GUÍA 4: OPERACIONES CON CONJUNTOS

The tainted visions of India and Pakistan through the prism of their own identities have torn apart the socio-cultural fabric of the mutual coexistence of Kashmiris. Some

especially in the aftermath of violence that has led to the polarization of the various cultural identities (Hewitt 1995). Furthermore, Pakistan’s support for militant activities in Kashmir and Indian’s attempt to label the freedom struggle in Kashmir as state terrorism, has resulted in quashing these common norms. It is difficult to come up with any

statistical data concerning the popular perceptions of the Kashmiri people about the actions of the Indian and Pakistani elites due to the instability in the region. However, increased militancy in the region by Pakistan, as well as the flawed general elections by India in Kashmir both have disillusioned the Kashmiri people (Jones 2009). The militant groups also vary with some supporting an active pro-Pakistani stance and a religious outlook, while others are fighting for their independence (Jones 2009).

A survey conducted by a ‘British company, MORI’ in a sample of 850 Kashmiris found that an ‘overwhelming majority’ of them wanted themselves to be ‘at the forefront of the search for a settlement’ (Jones 2009). The question of independence was not asked in the survey (Jones 2009). Another survey was carried out by the ‘International Crisis Group (ICG)’ in 2002 on a smaller sample of 80 people in ‘the Kashmir Valley and Srinagar’ (Jones 2009: 131). In that survey many viewed Indian rule as ‘oppressive’ and they believed the fight of Kashmiri militants was ‘justified’, but at the same time ‘they were also exhausted by the conflict and sceptical of Pakistan’s motives in Kashmir (Jones 2009: 131). However, ‘70 percent’ were in favour of opening the Kashmir border

between India and Pakistan for economic and ‘cultural’ reasons (Jones 2009). The results of these surveys are ‘disputable’ but time is still the testimony (Jones 2009). For example, in the past 63 years, the elites’ social practices of India and Pakistan have so far not borne

the popular social practices [Kashmiri people] and the elites’ social practices of India and Pakistan.

India and Pakistan both have sidelined the Kashmiri leadership in their negotiations, though in rhetoric, both states’ elites have desired the resolution of the Kashmir dispute according to the wishes of the Kashmiri people. Mirwaiz Umer Farooq, the chairman of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) a conglomerate of diverse political parties in Indian held Kashmir, complained against this fact. Farooq pointed out that:

“The main purpose of our visit is to reiterate our stance that without involving

Kashmiris of both sides in dialogue, the issue could not be resolved and no durable solution could be reached. Kashmir is not a territorial or border area issue. It involves lives of 13,000,000 Kashmiris” (Dawn 22.6.2008)

Another question which arises is whether the popular social practices based on the norms of ‘Kashmiriyat’ still exist in the turbulent part of Kashmir itself? Is there still a viable option that such norms can be propagated given the recent turmoil in Kashmir? Nasreen Ali has studied the distinct Kashmir identity in the diaspora Kashmiri

community in Great Britain (Ali 2002). She has concluded that the “discourse of

Kashmiriyat emerges in a diasporic space” (Ali 2002: 146). This diaspora community in Britain came mostly from the Mirpur district of Pakistan held Kashmir. In Britain, they found the space necessary to foster their own distinct identity that they were not able to have in Indian and Pakistani held Kashmir. The underlying message of the research carried out on the diaspora is that Kashmir is a nation in every sense of the word with a distinct culture and identity (Ali 2002). The disharmony between the elites and the popular social practices has resulted in the ‘tragedy over Kashmir’ in which ‘the voices’

both Islamabad and Delhi” (Jones 2009: 139).

In a ‘content analysis’ of 46 proposals introduced for the resolution of the Kashmir issue between 1947-2008, Yusuf and Najam found that ‘autonomy to

Kashmiris’ has been the recurring theme among all such proposals (Yusuf and Najam 2009). Furthermore, they also identified the ‘virtual consensus’ on ‘catalysts’ leading to its resolution which involves ‘soft borders’, the ‘involvement’ of Kashmiris in the

resolution of the dispute and the ‘demilitarization’ of the region (Yusuf and Najam 2009). This sounds somewhat familiar to the Musharraff formula introduced previously and points towards enhancing harmony between the elites and the popular social practices. But in reality we see that the ideological commitments of Indian and Pakistani elites towards their respective state’s identity discourses have never allowed this to be actualized.

The tension within India due to the pressures of the centripetal forces demanding a common identity under the canopy of secularism and the outward centrifugal forces demanding more autonomy in the region has caused relentless struggle in Kashmir. The Bharatiya Janata party, as flag bearer of Hindu domination, has also proposed that the special status given to Kashmir by Article 370 in the Indian constitution be eliminated (Dutt 1998). Even though such a guarantee only remains in de jure, while Kashmir is being treated de facto as one of the ordinary states within an Indian Union. For India, the fundamental question being asked is can “a Muslim-majority state exist, without undue fuss or friction, in a Hindu-majority, but ostensibly “secular” India?”(Guha 2007: 249, emphasis of the author ). The answer seems to be ‘no’. It was the government of India

backed down from both the United Nations Resolutions 47 and 211 to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir (Malik 1993).

Kashmir’s own identity discourse based on popular social practices that have been around for centuries was never allowed to come at the forefront. As Bazaz points out, “the prerequisites to attain that ideal [free Kashmir] is a mental revolution”(Bazaz 2003: 737). This demands the propagation of social norms for peaceful coexistence based on Kashmir’s indigenous culture of ‘Kashmiriyat’. Only with the “assertion of a nationalist Kashmiri identity” will the dispute be resolved (Ellis and Khan 2008). The identity of the two main actors India and Pakistan have submerged the indigenous composite Kashmir identity in their own nationalistic discourses. Weldes explains, “insecurities are cultural in the sense that they are produced in and out of the context within which people give meanings to their actions and experiences and make sense of their lives ” (Weldes, Laffey et al. 1999). The social practices of Indian and Pakistani elites have up until this point formed their particular narratives on Kashmir based on their own national identities and have sold them to their respective audiences. The population of both states has conformed to this as the sole reality of the dispute. The material disposition of this dispute may include many resolutions, but it is its cultural context which renders all such settlements null and void. The partitioning of the state of Jammu and Kashmir has sacrificed its identity based on ‘Kashmiriyat’ at the altar of pragmatism.

The lack of space given to the Kashmiris for the propagation of their own

indigenous social norms of peaceful coexistence as well as the parallel irredentist claims of both India and Pakistan have led to the security issue of Kashmir. The rival discourses of the identities of India and Pakistan have had a spill over affect on Kashmir which has been forced to lay down its own specific identity in lieu of an Indian or Pakistani version. The Kashmir dispute can be better explained if we abandon these nationalist discourses of the secularism of India and the Islamic identity of Pakistan and instead focus our minds on the construction of an identity for Kashmir. The distinction between the security dilemma in a realist sense and in a constructivist one is over the material versus the ideational components. The explanation of the ideational component of a security dilemma requires “taking seriously the parties’ culturally rooted interpretations and the fears and threats underlying them” (Ross 1997: 317). The various strategic solutions to the dispute based on realist explanations have not achieved the desired results (Winner and Yoshihara 2002).

The security dilemma over Kashmir examined from a social constructivist perspective shows that Indian and Pakistani elites have contributed to the aggravation of this dispute. What was formerly a territorial dispute in Kashmir, has now evolved into an intractable identity crises. There are “very few movements in the world [which] have been so determined and so sustained” (Nayar 11.6.2010).The Kashmiris are in search of their own identity by looking for its roots in their indigenous culture. As Adler explains “people imagine that with respect to their own security and economic well-being, borders run, more or less, where shared understandings and common identities end” (Adler

quagmire. The Muslim leadership in Kashmir wants tripartite negotiations among the principal stakeholders India, Pakistan and the Kashmiris for a solution to this problem. The denial of space for the recognition of Kashmiriyat norms by way of India- Pakistan elites’ social practices is the major cause of the present stalemate over Kashmir. The Kashmiriyat forms the socio-cultural norms underlying the traditional popular social practices of the Kashmiri people. The elites social practices in the shape of flawed elections, the lack of impartial enforcement of Article 370 of the Indian constitution and the use of excessive force in the shape of the Indian army, as well as Pakistan’s support for the militants, has so far not allowed the popular social practices of the Kashmiris to come to the forefront.

6: India-Pakistan nuclear rivalry: the influence of ideology upon elites’