El Hospital no cuenta con programas para el adulto mayor con

in the Netherlands East Indies.

Although Dutch-Japanese relations were entering a new phase and the Netherlands were believed to be close to achieving a breakthrough, the Netherlands and the Netherlands East Indies had different interests in their dealings with Japan. Whereas the Netherlands strongly desired to deal with Japan for the sake of commercial and political interests in the Netherlands itself, the Government of the Netherlands East Indies, especially Rochussen’s successor, Governor-General A.J. Duymaer van Twist (r.1851-1856), had little interest in matters relating to Japan.

Duymaer van Twist had not been Prime Minister Thorbecke's first choice as Governor-General. Originally in the formation of his new cabinet Thorbecke had selected George Isaäc Bruce (1803-1850) from his own province, Gelderland, to be Governor-General. Bruce, however, died before he could take up his new office. It was difficult for Thorbecke to find a new candidate. Baud was the most suitable person because of his knowledge of colonial affairs and his ability.

260 _{NA Koloniën no.5825, 8 March 1851 No. 64/H and 15 March 1851 No. 78. The king’s} approval was obtained on 17 March 1851 No. 79. (NA Koloniën no.5825). Van der Chijs, Neêrlands Streven, pp.69-70.

However, since he was a Conservative, it was expected that his appointment would cause difficulties with the king and the ministers. Therefore, because of the similarity of his and Bruce’s political ideas Van Twist was chosen as ‘Bruce’s Political Twin’. A popular and well known speaker in parliament, where he was appointed president in 1850, this quite sensitive man later on became the victim of the hard-hitting discussions in the press and Parliament in connection with the accusations uttered by the Dutch writer Multatuli against the Cultivation System on Java and the Governor-General in person. He was a moderate conservative; although a reformer in Java itself, he was not the kind of person to be inclined to pursue a strong foreign policy.261

He informed the Minister of Colonial Affairs about his opinions in these words: ‘The trading chief on Deshima, Frederick Cornelis Rose (1808-1880), had requested that he be allowed to resign after only one year and this had been accepted. Since England and the United States were trying to make contact with Japan, it was very important, and at the same time very difficult, to choose a suitable successor.’ It was difficult to explain the reasons for Rose’s resignation given the lack of reliable material, however the well known parlementarian, W.R. van Hoëvell, had insisted that ‘an efficient merchant’ would be the most suitable successor to the trading chief in Deshima and, at that time, the liberals in Parliament were appealing for an active policy to be pursued in Japan. Since Rose’s assumption of office in 1851, his skill in dealing with Japanese affairs had already been called into doubt and his functioning was summed up in the words of Van Hoëvell ‘An efficient diplomat is not always a good merchant’.262 On the other hand, it was also said that Rose submitted his resignation because he disliked living in the confined space on Deshima.263

Furthermore, according to Duymaer van Twist, it would be impossible for the Netherlands to maintain its neutrality should a dispute erupt between Japan and a foreign country. Therefore, he asked: ‘Should we take sides with an aggressor and in a sense betray our old friend, or should we take sides with

261 _{W. Verkade, Thorbecke als Oost-Nederlands patriot, Zutphen, 1974, pp.218-220. Multatuli,} Max Havelaar, of de Koffieveilingen van de Nederlandsche Handel-maatschappij, Amsterdam, 1860.

262 _{NA Koloniën no.5831, 21 March 1852 No. 100. Tijdschrift voor Neêrlandsche Indië 1850 (2),} p.78.

Japan and be obliged to become the enemy of England or the United States?’ He believed that the Netherlands should persuade the Japanese Government to acquiesce in the Western demands. Should this prove unsuccessful, ‘It would be better to give Japan up completely,’ rather than to expose the Netherlands to danger. Duymaer van Twist went on to argue that the commercial profits from the trade with Japan were not large and this trade was maintained mainly out of ‘a certain national honour or prestige.’ Moreover, he noted that he did not understand what reason people had to boast about this relationship with Japan, because it was common knowledge in every country that, in order to maintain this trade, the Dutch had to suffer very humiliating treatment at the hands of the Japanese. Furthermore, he continued, every country had its doubts about the Netherlands’ policy towards Japan and it was generally believed that the Dutch intended to made big profits, while excluding all other countries from Japanese trade. He argued that although this doubt was completely unjustified, it existed.

A fine example of the Americans’ misunderstandings over the Netherlands, is the diary of an American sailor, William Cleveland (1777-1842), who visited Nagasaki on a chartered ship in 1800. He mentions that ‘The Dutch being the only foreigners, except the Chinese, that are permitted to trade here, have it in their power to prejudice the Japanders, against any foreign nation, of whom they may be jealous, but as the Americans hold no place in India, I cannot conceive of any motives of policy that can be offered for diminishing the importance of America unless it is to make the Japanese, think they possess the most extensive Country in the Western World.’264 _{This example shows that the} Americans not only held a prejudice against the Netherlands for a long time, but also believed that the Netherlands had a certain level of influence in Asia.

The British historian W.G. Beasley also supports this view; ‘The Dutch and Chinese merchants at Nagasaki were Japan’s only regular source of information on world events, and neither were likely to view with sympathy or approval Britain’s growing power and influence east of Singapore. The Dutch,

264 _{Kanai Madoka, ‘A Diary of William Cleveland, Captain's Clerk on Board the} Massachusetts’ in: Monograph Series 1 Quezon City Institute of Asian Studies, University of the Philippines, 1965, p.20. It was translated by the same author into Japanese, ‘Kansei 12 (1800) Beisen Massachusetts-gô Nihon Nagasaki taizai nikki’ in: Yôgaku 1, Yasaka shobô, 1993, p.195.

in particular, had long used their special position in Japan to prejudice the officials against possible competitors.’265 _{Hence, Van Twist’s anxiety was} justified in a way. Against this background the Governor-General thought that it would be a good idea to make public the letter from the late King Willem II, advising Japan to open in 1844; it would serve to remove this odour of suspicion hanging over the Dutch. If it resulted in failure, ‘We cannot be blamed for this. The Japanese Government should be forced to adopt another system by military force: we can leave it without a concern about other powers that might be called in and be capable of handling this matter’.266

In response to the Governor-General’s message, the Minister of Colonial Affairs in the Netherlands, Charles Ferdinand Pahud de Montanges (1803-1873), who has been described as ‘an administrator more than a legislator, especially an administrator more than a reformer; a diligent, active administrator, but the administrator more than all other administrators stubbornly attached to the tradition,’267 _{proposed to the king that the new trading chief in Deshima should} be instructed to advise Japan to change its foreign policy. This should be done through a letter from the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies, while a copy of King Willem II's letter should be transmitted to the United States. At the same time, however, he decided to inform the Governor-General that relations with Japan were not to be broken off, and that the trading factory on Deshima was not to be closed down. In spite of the negative policy towards Japan proposed by Duymaer van Twist, Pahud made a clear case for autonomous diplomacy by the Netherlands.268