ENFERMEDAD “Siento morir de a poquitos”
7. A parte yo también le rezo mucho a Dios (17) para que mi viejito no me deje mucho
The Netherlands collected and analysed information about Perry’s expedition through the Dutch Minister to the United States, Testa. This information contributed to the formulation of a new Dutch policy for the Far East. Testa informed his Government of a report by the Secretary of the U.S. Navy that was attached to the President’s State of the Union message to Congress. 299 It said
296 NA Koloniën N.339 1852 on ‘6 January 1853 N.2’. 297 NA Koloniën no.5839, ‘A letter of 25 June in 1852’.
For a study handling the Japanese activities towards the Americans policy from the perspective of the history of information, since the Dutch information about Perry’s arrival came in Japan, Iwashita Tetsunori, Bakumatsu Nihon no jôhô katsudô –「Kaikoku」no jôhôshi (‘Japanese intelligence activities in the late Tokugawa era – the history of information about the opening of the country’), Yûzankaku, 2000.
298 NA Koloniën, ‘A letter of 25 June in 1852’.
that Perry’s squadron was fully armed for a possible confrontation. Although the mission had a peaceful character its stated intention was not to go home until it had succeeded in its purpose; and that the expedition had been strengthened in order to prevent failure.
The military strength of the American squadron was also indicated in the letter from Tailor to Von Siebold. According this letter, ‘the squadron was strong enough to make an impression, in case finally military force should be necessary. The squadron consists of eight steam ships and frigates, which are equipped with 230 cannons. You are more able than I to imagine the influence that this kind of extraordinary military power can exert on the Japanese.’300
The map made by the United States named the tip of Kannon Point,
Rubicon Point,301 a designation which shows how serious the purpose of the
American squadron was. Meanwhile, Marshall wrote to Perry, ‘and it appears to me no effort should be spared to preserve the beneficial and prosperous commerce already open with this great, extensive, and productive country (China)’ The Japan expedition, Marshall concluded, was only of secondary importance. China was the most pressing issue.’302 Actually ‘Nothing that Marshall could have said could have been more offensive to the commodore (Perry).’303 Before Perry arrived in the vicinity of Edo, he visited Ryûkyû. Through this visit, ‘Perry left the Bonins with the sense of having accomplished one of the major objectives of the expedition, undoubtedly a source of satisfaction this early in his voyages. He had been instructed to locate ports of refuge and sources of supplies for ships sailing the surrounding seas. This he had done at Naha and Port Lloyd. More important, he had found ‘suitable stopping places, for a line of mail steamers, which I trust may soon be established between some one of our Pacific ports and China.’304
300 Siebold-Archiv, ‘Mittelbiebrach/Brandenstein,Nr.III 1483’ in: Miyasaka Masahide, ‘Shîboruto to Peri no Amerika Nihon enseitai – Burandenshutain bunsyo wo chûshin ni –’ (‘Siebold and Perry’s expedition’), in Yanai Kenji, Miyazaki Michio (red.), Shîboruto to Nihon no kaikoku kindaika, p.222.
301 Katô, Kurofune ihen, p.38.
302 A Report of the Secretary of the Navy…relative to the naval expedition to Japan, pp.22-23. See Wiley, Yankees in the Land of the Gods, p.161.
303 Ibidem, p.161. 304 Ibidem, pp.211-212.
Testa’s report, furthermore, noted that the United States intended to enlarge the reach of its navy on the political consideration that other maritime powers had also reinforced their naval power. It is worth noticing that the Secretary of the U.S. Navy took special pains to point out that the south of the Pacific Ocean would be the stage of many important expeditions ten years on. Testa also mentioned the Russian advance in the Pacific and he directed the attention of the Dutch Government to four expeditions that were being prepared in the United States, as follows:
1. An expedition to explore and open Chinese waters of the North Pacific Ocean and the Bering Strait.
2. An expedition to explore part of the African continent.
3. An expedition to cruise and investigate the Plata and Parana Rivers in South America, which had recently opened to foreign trade.305
4. An expedition to explore the northern shore of Greenland.
It was thought that these expeditions might contribute to international trade, which was being stimulated by the development of new technology and by the advance of other maritime countries into undeveloped areas, especially Asia and Africa, which were expected to act as new reservoirs of commercial activity in the near future. The Russian expeditions are an example of the rapid development of international trade at that time. The attention of the Dutch Government was also drawn by an American expedition under the command of Cadwalader Ringgold (1802-1867) to conduct a hydro-graphic survey in the Indian Ocean, in Chinese and Japanese waters along the sea route between China and California, as well as in the northern Pacific Ocean and the Bering Sea area, which American merchant ships frequently visited.306 Acts of American diplomacy in Asia, especially the Perry expedition, were often reported in the Dutch newspapers. This indicates that the Dutch showed a great
305 NA Koloniën ‘A letter of 4 January 1853’. The names of places in the third expedition would be considered to be Rio de la Plata and Paraná in South America.
306 NA Koloniën no.5860, A letter of 23 December 1853 N.261/R3 on 14 February 1854 N.50. Since the United States had taken possession of California, it was planning to realize the trans-pacific steamship route. Ishii, Nihon kaikokushi, p.42.
interest in them.307
The Dutch Government expended considerable energy in trying to figure out a response to the intended expedition to Japan by the United States. The Government of the Netherlands East Indies, however, disagreed with the plans for Japan that were being made in The Hague. The Governor-General expressed various objections.308 To begin with, he asked the Minister of Colonial Affairs how could he carry out the instruction that he was preparing to fulfil, because the Dutch Government had promised its assistance to the American expedition. Next, the Governor-General, on the advice of the Council of the Netherlands East Indies, asked the Minister about his plan to dispatch a king’s ship to Japan with a definite mission. He wanted to know whether he should consider this instruction a definitive order or did it simply authorize him to carry it out, and in the latter case he would assume this authority. He pointed out that the dispatch of a warship under present conditions might arouse suspicions in Japan. Also he gave the Minister a warning that it could harm the negotiations, if these were initiated.309
Van Twist worried that Japan would think that the Netherlands was conspiring with the United States against it. In fact, when Perry negotiated with the Japanese, ‘A number of officials from the san bugyo (三奉行) offered their own analysis of the situation. It was clear to them that the American and the Dutch were ‘in collusion in a cunning plot to betray us.’’310 This may be construed as a clue that the Japanese had doubts about the Dutch, thinking that
307 In Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, the articles are seen as below, Survey no.247 (Algemeen overzicht) dated 7 September 1853; Survey no. 288 dated 18 October 1853; Survey no. 353 dated 22 December 1853; NA Colonies no. 46 dated 15 February 1854; Survey no. 47 dated 16 February 1854; NA Colonies no. 75 dated 16 March 1854; Survey no. 152 dated 3 June 1854; Survey no. 218 dated 9 August 1854; Survey no. 238 dated 29 August 1854; Survey no. 240 dated 31 August 1854; Survey no. 241 dated 1 September 1854; Survey no. 260 dated 20 September 1854; Survey no. 271 dated 1 October 1854; Survey no. 273 dated 3 October 1854; Survey no. 288 dated 18 October 1854; Survey no. 302 dated 1 November 1854; Survey no. 351 dated 20 December 1854; Survey no. 26 dated 26 January 1855; Survey no. 118 dated 29 April 1855; Survey no. 80 dated 21 March 1858 about the report on Perry’s death.
308 NA Koloniën no.5834, 17 July 1852 N.249 F1 and 22 July 1852 N.256.
309 NA Koloniën no.5838, A letter of 22 September 1852 on 15 February 1853 N.75. 310 Wiley, Yankees in the Land of the Gods, p.336.
their only purpose was to protect their own trade interest.311 This shows that Van Twist's concern was right. Against this background, the Governor-General wrote in his letter to Commodore Perry that he could not give the trading chief on Deshima definite orders urging him to assist the American plan because he had not yet been officially informed. Moreover, he stated that even if the trading chief had succeeded in the negotiations with the Japanese Government, the understanding between the United States and the Netherlands would clearly exert a disadvantageous influence on these negotiations, because the intentions of the United States were not necessarily always peaceful.312
The Minister of Colonial Affairs supplied the Governor-General with a letter to be passed on to Commander Perry in case he should visit Batavia. This letter contained regulations and pointed out what the Netherlands wanted to secure in a possible future treaty with Japan. This was a precaution against the Americans getting the idea that the Dutch Government was intentionally refraining from informing them. Furthermore, the Minister instructed the Governor-General that he was authorized to deal with this matter,313 and that any further steps taken towards the Japanese Government should be in line with the action taken by Willem II in 1844. In this way, the Minister of Colonial Affairs was clearly pursuing an active course of diplomacy towards Japan in his communications with the Governor-General, in spite of the latter's opposition to his views.
The Dutch Government also provided the Governor-General with specific directions regarding the trading chief to be appointed to Nagasaki. The directions stated that he was not to lose sight of the objective of concluding a treaty; and that he should be careful to prevent Japan from granting any privilege or concession to foreign powers which excluded the Netherlands. Furthermore he should do his best to convince Japan that it was in its own interest to abolish the isolation system, and that the Netherlands would continue to give it altruistic advice in this matter. The document continued by instructing the chief that he was to remove any misunderstandings that the
311 Iwashita Tetsunori, ‘Perî kaikô chokuzen ni okeru Date Munenari(伊達宗城) no jôhô katsudô – Bakumatsu Nihon no jôhô katsudô hoi’ in: Meiji ishinshi gakkaihô, No. 36, 2000, p.8. 312 NA Koloniën no.5838, A letter of 22 September 1852 N.406 on 22 April 1853 N.162. 313 NA Koloniën no.5838, 22 April 1853 N.162. The word ‘authorised’ was emphasized by underlining in the document.
Netherlands sought or enjoyed any exclusive privileges that might exist among other foreigners. Furthermore, concerning the Japanese request to obtain a warship from the Netherlands in order to build the Japanese navy, the Dutch Government would do nothing for the time being, however it planned to dispatch a small, unarmed steamship to Japan so as not to damage the relationship.314 This measure should be seen in the context of the Crimean War (1853-1856). As the Netherlands took a neutral position in this conflict, it had to avoid becoming involved in a possible collision between England, France and also Russia in Japan.
It was of great importance for the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies to avoid coming into conflict with any of the great powers. Moreover, as he had already received a report from the trading chief relevant to the American and Russian intentions to enter Japan, this issue was very real for him. He was not actually in favour of the active diplomacy of the Dutch Government towards Japan, and he requested the Dutch Government to take measures to deal with this matter in consideration of the advice of the Council of the Netherlands East Indies: ‘As the Council rightly advises, the supreme Government in the Netherlands has discretion in this matter’. Moreover, he said that ‘he restricted himself to waiting for such orders as the home Government might deem necessary.’ In other words he left this matter completely to the Dutch Government.315 His position in this matter is understandable, because he occupied a subordinate office, but none the less one with far-reaching powers as an executive body in the overseas territories, and the Dutch Government had to rely on this body because of the great distance between Europe and Asia. The lack of enthusiasm, or rather passive resistance, of the Netherlands East Indies Government regarding the policy of the home Government would lead to great difficulties for the realization of an effective Dutch foreign policy towards Japan.
314 NA Koloniën no.5861, 19 March 1854 N.101, Zeer Geheim.
315 NA Koloniën no.5861, A letter of 23 December 1853 on 20 March 1854 N.103/N, Zeer Geheim.