Hipótesis especificas

Forced displacement and resettlement have often raised ethical questions related to unequitable benefits and losses suffered by different stakeholders in forced resettlement projects (Cernea, 2000:11; De Wet, 2009:79). On the one hand, there are those for whom development projects necessitate compulsory relocation and, by extension, displacement. While on the other hand, there are those for whose benefit development projects are initiated, who often do not have to suffer the losses related to the construction of projects. Consequently, not only does this raise ethical issues but also questions on how to respond constructively to the displacement that comes with development projects.

In addition, ethical issues in forced resettlement arise partly from the earlier discussed power dynamics and their negative effects on the less powerful. The point of departure in cases of involuntary resettlement is that the state has an absolute right to acquire private land outside the approval of private owners. Many issues arise from this absolute entitlement of the state to land. Informed by the principle of eminent domain, which originated in 1625 from the work of Hugo Grotius – De Jure Belli et Pacis – land expropriation is underpinned by two conditions; that it is strictly for the purpose of public good and that just compensation is given for the losses incurred by those forcefully resettled and displaced (Berger, 1977:204; Desai, 2011:95). From these two conditions, many ethical issues arise.

4.5.1 Development as the greater good - public purpose

One of the main points of contention regarding “public purpose” is how the phrase is interpreted and applied by different stakeholders in different contexts, and how this is expressed in resettlement processes and outcomes. Axioms such as “the welfare of the people is the paramount law”, “public necessity is greater than private necessity” or “the greater

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good” (Mohan and Shiju, 2011:13) are often used to justify the right of the state to forcefully acquire land through the principle of eminent domain. However, where the conundrum lies is on the differences in the application of such concepts as public purpose or greater good, and how they apply in real terms. Technically, “the welfare of the people is the paramount law” should also capture the wellbeing and rights of those who are forcibly moved in involuntary resettlement cases, yet their welfare is often compromised by the perceived need for resettlement-inducing development projects, by certain stakeholders in a given society (Penz, et al., 2011:95). While it can be argued that the course of development is a greater one, the challenge is that the concept of development itself has been a source of debates based on ideological differences (Gasper, 2004:1).

Macro, neoliberal development policies emphasise the need for economic progress, facilitated by such aspects as infrastructure development (Oliver-Smith, 2006:142). The end of WWII came with an emphasis on economic revitalisation, which was fundamentally premised on infrastructure development and the establishment of development institutions (ibid.:142). These economic development goals have since seen many more cases of resettlement- inducing development projects than in any other time in history, as discussed earlier. Because involuntary resettlement is often accompanied by negative consequences, contending arguments have often pointed out to the limitations of development policies that are solely driven by an economic agenda, instead of being rooted on the assurance of people’s welfare as the fundamental goal of human progress (Gaude and Peek, 1976; UNDP, 1990; Sen, 1990; Terminski, 2015:49). In this sense, the fundamental duty of development is that it does not cause harm, but instead, serve to promote wellbeing among citizens (Penz, et al., 2011:118- 119). However, where resettlement-inducing projects are developed, there is always some kind of harm inflicted on those forcefully resettled because they are considered to be in the way of development.

Central to the persistent implementation of development projects that propel forced resettlement, despite their negative consequences, is not only their perceived contribution to the project of development, but also power dynamics that facilitate how development is arrived at. While there may be a consensus among different stakeholders in society on the values that guide development, such as human wellbeing, human rights, and sustainability (Penz, et al., 2011:120), how those values are ensured is often a source of conflict between the involved stakeholders. Development projects are often justified on grounds related to the improvement of human wellbeing through the augmentation of services and resources. Yet,

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the wellbeing of those forcefully resettled on account of development projects is often left compromised, as in the majority of cases, resettled people are left in worse-off socio- economic conditions. Writers such as Drydyk (in De Wet, 2009:91) argue that if a development project can be shown to be incapable of affording benefits to “social groups including the worse-off”, then such a project should be abandoned. However, in practice, there are cases where development projects fail such tests related to “no harm” caused to the most vulnerable, yet because of the power vested in the state, such projects prevail based on the state’s perception of the benefits of the project, even if they do not meet the requirements of human rights, human wellbeing and sustainability.

The above discussed Sardar Sarovar Project is such an example, where despite evidence based on an independent review, that “…resettlement and rehabilitation of all those displaced by the project was not possible under ... [the] circumstances…” (Morse and Berger, 1992: XII), the state went ahead with the construction of the project nonetheless. These irreconcilable differences between the authorities acquiring land and the people directly affected often result in resistance from affected people on the ground, and some kind of coercion on the part of the more powerful implementing authorities.

Oftentimes, where there is a conflict of priorities, issues of power inequalities come into play, and determine which of the interests and priorities prevail. Because of the principle of eminent domain, which affords the state power to acquire land without the approval of private landowners or users, when there are disagreements regarding the necessity or ethicality of a resettlement-inducing development project, the state’s interests customarily prevail. Later discussions on grassroots resistance in the Indian context will reflect this tension between the state and the affected people, and how in many cases, the state has the upper hand. This was also reflected in the above discussed resettlement cases, where development projects were implemented amidst resistance from people on the ground.

In this regard, critics of development frameworks based on economic measures such as GDP, argue that for development to be ethically defensible, it should include values such as equity, cultural freedom, access to opportunities, and environmental sustainability (Basu, 2012; Kurian, 2000; Penz, et al., 2011:120; Sen, 1990; Terminski, 2015:53). However, these values are often perceived and prioritised differently by various stakeholders, based on how each set of stakeholders is affected by a development project. In addition, values such as equity are usually difficult to reconcile, as the nature of resettlement is such that some stakeholders bear

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the cost that others do not, while others enjoy the benefits not enjoyed by those who bear the cost in many cases. Furthermore, issues of cultural freedom are complicated by the contextualised nature of culture, such that cultural meanings and values are usually observed by specific stakeholders in a resettlement project, and are not shared by all the involved stakeholders. In this regard, cultural values are often only observed as far as the development project in question can allow, or other stakeholders are willing to accommodate such values.

Although development projects that induce involuntary resettlement – such as large dams – have been proven to be predominantly destructive to certain segments in the given population, the moral urgency behind their continuous approval is usually tied to their perceived ability to reduce poverty, and to alleviate drought in drought-stricken areas (Fisher, 1995:3; Gandhi, 2003:484; Gasper, 2004:1). However, the irony is that involuntary resettlement that arises from such development projects has been shown to result in increased poverty among resettled people, in cases where losses are not efficiently recovered, which is in most cases across the globe (Scudder, 2005; Terminski, 2015), including the above discussed cases with the exception of the Aswan High Dam resettlement case.

Oftentimes, the people who tend to suffer forced resettlement on account of the greater good are those with less power – in both economic and political terms. As argued earlier, in most cases people who are primarily affected by resettlement are based in rural, less economically developed contexts, largely due to their geographical settings. And because their economy is often predominantly based on natural resources, social networks, etc., which are rarely compensated in resettlement situations (Cernea, 2000), many of their losses are underestimated in compensation procedures. As later discussions in Chapter Six will argue, compensation procedures are usually limited from fully capturing the losses which are qualitative in nature, with long-term benefits or uses (Cernea, 2009:41). This is because compensation procedures are customarily based on market-related approaches, which have limitations in incorporating qualitative losses, such as those linked to natural resources and social networks. Even in cases where natural resources are compensated, as in the studied Mohale Dam resettlement case, the losses are often under-accounted for, and therefore, under-compensated.

Because of the complexities inherent in forced resettlement, which often make it difficult to achieve positive outcomes for affected people, one of the fundamental elements of resettlement policies, present in most international, and national policies, is that of options

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assessment. Options assessment is a policy provision which prescribes that, in the first instance, alternative means of providing goods and services, which do not involve involuntary resettlement and environmental degradation, must be exhaustively explored before a decision to undertake a resettlement-inducing project is made (Asian Development Bank, 1995: Section 34 (i) and (ii); Government of India, 2007: Section 1.4; International Finance Corporation, 2012: Section 3). However, the implementation of this policy provision continues to expose ethical deficits in a number of cases. The forceful nature of forced resettlement, coupled with the complexities involved in resettlement, which often make it nearly impossible for affected people not to be harmed in resettlement cases, constitutes inevitable human rights violation on those resettled and displaced (De Wet, 2009:79). This, therefore, raises a need to ensure that a resettlement-inducing project is implemented where there is no feasibility of alternative means of meeting the perceived needs. For, on the other hand, as Drydyk (in De Wet, 2009:91) argues, the failure to meet the needs of other groups of people on account of preventing forced resettlement, may also constitute a violation of the human rights of those denied development.

However, although options assessment is a necessary requirement and a policy provision, in practice, the assessment of alternative means are rarely sufficiently undertaken. The sufficiency of options assessment includes, among other requirements, a participatory approach which incorporates the involvement of affected people (The World Bank, 2003:xxii). Active stakeholder involvement, particularly that of primarily affected people, may help address tensions between the implementing authorities and affected people, and prevent resistance on the ground, if ultimately, the chosen option is one that induces resettlement (ibid.:xxii). Nonetheless, in practice, options assessment is either not undertaken or is undertaken without stakeholder involvement, partly due to concerns related to the costs of a participatory process, both financial and time-related (The World Bank, 2003:17).

In addition, because in some cases dam projects are part of national projects tied to political agendas, such as in the above discussed cases of resettlement in Kariba and Three Gorges dams, and the studied Mohale Dam case, options assessment might as well not be incorporated if the decision to build a dam has already been taken by the government. This is indicative, therefore, of the fact that to some extent, policies without ethical conviction and political will among other factors, remain theoretical provisions with no positive impact. Hence, ethical issues in resettlement processes speak to not only the complexity of the

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process itself, but also to the integrity of key players to see the process of responsible resettlement realised.

4.5.2 Just compensation

The second condition of the principle of eminent domain is just compensation for affected people. Since the formalisation of forced resettlement as a field of study, compensation has been, arguably, the most debated and critiqued aspect of resettlement. Just compensation is a fundamental element of resettlement, which determines whether affected people are able to recover from losses suffered or are led to worse-off conditions after resettlement. By virtue, just compensation alone would be sufficient prerequisite in involuntary resettlement, because it would ideally be implemented in a manner that ensures equitable benefits for the losses suffered. However, it is often carried out in such a minimalistic and reserved manner that typically leads to under-compensation, and by extension, impoverishment (Cernea, 2008; Fernandes, 2008; Penz, et al., 2011:87). Under-compensation occurs when the losses suffered by the forcefully resettled or affected people outweigh any gains. Cernea (2003; 2008) argues that in many projects where people are involuntarily resettled, affected people are led to impoverishment partly due to the limitations of compensation, which will be discussed in detail in Chapter Six.

Although compensation has inherent limitations, procedural challenges associated with compensation also tend to get in the way of sufficiently making up for the losses suffered on account of forced resettlement. Hence, compensation tends to result in impoverishment, regardless of how generously and efficiently it is implemented. The discussions in the ethnographic chapters will also confirm this assertion. In consequence, more qualitative descriptions have had to be incorporated in addition to compensation, with a companion concept – rehabilitation – also having to be distinctively articulated, owing to the limitations of compensation in re-establishing livelihoods and other losses after forced resettlement. There are many reasons why people end up being under-compensated in resettlement cases, but in this sub-section, only those related to ethical issues will be discussed.

The point of departure in determining appropriate compensation for the forcibly displaced is entitlement and valuation. Entitlement in forced resettlement is about who has or has no right to compensation, and what kinds of losses they are entitled to be compensated for, having been affected by and/or forcibly moved on account of a development project. Further issues of entitlement will come out in detail in the contextual and ethnographic chapters of the two

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cases studied in this research, particularly in the Indian context. As discussed earlier, forced resettlement is one of the areas in which power asymmetries arise and are expressed with devastating consequences on the vulnerable, affected people. Entitlement and valuation are two of the ways in which power inequalities show in forced resettlement, often with negative consequences on affected people. Thus, many ethical issues have arisen in this regard, with many authors questioning the fairness and ethicality of frameworks or approaches employed to determine who is or is not entitled to compensation (Morse and Berger, 1992:19; Routledge, 2003:247).

Two fundamental questions that bring out ethical tensions when it comes to compensation entitlements are; who determines who is or is not entitled to compensation? And who determines what the affected people are entitled to? Compensation is often subjected to specific administrative procedures to determine the validity of “ownership” of lost assets by those who claim losses. The limitation in this regard has been that in many cases, entitlement is confined to certain procedural standards that define the legality or proof of “ownership”. The use of procedures such as legal approaches to determine entitlement often override the dynamics of land and property ownership or use patterns in different contexts – particularly in indigenous societies as will also be seen in Chapter Eleven – leaving many affected people in deprived, worse-off conditions (Fisher, 1995:31; Morse and Berger, 1992:19; Routledge, 2003:247).

In the Indian context, for example, resettlement by development projects was for a long time implemented on the basis of the Land Acquisition Act (LAA) of 1894, amended in 1984. This act was heavily criticised by many authors for discarding contextual dynamics (Arora, 2017; Asif, 1999; Fernandes, 1998; Morris and Pandey, 2007), including landownership and use patterns among groups such as tribes. In this context, customary rights, on the basis of which tribal groups organised land use, were not compatible with legal measures provided for in the LAA, which was developed during the British colonial era. Later discussions in Chapter Eleven will reflect further on issues related to this tension.

In response to the incompatibility between indigenous, customary rights and legal provisions used to determine the entitlement of those affected by development projects, resettlement policies, both at international and national levels, are beginning to recognise and incorporate indigenous rights to property and landownership. Examples include those of the World Bank, the International Finance Corporation, and the Indian National Policy – which will be

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discussed in the next chapter – that provide for the recognition of not only those with legal and customary rights but also those with no rights, who are dependent in some ways on the land being acquired (Government of India, 2013: Section 16; International Finance Corporation, 2012; The World Bank, 2013: Section 15).

However, as the discussion of findings will show, particularly of the studied Indian case, the implementation of policies in this regard may be dependent on conditions such as timeframes, which – although meant to control opportunistic land occupation – may also exclude some genuinely affected groups. In addition, some people with customary rights continue to be excluded despite policy provisions, due to the complexity of implementation, which, in one way or another, always have to follow certain institutional procedures, in some cases to the exclusion of those with claim to the acquired land. The discussion of the studied Chandil Dam resettlement case in India will show how, even in the context of the newly implemented resettlement policy, there were still some people with customary land rights, who were excluded due to the limitations or complexities associated with resettlement implementation.

Some shortfalls with regard to implementing compensation in an ethically sensitive manner relate to a lack of active participation of affected people in resettlement processes, from planning, implementation, through to monitoring (Penz, et al., 2011:96). The active participation of affected people is not only an ethical imperative but also a necessity if resettlement programmes are to be successful. From an ethical point of view, resettler participation is necessary because the consequences of resettlement are felt by, typically, the most vulnerable of all stakeholders – the resettled communities. Scudder (2005:260) asserts that in many cases, the groups of resettled people tend to be “the poorest, the least educated, and the least politically connected”. For this reason, power dynamics easily find their way in the manner in which resettlement projects are implemented, and the ethnographic findings from this thesis will show this in detail. Hence, it is ethically responsible to actively engage the resettled people, not only to improve the understanding of losses, but also to affirm their