Parámetros generales para el cultivo de trucha

Resettlement occurs in the context of wider political, economic and ideological settings; as such, its processes are influenced by these contextual dynamics. As Devitt and Hitchcock (2010:71) assert, even where the resources and expertise are adequate, and the responsible authorities are sympathetic of affected people and the consequences they incur, the processes are subject to “political, economic and ideological pressures, which drive them on an unpredictable and uncharted path”. The inherent complexities approach highlighted some characteristics of resettlement, which make it a complicated process to navigate. The IRR model also outlines the features embedded in the nature of forced resettlement, which makes it a naturally damaging process that needs to be actively controlled in a particular way, if its negative effects are to be reversed. The discussions below will be centred on issues entrenched in the political and economic factors of resettlement programmes, which can interfere with processes and outcomes of resettlement policies and policy practice.

6.3.1 The politics of resettlement projects and policy implementation

As indicated earlier, although the effects of forced resettlement are felt on the ground by affected people, resettlement processes – policy formulation, resettlement planning and implementation – typically adopt a top-down approach. In fact, forced resettlement by its very nature is a top-down process. As shown earlier in the discussion of Scudder’s FSF, decisions to construct dams and resettle people are high-level decisions that tend to exclude affected people (Scudder, 1993:130). In the case of Lesotho, with regard to the construction of a series of dams, as in many other cases, the decision had already been made by the governments of the two involved countries, Lesotho and South Africa, although the implementation would require a renewed agreement (LHDA, 2017b). Any deliberations that lead to the gazetting of the construction of a dam are customarily exclusive of the public. This top-down approach also tends to extend to all processes from project design, implementation, and monitoring.

Although in some cases, such as India, the National Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy was developed with some contributions from stakeholders such as local activists and affected people (Fernandes, 1998:2703), in many cases policy development is an exclusive process. China’s amendment of its resettlement policy in 1999 in relation to the Three Gorges Dam, was the result of a long process that had been going on as an exclusive project of the government (Heggelund, 2017:4). Some of the implemented changes had a significant effect

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on the people on the ground. The changes included resettling people from the reservoir region, including from areas that, initially, were meant to be settlements to which some people would be relocated (ibid.:4). Because the people resettled from the reservoir areas were mainly rural populations, many of them depended on agriculture as their main form of livelihood. And since resettlement was large-scale, in the context of land scarcity, the re- establishment of livelihoods and lost assets such as land became difficult to achieve, leading to jeopardised food security (Heggelund, 2017:4). While the government did engage a semi- governmental organisation to conduct a study that would inform the resettlement plan, evidence suggests that the study was merely a survey and not a participatory activity (Yuefang and Steil, 2003:426).

A lack of participation in resettlement, not only in policy implementation but also formulation, is a first indication that resettlement is often designed from a top-down approach, with little to no contribution from the primarily affected people. Even in cases where the affected people are involved, participation is typically solicited at a later stage, mainly to implement project activities designed by officials. The implementation of communal compensation through community development projects in the studied Mohale resettlement case exemplifies this assertion, where the affected people were invited to come up with ideas and implement projects, but were not involved in the design of this approach to communal compensation. Hence, the findings will show that although the affected people were involved in the implementation of these projects, there was a notable lack of continuity from policy design to implementation.

In the inherent complexities approach, De Wet describes resettlement as a problematic institutional process (2006:185). To add on to that, Mosse (2004:641) argues that what makes resettlement problematic is that, as a process, it is mainly about attempting to fit policy prescriptions into institutional values, culture, and reality. These institutional aspirations and reality are often highly politically motivated. In this context, participatory methods in resettlement processes will always be designed to fit institutional structures and culture, and not to primarily deal with the dynamics on the ground. Hence, when the LHDA developed a framework for communal compensation in the Mohale case, it was based on the institutional values of technical project design, and the affected people had to come up with project ideas, based on the approach that suited the institutional culture. Consequently, the complexities on the ground such as a lack of technical expertise, a lack of economy to support the designed

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projects, etc., became inhibiting factors, irreconcilable with the institutional culture of routine planning.

Furthermore, in some cases, as in the case of the LHDA, the development of policies follows a prerequisite for securing financial support from funding institutions – mainly the World Bank in the case of the LHDA. Hence, the design of such policies and their provisions will also likely follow an institutional culture of those funding institutions, since the primary function of policy in that case is to legitimise projects, through mobilising and maintaining political and economic support, only secondary being to orientate practice (Mosse, 2004:648).

If policies are fundamentally about practice, whose effects are felt at grassroots level, Rew, et al. (2006:49) argue that it should not be a top-down process, but a negotiated process, between those implementing policy and the people directly affected. The LHDA has permanent offices, for example, in the reservoir areas, where some implementing officials are based, and maintain contact with the affected people. The decision to have permanent implementing officials in the reservoir areas, where some resettled people remain, was part of the recommendations from the lessons learned in the previous Katse Dam resettlement (Thamae, 2006:89). However, although this has ensured increased access for people who would have been, otherwise, far from the head office in Maseru city, what remains a challenge is that decision-making is still centralised, which makes a local office less efficient in as far as the outcomes are concerned. It may be argued that this is to prevent inconsistencies, and to ensure proper control of processes and procedures. However, decentralised decision-making can work efficiently if proper monitoring systems are put in place. Otherwise, decentralising offices with no decision-making power defeats the very purpose of decentralisation.

Despite that many resettlement policies incorporate public participation, particularly those of borrower countries of institutions such as the World Bank, who have to comply with World Bank policies, the implementation of this aspect is mainly managerial in nature, with a top- down approach. According to Devitt and Hitchcock (2010:71), two principles are central to many resettlement policies and programmes: the first is that affected people must be actively engaged in resettlement processes from the beginning to the end, and be allowed to shape the affairs of their own future. The second is that the lives and living standards of affected people must not be led to a worse-off condition. Yet, when policies are implemented, these two

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principles seem to sometimes, if not often, be secondary to institutional values such as profit maximisation and expenditure minimisation, even if it comes at the cost of human suffering.

Although a development-focussed, participatory approach to resettlement is claimed in resettlement policies, both at international and local levels of implementing agencies, a predominantly top-down approach which resettlement projects adopt, remains a fundamental challenge and an inhibiting factor to active resettler participation. The commitment to a participatory approach to resettlement is not only necessary at the level of implementing authorities, but also at the level of funding institutions, who have an influence on how projects are designed and implemented.

6.3.2 The economics of resettlement projects and policy implementation

The economics of resettlement and policy implementation, particularly with regard to compensation as the main mechanism for making up for the losses suffered in forced resettlement, has been widely engaged with, including in Cernea (1998; 1999; 2003; 2008; 2009), Fernandes (2008), Kanbur (2008), Maldonado (2009), Slater and Mphale (2009), Witter and Satterfield (2014). Arguably, there is now a consensus from this body of research, on the inadequacy of compensation to re-establish livelihoods and increase the standards of living. While it is widely acknowledged that compensation is not only necessary but also obligatory in resettlement cases, writers such as Cernea argue that on its own, compensation is incapable of providing the necessary long-term benefits of livelihood and income recovery (2008:16). According to Fernandes (2008:1), due to its proneness to distortions, compensation does not have the capacity to perform the function of livelihood restoration, not to mention improvement.

As indicated earlier in the discussion on ethical issues, compensation is one of the two prerequisites for land to be acquired involuntarily under the principle of eminent domain. Thus, the question is, if this does not live up to its function of making up for losses in a fair and economically effective way, what are the alternatives? Cernea argues that fundamental reform in how forced resettlement is conceived and undertaken is necessary, particularly with regard to economic foundations of resettlement planning (2008; 2009). In this regard, not only do compensation levels need to be raised, but also other mechanisms need to be incorporated to facilitate development among affected people after resettlement (Cernea, 2009). This sub-section explores why compensation alone is an insufficient mechanism for improving standards of living, leading to the failure of policies to deliver on their intended

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objective to enable the recovery of experienced losses. The subsection will also explore other forms of livelihood re-establishment.

As indicated earlier in Chapter Five, central to the limitations of compensation is that it is prone to administrative distortions. These include delayed compensation payments, difficulty with measuring intangible losses, corruption on the part of officials managing resettlement finances, and the use of cash compensation by affected people for immediate and other expenses other than replacing lost assets (Al Atahar, 2014:262; Cernea, 2003:41; Eguavoen and Tesfai, 2012:49; Slater and Mphale, 2009; Vanclay, 2017:13).

Delayed compensation payment is one of the common factors that contribute to the shortcomings of compensation. As previously noted, in one case in the earlier discussed Sardar Sarovar Project in India, research shows that some people only received their subsistence allowance three to four years later, even though the allowance was meant to assist the resettlement people with their immediate expenses during the initial transition phase (Parasuraman, 1999:193). As can be expected, by the time the funds were disbursed, many had experienced significant difficulties surviving without their fundamental, productive assets, which were lost to resettlement. The findings from the Chandil resettlement case study will also reflect some of the challenges related to delayed compensation payment. The implementation of compensation in the Katse Dam resettlement, one of the first two projects of the LHDA, was also riddled with delays (‘Matli, 2004:45).

In addition to declining living standards due to delayed compensation, where compensation is given in a form of cash, affected people tend to use it to meet their immediate expenses as opposed to replacing lost assets. This can be worsened in cases where provision for transitional expenses has not been made by implementing authorities. A research by Slater and Mphale (2009), in relation to the Katse Dam resettlement in Lesotho, revealed that among the resettled people, the majority had not been able to replace their lost fixed assets with compensation funds, due to the use of funds for competing immediate expenses.

Furthermore, compensation is limited in providing effective recovery of losses due to its economic-based administrative processes, which tend to omit non-material assets, or at best, devaluate them (Downing, 1996:34). In their study among affected people resettled from Mozambique’s Limpopo National Park, Witter and Satterfield (2014:1398) highlight the inability of compensation to fully capture non-material losses. They illustrate this point using socio-cultural losses experienced by affected people, showing how, in attempting to make up

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for losses, compensation measures are incapable of factoring in social benefits derived from the socio-cultural base of lost resources and assets, and the long-standing mechanisms to utilise such resources (Witter and Satterfield, 2014:1398). Their examples include the loss of access to the Makwakwa trees, which the locals valued for not only the fruits they produced – prepared using specific skills – but also for what the locals described as “saving them in times of drought and war” ibid.:1398). Owing to the fact that the practice of resettlement is a highly institutionalised, top-down process, usually with limited participation from the people on the ground, it is subject to conflicts between administrative and socio-cultural realities at grassroots level. And because of the power dynamics between implementing institutions and the forcefully resettled people, institutional values typically win over local realities and culture.

Institutional corruption is also one of the factors that have been proven to impede the already inadequate mechanism of compensation. One of the inherent, yet inhibiting features of administrative procedures is that they are subject to bureaucratic processes, commonly leading to delayed service delivery. In the process, financial mismanagement can further impede the ability of cash compensation to improve or restore living conditions in the long- term. Heggelund (2008) explores what he calls “the disappearance of money” in the Three Gorges Dam resettlement programme, where funds that were meant for the resettlement and rehabilitation of affected people were misappropriated. Supported by financial audits of the programme, over 270 million yuan meant for housing, training of the resettled people as part of the rehabilitation programme, etc., was reported to have been diverted to activities such as personnel salaries and other expenses unrelated to resettlement (Heggelund, 2008). Jackson and Sleigh (2000:236) also reveal in a similar Chinese case, what they refer to as the “China’s corruption problem”, which has also been revealed in many other large dam projects.

In a study of the Jamuna Multi-Purpose Bridge Project resettlement in Bangladesh, Al Atahar (2014:262) reflects that a number of respondents admitted to have paid between 10% to 15% of their compensation money in bribing officials to speed up the release of compensation funds – something they should have been doing anyway. In the end, the majority of respondents in Al Atahar’s study – about 90% – indicated that they were either unable to acquire land after displacement, or were unable to acquire the same size of land as they owned before (2014:262). A combination of two factors was behind the inability of some resettled people to replace land. These were the scarcity of land and the shortage of finances

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from their compensation. These factors played a particularly negative role to the extent that of the 72% of resettled households who claimed to have been significantly reliant on agriculture prior to resettlement, only 28% acquired agricultural land after resettlement (Al Atahar, 2014:263).

Where corrupt practices are rampant, the delivery of services is retarded, delaying normal access to services, unless an unofficial fee is paid to speed up the process that officials are paid to do anyway. This is a result of both the political and economic landscapes that allow corruption to thrive; because either people are extremely desperate for such services – and they often are – or there are no serious repercussions for officials who are found to have violated professional and administrative principles; or a combination of the two.

To complement compensation in the efforts to recover losses that resettled people experience, and to enable them to improve their living standards, more long-term measures are prescribed, not only in research but also in certain policies. Cernea (2009) presents mechanisms of benefit-sharing for projects, which have the potential to enable the development and improvement of the conditions of resettled people in the long-term. Van Wicklin (1999) had also earlier presented an argument for benefit-sharing in involuntary resettlement. Due to the earlier mentioned complexities associated with a lack of resources in most resettlement projects, particularly in developing countries (De Wet, 2006:186), the argument for benefit-sharing is that it enables the development of affected people, through the benefits generated from the very project that displaced them (Cernea, 2009:57; Van Wicklin, 1999:233). Not only does this have economic benefits but also have ethical implications, based on enabling equitable gains from a development project, by resettled people and those for whom a development project is constructed (Van Wicklin, 1999:234).

One of the mechanisms proposed for sharing the benefits of development projects with affected people is through the redistribution of revenue in the form of royalties to local or regional authorities (Egre, et al., 2008:318). Although the LHWP is an example of a case where royalties are received from dam revenues, the limitation is that in this particular case, this kind of benefit does not directly profit the affected people, but is part of the national revenue that contributes towards the national budget. In this regard, there are no direct, long- term and sustainable benefits exclusive to the affected groups.

Other mechanisms for benefit-sharing include giving access to economic opportunities, services or resources generated from a development project, such as electricity, irrigation,

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transport infrastructure, fishing rights, preferential employment, etc. (Egre, et al., 2008:318; Van Wicklin, 1999:241-249). The studied Chandil Dam resettlement in India provides a good example of a case where economic opportunities such as fishing rights are offered primarily to the benefit of the affected people. The earlier discussed Aswan High Dam project also exemplifies a case where the primary benefits of the project were channelled towards improving the lives of affected people, by giving access to irrigated land to the resettled people.

However, Cernea (2009:59) warns that benefit-sharing is not only a matter of resource availability but also of political will. As argued above, resettlement projects are often executed as top-down, institutionally controlled projects, heavily influenced by political powers. As such, major decisions such as sharing the benefits of development projects are typically made by high-ranking officials. Hence, where there is no political will for one reason or another, the proposed mechanisms for benefit-sharing may not be taken into consideration, even when they are economically feasible. Hence, it is significant that policies, particularly at the national level, be developed to indicate the commitment of governments to the process of responsible, constructive resettlement, as well as to enable such commitment to be put into action. With reference to the Shikou Hydro-electric Project, Trembath (2008:377) argues that where the standards of living among resettled people have been improved, it often can be attributed to the approach of implementing authorities to plan for and implement a development-driven resettlement process. Hence, the availability of resources and the will on