It has already been noted that aid policy is primarily the preserve of the bureaucracy. Neither the legislature nor executive provide leadership; and neither play a proactive role in defining Japan’s aid policies. This reflects the more long-standing relationship between politicians and bureaucrats, with the former playing a supportive role; their level of involvement in policy making often dictated by constituent interests.72
While individual politicians may be very influential, especially the faction leaders in the former ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), generally politicians act through parliamentary and party committees or policy groups known as zoku (tribe or caucus). Due to the long reign of the LDP as governing party, most LDP Dietmen developed expertise in a particular area of policy.73 They are thus known as zoku giins. Their interest and expertise has been extended to aid policy since this is a growing budget and is generally sector oriented (corresponding to the domestic economic domains of construction, telecommunications, health, agriculture and fisheries industries) . 74
Bureaucrats who want to press for a new aid policy or aid package that requires Cabinet approval will often consult with the specific zoku and through that process of
71 This should not be surprising given the fact that within one industry, there may be intense
competition and rivalry; and conflicting interests and policy priorities. The case of the fisheries sector in Japan reflects these problems, which are elaborated in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5.
72 While there continues to be debate about the power of the politicians versus the bureaucracy in Japan, the recent trend in academic studies has tended to argue that politicians, specifically the Liberal Democratic Party, were assuming more o f an equal partnership with, if not leading, the bureaucracy. See collection of studies in Gary D. Allinson and Yasunori Sone (eds), Political Dynamics in Contemporary Japan. It is not clear how this stands in the light o f the present shifting political alliances in Japan. For foreign policy in general, and aid policy in particular, there is agreement that policy making prerogative lies with the bureaucrats.
73 See Ellis Krauss, ‘Politics and the Policy making Process’, p.53.
74 It is important to note that politicians who are affiliated to a special policy area may try to influence aid policy decisions in line with their special interests. This can mean lobbying the potential recipient government to request projects that fall within their ‘jurisdiction’. Some bureaucrats are critical of this role because it may distort the aid relationship with the recipient. Interview, Former Director General of the Fisheries Agency, June 1993.
consultation (or nemawashi) they may secure Cabinet support75 Often this serves to put pressure on MOF, which is resistant to increasing resource allocations.76 There is also an LDP aid committee, the Special Committee for External Economic Assistance and, since December 1988, a Ministerial Conference on ODA, also initiated by the LDP to ‘overcome bureaucratic tangles and expand the LDP’s influence over aid policy’.77
The aid bureaucrat prefers not to acknowledge contact with or pressure from politicians (or politicians’ aides). Officials generally maintain that political pressure was more frequent in the past and to the extent that it does occur now they will not bow to pressure. Rather, projects are chosen on the basis of their quality as 'good' projects.78 This refers to the policy guidelines described earlier. But it overlooks the fact that diplomatic and special interest considerations are factored into the aid decision making process. These compete with budgetary and other bureaucratic considerations.
Decisions concerning aid disbursements are usually made prior to the formal involvement of the Diet or Cabinet. MOF presents its aid budget as a fa it accomplis to the Diet, which simply approves it as part of the total General Account Budget.79 Later, individual projects are sent to Cabinet for approval prior to the signing of the Exchange of Notes with the recipient government but little debate is generated at this point either. Executive and legislative powers do of course reside in the Cabinet and Diet respectively and they may assert themselves over particular policy issues. This occurs if constituent interests are at stake or if public opinion about an issue is
particularly heated (for example, as a result of press exposes of corruption as occurred with the Marcos scandals). Executive and legislative intervention also occurs when international opinion (for example, the US or Group of Seven) is pressing for action. This may result in emergency aid packages, aid policy innovation and the sweeping five-year aid doubling plans that have pushed up Japan’s aid flows since the late 1970s.
In general, lobbying of the bureaucracy by politicians takes place when individual projects are being considered for approval. Bureaucrats, in turn, need to ensure the smooth adoption of policies decided upon and this depends on the process of consultation or nemawashi. Insofar as there exists a quid pro quo relationship
75 Nemawashi (paving the way for a policy decision) is a term derived from a Japanese gardening technique where a tree is prepared for transplanting by careful binding o f the roots over a period of time. If carried out with patience and care, it results in a healthy transplanted tree.
76 This was the case with the introduction of fisheries grant aid. The policy system as described here operated under the ruling LDP (which lost power in July 1993 after 38 years in office). Under that system, a central role o f ‘clearing house’ was played by the LDP Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC). For details o f the policy making system in general, see Ellis Krauss, ‘Politics and the Policy making Process’, pp.51-2.
77 Robert M. Orr Jr., The Emergence o f Japan s Foreign Aid Power, p.22. 78 Interviews, Grant Aid Division, MOFA, December 1992 and February 1993. 79 Grant aid is funded from the government’s General Account Budget.
between politicians and bureaucrats, bureaucrats may facilitate policies important to politicians and in exchange politicians avoid causing problems for bureaucrats (for example, stalling or sabotaging the passage of specific policies).
The process of formulating and adopting the Aid Charter in 1992 required close collaboration between the bureaucracy, especially MOFA, and the Diet. This was also an example of the use of former bureaucrats in special policy groups to boost the position of MOFA. The Aid Charter remains a bone of contention as some politicians would prefer something more stringent (that is, an aid law) and some would also support a new ministry for ODA. This is strongly opposed by MOFA.
An aid law would require prior Diet approval for ODA disbursements, something which MOFA rejects as unworkable. A senior official in the Economic Cooperation Bureau argued that the idea of an aid law is not acceptable because it would be too rigid, saying: ‘We need to be able to respond flexibly to different situations’.80 MOFA also rejects the idea of a separate aid ministry or agency. According to an official in the Grant Aid Division, MOFA is best able to judge the political and diplomatic interests of Japan and how to promote these with ODA. It can thus provide a more coherent framework and rationale for ODA.81
Politicians may make representations on behalf of recipient governments with whom they have close ties. For example, some politicians belong to Dietmens Groups that promote relations with a particular country.82 Another forum where ties between Japanese politicians and other governments are cultivated is the Asia Pacific
Parliamentarians Union (APPU).83 At the annual meetings of the APPU, it is not uncommon for parliamentarians from recipient countries to solicit aid informally from their Japanese counterparts.
Politicians may also lobby on behalf of individual contractors or firms who have identified and formulated a project and stand to benefit from its execution. In exchange, the politician would receive a gift, such as contributions towards election funds.84.
80 Interview, Director, Research and Programing Division, MOFA, October 1992.
81 Interview, Grant Aid Division, MOFA, May 1993. In other interviews, aid officials in MOFA supported this position.
82 In the case of the Pacific islands, such groups exist for Papua New Guinea, Palau and the Federated States o f Micronesia.
83 This began as the Asian Parliamentary Union in 1965, essentially to forge close ties between non communist Asian countries. Japan was a leading member of the organisation. With the admission of Nauru in 1978, it became the Asian Pacific Parliamentary Union. Most Pacific island countries are now members and attend its regular meetings (two conferences and one general assembly each year).
Charter and By-Laws of the APPU.
84 The importance of ODA as a source of political funds was noted by a number of Japanese observers and ex-government officials interviewed by the author. According to a former Director General of the Fisheries Agency, ‘aid is a tempting target o f politicians (because) it is a source o f many job
Politicians are also likely to lobby on behalf of an industry within their constituency, which may benefit from aid contracts, exports derived from aid contracts, or licenses for logging, fishing or mining in a recipient country, which are awarded because of, or are otherwise related to, the disbursement of aid.85
Although there are mutually beneficial ties between politicians and their local constituents in dealing with day to day issues and problems, the status of politicians in Japan has often been tarnished by revelations of corruption and other scandals. In such cases, politicians are seen to be primarily concerned with promoting their re-election prospects and sheltering business and other special interests.86 This is reflected in the
relative power balance between the Diet and bureaucracy. More generally, the role of politicians is shaped by the nature of the Japanese electoral system, which reinforces what Kent Calder described as the ‘factional, particularistic, distributive orientation’ of Japanese politics.87
In the context of aid policy making, politicians may be a key link between the bureaucracy and private sector and add weight to a particular decision. Their effect, however, is to strengthen coordination along sectional lines between the bureaucracy and the private sector, rather than within the bureaucracy. The Prime Minister and Cabinet may exercise more encompassing powers but as a rule strong political leadership on aid policy is not evident. This allows for bureaucractic prerogative and discretion to prevail.