5.2.2.2 HORMONA DEL CRECIMIENTO

Collective-choice agreements require that the rules surrounding a CPR be determined by those who interact with that CPR and, in effect, each other. Following this principle is expected to most effectively implement the rules from the previous principle and Ostrom (1990, p. 93) writes, “CPR institutions that use this principle are better able to tailor their rules to local circumstances” by using the knowledge and expertise of those closely involved with the CPR. A major facet of collaborative governance, like that within the Zone process, is the idea that the local public are consulted and empowered when it comes to different issues and this lends itself to the collective-choice principle. If these aspects of collaborative governance are met, then in turn they would help to meet the collective-choice ideals recognized by Ostrom.

Document Analysis

Identifying collective choice through document analysis came mostly through those involved with the Nutrient limit-setting Focus Groups and from presentations given at the ZC.

71 Appendix B shows the summaries of some Focus Group meetings. The main issue of note for these Focus Groups was, logically, the limit-setting process. This topic was of such high importance because of its ramifications for land and water use in the entire catchment. Figure 16 shows the interaction of these different entities within the CWMS.

Figure 16: Draft Engagement Plan, (Environment Canterbury, 2012b)

Often, the groups were asked to assess different qualities, goals, or aspects within the catchment, and they responded by assigning corresponding red, blue, and green dots to each category depending on where they assessed each issue. The different groups could have widely differing views as illustrated by Figure 17 which shows the assessments made by various stakeholder focus groups of the likelihood of the current scenario in Canterbury achieving priority outcomes of the CWMS. These viewpoints were presented and discussed within ZC meetings by those involved with the focus groups and several members of the ZC observed, but did not participate in, the focus group assessments.

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Figure 17:Current Scenario Stakeholder Deliberation Results (Environment Canterbury, 2012c)

The ZC, although based on collaboration, did include several runanga representatives. Their representative status is different than others on the ZC, and so within the ZC’s Terms of Reference, a 75% vote would be accepted if consensus could not be reached on the

committee (Selwyn-Waihora Zone Water Management Committee: Terms of reference,

2010). Beyond that, external help would be required. It is worth noting though, that there were not enough votes to advance anything when the cultural split was considered

exclusively and this lent itself to collaboration. No votes were held during the observation periods nor were any recorded during the period of the empirical fieldwork, so this thesis cannot judge the effectiveness of the cultural split and 75% requirement.

Observations

Within the ZC the Focus Groups were discussed at each meeting, attendance of ZC members at the Groups was noted, and the summaries and stakeholder responses were included in agendas and presented to the ZC to make sure there was a viable working relationship between the two entities. Within the ZC, it was obvious that one group did have an

opportunity to have much more input into the process; the runanga. With six specific seats Key

= Disagree

= Moderately agree = Agree

73 on the ZC, they were the only representatives of an interest, officially, at the table. No other interest, even that of dairy, or farming, or of New Zealand’s fishing community had even one specified representative seat.

One group that seemed to be missing from the stakeholder groups used in the Focus Groups was that of young people, possibly those in college or university (under the age of 25) who would grow up with the sanctions designed by the current generation of decision makers. There was also little to no discussion of such interests within the ZC, although it was observed that several claims were made about doing things on behalf of young people, families and future generations. It can be said, however, that most interests present

through focus groups had a chance to have their thoughts shared. The type of impact those thoughts would have on the final recommendations was unclear. Throughout the

observation period (nine meetings) it was rare to have the entire ZC present at any ZC meeting.

Interviews

The major theme of responses was that opportunities existed to participate but that different levels of involvement were present. On the one hand, EC1 said, “I think a really good attempt has been made to incorporate all interests. That being said, there will always be arguments about whether some interests get more air time than others” and on the other hand continued, “If you’ve got a ZC with twelve people it’s going to be bloody hard to be representative of everybody”. ZC4 thought most people were given a chance to be heard, “Everyone’s had an opportunity to come in” and “I don’t believe anybody’s been shut out”. ZC7 felt similarly, “I think that I’ve been impressed with the breadth of interests that have been involved through the Focus Group process. There’s obviously an attempt by the Zone Committee to get a good breadth of representation. With fifteen people, how well can you do?”

When asked about who should be involved in managing the Lake, all interviewees

mentioned that Ngai Tahu and/or tangata whenua should play a role in the management process as they own the lake bed and have significant cultural ties to the Lake. The question was open-ended and some responses focused on the Lake and others on the catchment, or both. ZC1 commented, “it’s quite clear that (Ngai Tahu) should be involved with

management decisions” and ZC5 said that, “the ZC of course is an integral part of that and the iwi really needs to be an integral part of the ZC’s decisions” and later, “I guess the whole

74 of the community needs to be involved”. ZC6 also added, “Te Waihora Management Board have a statutory right around the Lake” and also, “Look I think that the community in a whole needs to have a say on the Lake”.

The issues over involvement were not over who should be involved but how much say those

who are involved should have. It was ZC4 who felt that, “If it was just around the Lake I would have no problems with the iwi group’s management boards having some control of the Lake. Where I start to run into problems is the idea that because a group owns the Lake bed then every decision of the catchment right up to the top, is a material consent, which they shall have input to”. ZC3 based their argument on the idea that, “Elected people from all these councils, now, have got no other business to fall back on, so I wouldn’t want [a] voted-on body dictating what farmers do. I think you’d have to have some appointees from outside the region, probably”.

Others felt that specific groups were either disenfranchised, or had poor representation within those opportunities for participation. ZC7 looked to the younger generations, “where are the young people in this whole process?” ZC1 mentioned two groups, “the recreational interests have felt more difficult to have their say,” and, “I think you could say the same about ecosystem biodiversity. People who have that as their primary interest, their views have probably been less well-represented”. Another interviewee, ZC5, had similar views, “I think the environmental and recreational groups were not always well represented and I think if they were there might have been one voice that perhaps dominated”. Two

interviewees used representation by location as something they felt was not complete, ZC6 commented, “I think what they call the Land [Lake] Settlers organization have not been as accommodated as much as they should have been” and ZC3 thought, “Yes, I think they [Lake Settlers] have [been poorly represented]. From my point of view, the area above the Main South road, right through the Alps [have been poorly represented]”.

DoC also came up in two interviews as being pushed aside or disenfranchised, especially as it related to their co-management agreement with Ngai Tahu in favor of another agreement with ECan. LU1 said, “I do think that what potentially has happened is that, I would say at the moment that the DoC feels disenfranchised”. ZC2 agreed, saying, “The one group that I’m a bit concerned about right now is DoC”. It is possible that this strained relationship is a side effect of the Treaty. One interviewee mentioned again the heavily weighted favour and/or impact of Ngai Tahu. ZC8 said, “No, I think it’s virtually been focused on Ngai Tahu

75 interest and the people it’s close to” and ZC4 felt that, “I guess a wee bit of a concern for me is that in the whole Zone process there are people living in the Zone that are a minority on the Zone Committee”.

When queried about the inclusion and influence of external interests, there was varied response. This was to identify any external entities, and highlight any that played a significant role in the rule-making process. ZC7 was unsure, “We’ve relied on local people representing all sorts of interests but have we talked to interested parties who live beyond Selwyn and Christchurch and Banks Peninsula? I don’t know that we have, no”. ZC1 mentioned a few entities other than central government; Agresearch, DairyNZ and Landcare” and ZC3 thought, “Only the agricultural. Whatever you call them”. Central

government was again included by ZC6 who added, “central government has certainly had a role and they have put money in…” and LU1 thought, “obviously Central Government, if you see those as external, they certainly play a role”.

Interviews revealed that external interests did not play a major role in the Zone outside of scientific input from consulting firms (most often locally based), an acknowledged role for central government, and input from the regional committee. The inclusion of these interests and their impacts was beyond the time and scope of this thesis to explore fully. ZC members seemed to downplay them, though, and so those outside interests’ roles could have varied.

5.2.4 Monitoring

When considering monitoring as a design principle, Ostrom’s criteria is not very strict. When studying CPR institutions, Ostrom (1990) found that those with monitors who are

accountable to the appropriators were present in successful CPR situations. This section hopes to identify the monitoring, find out who is doing the monitoring, and then determine whether or not those monitors/auditors are accountable to the appropriators. There are several types of monitoring this section will consider: First is the Lake health, second is the impact of the Lake openings and third is on a catchment level. There is also mention of institutional monitoring within the Zone. Much of the monitoring is undertaken by different entities, so those pertaining to the ZC and water quantity and quality remain the focus.

Document Analysis

Much of the documentation for official monitoring is available online from ECan’s website. Three examples of monitoring in the area are shown in Figures 18-20. First is an

76 environmental example, second is the location of groundwater wells and third is an auditing- type map of allocation zones in the region.

Figure 18: Recreational Water Quality Map (Environment Canterbury, 2013c)

Figure 19: Groundwater Quality Monitoring Wells (Environment Canterbury, 2013b)

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Figure 20: Groundwater Allocation Zones (Environment Canterbury, 2013a)

Also included online are reports from various experts in regards to water quality/quantity and lake levels. The variety, detail, and availability of monitoring as it applies to Lake environmental health at the time of this thesis varied within the Zone and around the Lake. Local universities and a joint effort between the University of Canterbury and Lincoln

University called the Waterways Centre, also contribute to the overall knowledge.

However, upon a search for accountability of the monitors, there arises a major difference

between the existing framework and Ostrom’s principles. The Environment Canterbury

(Temporary Commissioners and Improved Water Management Act 2010) (ECan Act) alters the accountability of the regional council (ECan) which does the majority of monitoring and auditing within the catchment. As a result of the ECan Act, the monitors in this CPR are not held accountable by the appropriators. The ECan Act reads,

“The purpose of this Act is to provide for the replacement of the elected members of the Canterbury Regional Council with commissioners who will act as the Council’s governing body until new elected members come into office following the next election; and provide the Council with certain powers that it does not otherwise have to address issues relevant to the efficient, effective, and sustainable management of fresh water in the Canterbury Region” (ECan Act, 2010).

78 Currently, the commissioners are accountable only to their Ministerial appointers. There is a case to be made, however, that the commissioners are better suited and/or more

knowledgeable when it comes to water management within the region and,

“The responsible Ministers must appoint commissioners who collectively have knowledge of, and expertise in relation to, the following matters: organisational change; and freshwater management; and local authority governance and management; and tikanga Maori, as it applies in the Canterbury region; and the Canterbury region and its people” (ECan Act, 2010).

That being said, even assuming momentarily that the appointed commissioners do well by the people of Canterbury, they are still not accountable to the people that they are

monitoring or auditing. After all, “A commissioner vacates office if he or she is removed by written notice given by the responsible Minister; or resigns” (ECan Act, 2010) not by votes in the region. And in fact, to lessen the accountability of the commissioners even more, the ECan Act says, “A commissioner is not liable for any act done or omitted to be done by him or her in good faith in the performance or intended performance of his or her functions, responsibilities, or duties as a commissioner” (ECan Act, 2010). Until the commissioners have been replaced by elected officials within the CPR area, this principle cannot be said to exist in the current framework, despite any failures or effective work by those appointed. It is also important to note that although the runanga members of the ZC are all accountable to their runanga, the other members of the ZC were appointed by the three local councils and it is a committee of the regional council, technically answerable only to the non-elected ECan commissioners. However, the members of the ZC are almost all people who own or have property or live within the zone.

It needs to be noted that all monitoring does not have to be specifically scientific and the ZC does play a role in politically monitoring the Water Executive at the regional level and with

that, the implementation of the programmes (Selwyn-Waihora Zone Water Management

Committee: Terms of reference, 2010). This does not help to add to the accountability of ECan commissioners, but it does give the institutions involved a path to adaptive

management in the future. It also gives some accountability in relation to the institutions surrounding the Lake as a CPR, but not elsewhere.

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Observations

Observations of the accountability of the monitors echoed that of the document analysis. Existing scientific monitoring by councils was not questioned at meetings and appeared accepted as reliable and is freely accessible, however updating information on water takes was often recommended by interviewees as a voluntary decision for farmers. Within the ZC, the issues revolved more around the limits being set and the actions that were to be taken to meet different monitoring goals.

Interviews

Most interviewees confirmed the responsibility for monitoring was ECan’s while

acknowledging a couple of other groups (e.g. universities) who perform monitoring duties but do not have the ability to sanction. Comments on monitoring varied between the three main types. Some interviewees talked exclusively about Lake environmental health, others on the opening, and others on a holistic catchment approach. ZC1 said, “ECan largely for the chemical and the water quality and quantity. DoC largely, for the bird life and I’m not too sure, a combination of DoC and Fish and Game, probably Fish and Game for the exotic

species. And now there’s COMAR4 for cultural evaluations”. Several others gave similar

answers citing ECan; ZC5 said, “Yea, ECan is pretty much involved in that,” and EC6 perhaps summed it up most accurately, “ECan do most of the monitoring but there are other

organizations that do bits and pieces”. Some of those bits and pieces were handled by DoC, Fish and Game or The Ministry of Primary Industry, as previously noted, who did different monitoring toward fish or birdlife. COMAR was mentioned twice as it is the cultural monitoring by the iwi of the Lake. The possibility of non-Maori cultural relationships and associated monitoring indices were not mentioned.

Some differences did appear, though, when prompted to speak on what the interviewees thought were the most important aspects of Lake monitoring. It was left to the interviewees whether or not to include the catchment in their monitoring commentary. ZC1 spoke about the chemical status as one major factor, “We need to know the chemical status of both the Lake and the inflows”. Another interviewee, ZC6, thought that, “clearly the lake openings are critical to the Lake”. ZC4 thought it a combination of the two previous comments, “Reduction, nutrient levels are the important one. After that, it’s really about lake level”. LU1 wanted to base monitoring on outcomes, “Well I think you need to be aware of what

80 your desired outcomes are and once you define those you need to make sure that you’ve got some indicators for each of those and you monitor those over time”. EC1 looked holistically, “I think we have to be looking at a, a kind of a, a more ecosystem-health sort of approach to measuring the Lake”. These all relate to either the ecosystem as a whole, or to the water quality and quantity. No one mentioned flounder or some other individual species as the most important factor. A holistic approach can be seen in the scenarios that target