GUÍA 3: RELACIONES ENTRE CONJUNTOS

The socio-cultural part forming the interests of Indian and Pakistani elites over Kashmir is based on their own struggle for identities. Fearon explains that “ethnic violence occurs when political elites construct antagonistic identities in order to

strengthen their hold on power” (Fearon and Laitin 2000: 853). In social constructivism the process of “primordialism” or the given nature of self interest is often rejected and criticized, but seldom is there an alternative explanation offered for the construction of identities during times of violence (Fearon and Laitin 2000). Sometimes it is the process by which the identities of two groups are constructed in a way that it ‘yields violence’ (Fearon and Laitin 2000: 850). In other words, the process of the construction of identities entails in it the seeds of violence. But how is this process formed and by whom?

In the case of Pakistan, Muslim ideology was used by Pakistani elites to shape the identity of the Kashmiri Muslims. However, Kashmir’s history and indigenous culture demonstrates that Muslims and Hindus have lived in harmony. Yet after the creation of Pakistan, the identity of Kashmir was aligned to the identity of Pakistan based on their

Kashmir which failed to coalesce the common identity of the Kashmiris. In his constructivist analysis of ethnic conflicts in South Asia, Chatterjee explains the clash between the nationalist discourse of identity and the sub-nationalist identity discourse (Chatterjee 2005). He found that “throughout South Asia, the discourse of territorial nationalism has been used by the state to counter the ‘threat’ of assertive and divisive ethnic identities with an aim to create monolithic construction(s) of nationhood” (Chatterjee 2005: 85). How have the Indian and Pakistani elites adopted such a

discourse? This section will explain chronologically the social practices of the Indian and the Pakistani elites.

The Indian and Pakistani elites adopted social practices for their own political gains in Kashmir which was evident during their struggle for independence prior to the partition of the subcontinent in 1947. The people of Kashmir wanted to get rid of the Maharaja rule and in order to achieve freedom started their own independence struggle in the 1930s. They invited the leadership of both the Muslim League and the Indian

National Congress [party] to help them in their struggle for freedom. But the leadership of both the Indian National Congress [party] and the Muslim League wanted Kashmir for the sake of bolstering their own identities. At the invitation of Kashmiri leadership, both Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founding father of Pakistan, and Jawaharlal Nehru, the

founding father of India, visited Kashmir in 1944 and 1940 respectively. They both spoke of Kashmir in the context of the wider struggle for freedom without considering the demand of the ‘fight for freedom’ started by the Muslim Conference [party] of Kashmir (Blinkenberg 1998: 60).

Kashmir struggle led by Muhammad Abdullah completely aligned itself with the Indian National Congress [party]. This period of history also witnessed a split in the Muslim Conference of Kashmir, with the pro-Pakistani leadership led by Ghulam Abbas remaining under the banner of the Muslim Conference in alliance with the Muslim League. The secularists led by Muhammad Abdullah formed the National Conference to instil the secular credentials of the Indian National Congress [party]. Nehru referred to his trip to Kashmir in 1940 as the ‘beloved visit’. Nehru was himself born as a Kashmiri pundit. While Jinnah asked the people of Kashmir to “awaken and instil life in the dead bones of the Muslim Nation” (Blinkenberg 1998:61). Jinnah saw the struggle in Kashmir as part of a wider Muslims struggle in the subcontinent. Gandhi also visited Kashmir in August 1947 days before the partition of the subcontinent and stated that “The people of Kashmir should be asked whether they want to join Pakistan or India. Let them do as they want. The ruler is nothing. The people are everything”(Wolpert 2001). The pre-

independence speeches of Indian and Pakistani elites reflect how they were seeing the struggle in Kashmir through the prisms of Indian-secular and Pakistani-Muslim identities. After independence, Nehru had reiterated time and again the solemn pledge of India to the people of Kashmir to ascertain their wishes by holding a plebiscite in Kashmir. When in 1957 he was taunted for going against his pledge made before the United Nations Security Council for a plebiscite in Kashmir in 1948, Nehru stated that “Kashmir is not ours but it is of the Kashmiris. We cannot stay in Kashmir for a moment without the consent of the Kashmiris. It is not our property” (Abdullah 1964: 532). The Kashmiri leaders in Indian held Kashmir, like Mohammad Abdullah [the Lion of

They wanted to make Kashmir “the Switzerland of the East” (Lamb 2002). After its accession to India, Kashmir was led by Sheikh Abdullah, the leader of the Jammu and Kashmir National Conference, who became Prime Minister in 1948. However, after he reminded Nehru of his pledge before the United Nations Security Council to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir, Abdullah was dismissed as Prime Minister of Indian held Kashmir in 1953 and was subsequently arrested. The Indian government in the 1950s was also accused by Abdullah of abusing the terms of the ‘Accession of Kashmir’ in which it is explicitly stated that apart from defence, communications and foreign affairs, every other state function had to be performed by the Kashmir government itself (Nayyer 2010). For speaking out, he was put behind bars for eleven years. A local pro-Indian leader Bakhshi Ghulam Muhammad was installed as Prime Minister of Kashmir in 1953. The cause for self-determination in the 1960’s and 1970’s was carried out by another popular political party the Plebiscite Front. Another important junction in the political history of Kashmir came after the death of Nehru in 1964. Any semblance of secularism maintained by Nehru for the Indian state also vanished with his death.

In the post-independence phase in Pakistan, the elite’s social practices vis-à-vis Kashmir can be divided into two categories. One is the civilian elite and the other is the military elite. The civilian elites of Pakistan have tried to wade their way through the marshy waters of Kashmir by engaging in dialogue, but they were given less

manoeuvrability by the military elites as principal stake holder due to the army’s stranglehold on Kashmir. The military elites have kept their hold on power by deliberately raising the issue of Kashmir every now and then (Acharya and Acharya

identities’ with both not willing to accomodate Kashmir’s own distinct identity discourse (Acharya and Acharya 2006).

Moreover, whenever the military elites came to power in Pakistan, from General Ayub to General Musharraff, they have always adopted a proactive military strategy in Kashmir. This resulted either in the direct involvement of Pakistan’s army or with the active support of the militant factions in Kashmir in their fight against the Indian might. This helped the Pakistan army in primarily two ways. First, it helped the army to

construct its place as the sole guardian of state identity and the saviour of its founding ideology; and second, it helped engage half of the Indian military in Kashmir. In 1965, General Ayub Khan launched the ‘Gibraltar Operation’ and ‘Operation Grand Slam’ to liberate Kashmir from India by force. Similarly, the ‘Kargil Operation’ was the brain child of General Musharraff in 1999. These historical examples support the proactive military strategy of engaging the Indian army in Kashmir. However, it should also be noted, that the actions of Pakistan’s army in 1965 did not result in a popular uprising among the Kashmiri population to stand up against the Indian army. Similarly, in 1971, when India and Pakistan went to war, there was no popular struggle against the Indian army in Kashmir. This may be because of two reasons. First of all, it was the precise timing of the event. Kashmir’s identity in 1965 and 1971 was not radicalized enough to take up arms against India. Secondly, the older generation of Kashmiris including pro- nationalist secular leaders like Abdullah still had enough influence so that they could help keep peace in the valley.

Abdullah pact was agreed upon between the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and the Kashmir Prime Minister Muhammad Abdullah in 1975. The special status of Kashmir in the Indian Union was forgiven and tacit approval was given by the central government of India to integrate Kashmir firmly into mainstream India. After this pact was adopted the autonomous character of Kashmir changed. The post of Prime Minister of Kashmir was re-designated as the Chief Minister. Abdullah was given Chief Minister-ship of Kashmir as his reward. This was a turning point, because after 1975, the local Kashmiris became disillusioned with their nationalist Kashmiri leadership (Bazaz 1978). The fears of the Kashmiri people were justified after the flawed and fraudulent elections that were subsequently held in the 1980s (Ganguly 1997). Democracy in Kashmir was conducted by ‘intimidation and terror’ (Bazaz 1978). The Kashmiris feared annihilation of their indigenous culture under the dominance of India. The new generation of Kashmir, now better informed and qualified, became disenchanted with Indian state practices and took up arms against the Indian army in 1989 (Ganguly 1997). The hopes of Kashmiris for the establishment of democratic norms by the largest democracy in the world were crushed by the despotic autocratic rule in Indian held Kashmir (Bose 2003). The centralist practices of the Indian state’s institutions had disillusioned the Kashmiris. India often blame Pakistan for the militant insurgency that erupted in the Indian held Kashmir in 1989. All Indian governments routinely accuse Pakistan of instigated the problem by sending militant infiltrators to the Kashmir valley. However, it can also be seen as the failure of the state apparatus in Indian held Kashmir to respect the wishes of the Kashmiri people. The centralist policies of keeping Kashmir in a nationalist fray and the increase in

and Bajpai 1994; Ganguly 1996). The struggle was exacerbated by the failure of Indian institutions to satisfy local demands for autonomy because of the implementation of central government policies, the imposition of the governor’s rule in the 1980s, as well as the fraudulent state elections held in 1987. The agency responsible for the entrenchment of this dispute is both leadership of India and Pakistan. It is useful to highlight some of the social practices of the elite by examining institutional policies developed for the sake of governance in Kashmir.

The ethnic nationalism in Kashmir presented an interesting deviation between state interests and the indigenous ethnic nationalist movement (Cockell 2000). The core values and norms of Kashmir directly clash with the institutions developed by the Indian state (Cockell 2000). The social practices of Indian elites were based on the nationalist discourse of an Indian identity whose corner stones are complete subordination to the nationalist cause with minimum recognition of cultural autonomy amid central control. While, the social practices of Kashmiris are based on the indigenous and autonomous discourse of a distinct identity of ‘Kashmiriyat’. The ‘state discourse’ rejects the ‘recognition of nationalist movements’ due to its own vested interests in national unity (Cockell 2000: 321).

The post-colonial Indian threat that seeks to engulf and draw this distinct

Kashmiris identity into the main folds of the nationalist cause has resulted in ‘existential fear of anxiety’ and ‘ontological insecurity’ among the Kashmiris (Kinnvall 2004). In India, the central government policies paid no heed to the Kashmiris’ “shared socio- cultural values and identity referents” (Cockell 2000: 321). The repressive measures

Kashmir invariably led the local Kashmiris developing a strong adherence for freedom and independence as a part of their core identity (Cockell 2000). The problem with both India and Pakistan is that they have inherited the post-colonial system of their foreign masters which was totally alien to the local culture and traditions. The only advantage of this colonial structure was its ability to extract the maximum amount of revenues from its colonies by allowing the local population few avenues for governance. They had set up the state apparatus accordingly and built institutions which had a centralist control and had no room for the recognition of autonomous local bodies based on the cultural

traditions particular to that region. This inheritance of post-colonial rule by the state elites after 1947 carried with it the seeds of its own destruction. The violence in Kashmir is one such example. Cockell points out that “subaltern ethnic minorities are excluded from this centralized definition of national identity, and often have circumscribed avenues for political mobilization” (Cockell 2000: 322). The Indian quest for a secular identity, versus Pakistan’s emphasis on an all pervasive Islamic identity, has led to ethnic insurgencies in Kashmir. It has led to the imposition of “a monological definition of national identity, and links this with the political closure and coercive control structures of national security” (Cockell 2000: 323).

The Indian constitution of 1950 gave Kashmir a special status in Article 370 by giving the state of Jammu and Kashmir all powers except defence, currency, external affairs and communications (Teng, Bhatt et al. 1977). This acceptance of the de jure autonomy of Kashmir was infringed upon and was eroded time and again by the Indian elites under pressure from the discourse of its secular Indian identity and it has now

central government rule, the abrogation of the Kashmir legislature and manipulating elections resulted not surprisingly in violence in the valley of Kashmir (Tremblay 2002). In reality between 1954 until 1975 when the Kashmir accord was signed which formally abrogates the special status of Kashmir, there was in total 28 constitutional orders passed in one form or the other to integrate Kashmir with India and 262 Union Laws [laws applicable in other Indian states] were adopted in Indian held Jammu and Kashmir (Guha 2007). The utter disregard shown by the central government of India towards the rising demand for autonomy and the local population’s desire for the right of self determination ultimately had a spiralling centrifugal affect.

Without going into the legal framework of the constitutional history of India, the point which I want to reiterate is that Kashmir has never been allowed by both states to develop its own ethnic cultural identity. Both India and Pakistan have tried to

superimpose their own identities of secularism or Islamic identity respectively so as to keep their own nationalist agendas on the table. Pakistan looks at Indian held Kashmir as the negation of its own identity. If a peaceful Kashmir can exists within India then the whole reason of the partition of the subcontinent on communal lines falls to the ground. For Pakistan supporting the Kashmir cause is like giving a new lease of life to its own identity.

This has developed a ‘contested concept of justice’ wherein Pakistan felt incomplete without Kashmir on account of its Muslim credentials and principles of the partition of the subcontinent (Forsberg 1996). Similarly, India contests on the basis of its secular credentials to thwart the secessionist trends in multi-ethnic and pluralist India.

local Kashmiri population whose third generation has grown up bearing the brunt of this dispute that has lingering on unabated since 1947 some sixty three years after the

independence of India and Pakistan. Some authors like Mitra have used cultural nationalism as a rational approach to study the ethnic movements in South Asia (Mitra 1995). He is of the view that the direction of the sub-national movement is guided by rational interests while the resources used by its protagonists are linked to cultural causes of identity (Mitra 1995). The Kashmir struggle is guided by cultural factors the essence of which is a separate identity based on “Kashmiriyat”. It is not directed by rational interests or material determinants, but rather an ideational component has inculcated a sense of an “imagined community” which a Kashmiri cannot resist (Anderson 1983). In short the contemporary checkered history of present day Kashmir is full of elites’ highhandedness. But the state of Jammu and Kashmir “was not monolithic: it contained many peoples with divergent pasts, traditions and patterns of life ” (Lamb 1991: 217). The next section explains some of the popular perceptions of the Kashmiri people

regarding the action of the elites of India and Pakistan. The popular social practices draw attention to the distinct identity of Kashmiris as practiced by the indigenous population. This also explains the tussle between elites’ perceptions and popular perceptions of the Kashmir identity.