their interaction and their adoption of the ASEAN way as the mode of function for their relations (Katsumata 2003: 113). The fundamental reason behind their preoccupation is that colonialism left these newly independent nations with great challenges (Elson 2004: 15- 29). One of these was the weakness of their internal infrastructures and institutions. During the colonial period, institutional structures and economic developments had depended on colonial powers and when they left, the newly-independent states faced huge problems of nation-building (Beeson 2002: 550). In addition, each country faced deeply ethnic and cultural divisions (Nesadurai 2008: 225). Another major issue was related to long-standing territorial disputes between regional countries (Dixon 1991: 9; Henderson 1999: 15). Given these challenges, the ultimate objective of the post-colonial leaders was to consolidate their fragile and newly acquired statehood (Tilman 1989: 12). For them, nation building and domestic developments were far more important than region building (Yeo 2009b: 194-5). As they were too weak physically to defend their statehood against other regional states or domestic problems, ASEAN states knew that they could only survive if others would respect their sovereignty (Jackson 1993). Consequently, “the normative ideal of sovereignty became the standard prescription for almost every political disease in the region and the cornerstone of ASEAN’s attempt at creating a regional order” (Busse (1999: 47). As summed up by Ghazali Shafie,111
It is also imperative to underline that despite major changes in the international system during the last decades, the challenges that ASEAN states faced 40 or 50 years ago have not been completely resolved.
ASEAN states “were recommending a special kind of relationship conscious of the fact that the modern state entities in the region were the product of colonial designs, which had left a number of thorny residual problems, particularly in relations to national border” (quoted by Leifer 1996: 12).
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111 He was Malaysia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and present at ASEAN’s Bangkok conference in 1967.
As put by Katsumata (2003: 104), “the political factors which affected the development of the “ASEAN Way” have not changed much”. For this reason, the ASEAN way has remained a constant feature of
112 For instance, intra-regional territorial disputes, which were unsettled but largely dormant (Dixon 1991:
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ASEAN as well as its ASEAN-plus institutions (Khong and Nesadurai 2007: 33-4; Yeo 2009: 195). During the interviews with the author, when asked why ASEAN states still strongly uphold the ASEAN way and especially its principle of sovereignty and non- interference, an ASEAN official and a former ambassador of an EU member, referred to Southeast Asia’s colonial past and the reality that whatever they are, ASEAN states remain very young nations (Interview, 2009). These comments also illustrate well the argument that the background, location and perspective of a political entity influence its normative foundation and differentiation. Unlike Western countries, which acquired their statehood for centuries and had solid and established economic and political institutions, ASEAN states did not have those luxuries. Most ASEAN members remain fragile entities because they are still locked in a struggle to become – and, consequently, very preoccupied with creating – stable nation-states (Narine 2004; 2008: 425; Weatherbee 2005). Therefore, it is unsurprising that they are still strongly committed to the sovereignty norm (Rüland and Jetschke 2008: 406). Furthermore, unlike post-War World II European leaders, ASEAN elites were revolutionary leaders, i.e. they came to power not through free and democratic elections and stayed in power for decades (Tan 2005: 9). Accordingly, they did not hold the liberal democratic ideals that (Western) European countries had long embraced.113
Another important factor, which is identified by Henderson (1999: 16) as one of the three reasons behind ASEAN’s adoption of the non-interference principle as its guiding tenet, is its members’ sheer diversities. Compared with Western Europe, Southeast Asia is a much more heterogeneous region in terms of politics, economy and culture (Zhu 2007: 156). Politically, unlike the EU, which is a club of liberal democracy, ASEAN includes a wide spectrum of political systems, ranging from an
Chapter 4 has maintained that the emphasis of the EU on individual rights and freedoms is also linked to the legacy of Enlightenment. Asia did not have such a philosophical heritage. Instead, some ASEAN leaders promoted the Asian values, which preferred collective rights to individual rights. Whether there are some cultural elements behind the Asian values is open to debate. Yet, the point made is that Asia’s non-experience of a Europe-like Enlightenment is a reason for ASEAN’s scant attention to the individual’s rights and its absence of liberal- democratic political arrangements.
113 Western Europe countries have more or less the same political system, i.e. liberal democracy (Zhu
2007: 157). According to Wallace (2000: 50), “[t]he EC and later the EU were in part devised to contribute to democratic stabilization as the club of European liberal democracies”.
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authoritarian military regime in Myanmar and authoritarian communist governments in Vietnam and Laos through a hybrid regime in Cambodia to flawed democracy in other countries (see Appendix 9). Economically, the disparity between ASEAN members is huge. For example, in 2009, Singapore’s GDP per capital was US$ 36,379 whereas the Myanmar’s was only US$ 571 (see Appendix 4). Culturally, unlike Christian Europe,114 Southeast Asia is a polyglot region of many different religions: Confucianism, Buddhism, Islam and Christianity (Chopparapu 2005: 135; Fong 2005: 8). Given these immense diversities, ASEAN states need to respect their diversity and create some unity among them. The ASEAN way is a feasible means of attaining that unity and promoting cooperation. In other words, the ASEAN way may be not desirable but it is a workable way of promoting regional cooperation (Zhu 2007: 156) because it allows its members to participate in a cooperative endeavour (Jetschke 2009: 413).